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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT, AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS, IN RELATION TO REBELLION, TREASO:-i',
AND SLAVERY.

following pages were not originally intended for publication, but were written by the author for his private use. H e has
printed them at the request of a few friends, to whom the opinions
therein expressed had been communicated; and he is not unaware
of several errors of the press, and of some inaccuracies of expression, which, in one or two instances, at least, modify the sense of
the statements intended to oe made. The work having been
printed, such errors can conveniently be corrected only in
the " errata." This publication was principally written in the
spring of 1862, the chapter on the operation of the Confiscation
.Act of Jnly 17th, 1862, having been subsequently added. Since
that time President Lincoln bas issued his Emancipation Proclamation, and several military orders, operating in the Free States,
under which questions have arisen of the gravest importance.
The views of the author on these subjects have been expressed
in several recent public addresses; and, if circumstances permit,
these subjects may be discussed in a future addition to this
pamphlet.
To pnivent misunderstanding, the learned reader is requested
to obse1l"e the distinction between emancipating or confiscating
sla, es, ,nd abolishing the laws which sustain slavery in the Slave
T HE
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States. The fonner mere!~· t:ike!; awny l'la,·e~ from the po,; cssion
and control of their ma~ter,-; the latter dcprh-es the inbnbit:rnt~
of those Stall's of tlw lawful right of obtaining, by purchase or
otherwise, or of holdiui:r ~i:n c;;. Emancipation or confiseatiou
operates only upon the slnn.>~ per,-onally; lint a law abolishing
the ri~ht to holtl sl:ll"e,<, in the- :-,lave :5tatcs, oper:ite:, on all citizens
residing then\ and efti.•(·tsa d1:inge of local law. ff all the horses
now in i.\Ia ~achu~ctts were to be confi~cate I, or appropriated by
government to public use, though this proceeding would change
the legal title to these horses, it would not alter the laws of .'llassachusetts as to per~onal property; nor would it tlepril'c om·
citizens of the legal ri~ht to purchase :ind use other ho1·ses.
The acts for confiscation or emancipation of enemy's ,,.Jave:,,
and the President's Proclamation of the 22d of Repternbcr, do
not abolish sl:wery as a legal institution in the States; they ::ict
upon persons held ns slaves; they alter no loc::il laws in any of
the States; they do not purport to render slnvery unlawful; they
merely seek to remo,·e sbves from the control of rebel masters.
If slavery shall cease by reason of the legal emancipation of
blaves, it will be because slaves are rcmo\'C<l ; ne,•crtbelcs , the
laws that sanction slavery may remain in full force. The death
,)f all tlle negrocs 011 a plantation wonk! result in a total loss to
the owner of so much "property ; " but that loss would not prevent the owner from buying other ncgroes, and holding them by
slave laws. Death does not inteifere with the local lnw of property. Emancipation and confiscation, in like manner, do not
necessarily inte1fere with local law establishing slavery.
The right to liberate slaves, or to remove the condition or status
of slavery, as it applies to all slaves li,·ing at any one time, or the
right to abolish slavery in the sense of liberating nll existing
slaves, is widely different and distinct from the right of repealing
or annulling the laws of States which sanction the hdlding of
slaves. State slave laws may or may not be beyond the reach
of the legisl:ith·e powers of Congress; but if they are, tliat fact

PREFACE.

iii

would not deter mine the qnestion as to the right to emancipate,
liberate, or to change the relation to their masters of slaves now
living ; nor the question as to the right of abolii-hing slavery, in
the sense in which this expression is used when it signifies
the liberation of persons now held as slaves, from the operation
of shwe laws; while these laws are still left to act on other persons who may be hereafter reduced to slavery under them.
It is not denied that the powers given to the various departments of government are in general lirnited and defined; nor is
it to be forgotten that "the powers not delegated to the United
States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." (Const.
Amendment, Art . X.) But the powers claimed for the P resident
and for Congress, in this essay, are believed to be delegated to
them respectively under the constitution, expressly or by necessary implication.
T he learned reader will also notice, that the positions taken in
this pamphlet do not depend upon the adoption of the most liberal
construction ofthe constitution, Ar t. I. Sect. 8, Cl. 1,which is deemed
by eminent statesmen to contain a distinct, substanti\'e power to
pass all laws which Congress shall judge expedient" to provide for
the cornmon defence and general we{fa1·e." This construction w:1s
h eld to be the true one by many of the original framers of the
con•t:lution and their associates; among them was George Mason
<>1' Virginia, who opposed the adoption of the constitution in the
Virginia convention, because, among other reasons, he considered
that the true construction. (See Elliott's Debates, vol. ii. 327, 328.)
Thomas Jefferson says, (Jefferson's Correspondence, vol. iv. p. 306,)
that this doctrine was maintaine<l by the Federalists as a party,
while the opposite doctrine was maintained by the Republicans
as a party. Yet it is true that several Ferleralists did not adopt
that view, but Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe,
Hamiltou1 Mason, and others, were quite at variance as to the
true intcl·pretation of that ~nch contesteil. clause. Southem
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statesmen, driaing towards the state-rights doctrines, as time
passed on, have generally adopted the strictest construction ol
the langunge of thnt clause ; but it bas not yet been authoritatively constrnecl by the Supreme Court. Whatever may be the
extent or limitation of the power conveyed in this section, it is
admitted by all that it contains the power of imposing taxes to
an unlimited amount, and the right to appropriate the money so
obtained to "the common defence and public welfare." Thus it
is obvious, that the right to appropriate private property to publie
use, and to proYicle compensation therefor, as stated in Chapter I. ; the power of Congress to confiscate enemy's property as
a belligerent right; the power of the President, as commander-incbief, as an act of wn.r, to emancipate slaves; or the power of
Congress to pass laws to aid the President, in executing his military duties, by abolishing slavery, or emancipating slaves, under
Art. I . Sect. 8, Cl. 18, as war measures, essential to save the
country from destruction, do not depend upon the construction
given to the disputed clause above cited.
I t will also be observed, that a distinction is pointed out in
these pages between the legislative powers of Congress, in time
of peace, and in time of war. Whenever the words "t!.e common
defence" are used, they are intended to refer to a time, not of constructive war, but of actual open hostility, which requires the
nation to exert its naval and military powers in self-defence, to
save the government and the country from destruction.
The Introduction, and Chapters I. and VIII., should be read in
connection, as they relate to the same subject; and the reader will
bear in mind that, in treating of the powers of Congress in the
first chapter, it is not asserted that Congress have, wit!.01,t any
public necessity justifying it, the right to appropriate private property of any kind to public use. T here must always be a justifiable cause for the exercise of every delegated power of legislation.
I t is not maintained in these pages th::it Congress, ~n t ime of
peace, has the r ight to abolish slavery in the States, by passing
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laws rendering the liolcling of any slaves therein illegal, so long as
slavery is merely a household or fau:ily, or domestic institution·
and so long as its existence and operation are confined to the
States where it is found, and concern exclu.sively the domestic
affairs of the Slave States; and so long as it does not conflict
with or affect the rights, interests, duties, or obligations which
appertain to the ajfafrs of the nation, nor impede the execution
of the laws nnd constitution of the United States, nor conflict with the rights of citizeus under them. Yet cases might
arise in which, in time of peace, the abolishment of slavery
might be necessary, and therefore would be lawful, in order to
enable Congress to carry into effect some of the express provisions of the constitution, as for example, that contained in Art.
I V. Sect. 4, CI. 1, i11 which the U nitecl States guarantee to every
State in this U niou a republican form of government; or that
contained in Art. IV. Sect. 2, CI. 1, which provides that citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.
It is asserted in this essay that, when the institution of slavery
n o longer concerns only the household or family, and no longer
continues to he a matter exclusively appertaining to the domestic
affairs of the State in which it exists; wheu it becomes a potent,
operative, and efficient instrument for carrying on war ngainst the
Union, and an important aid to the public enemy; when it
opposes the national military powers now involved in a gigan,
tic rebellion; when slavery bas been Jeveloped into a vast,
an overwhelming war power, which is actually used by armed
t raitors for the overthrow of government and of the constitution; when it has become the origin of cidl war, and tlie
means by which hostilities are maintained in the deadly struggle
of the U uion for its own existence; when a local institution
is perverted so as to compel three millions of loyal colored subj ect s to become belligerent trnitors because they are held as
slaYes of disloyal masters, - them indeed. slavery has become an
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affair most deeply 11ffecting the national welfare and common
defonce, and has subjected itself to the severest enforcement of
those legislati,·e 11nd military power~, to which alone, 11nne1·
the constitution, the people must look to save themselves
from ruin. In the last extremity of our coutest, tbe question must be decided whether slavery shall be rooted up
and extirpated, or our beloved country be torn asunder and
given up to onr conquerors, onr Union clestroyen, and our people
dishonored? Arc any rights of property, or 11ny claims, which
one person can assume to luwe over another, by whatever local
law they may be sanctioned, to be held, by any just construction of
th<' constitntion, as superior to the nation's right of self-defence?
And can the local usage or law of any section of this country
o,·erri<le and break down the obligation of the people to maintain
and perpetuate their own government? Slavery is no longer
local or rlomestie after it ha;; become an engine of war. The
country demands, at the hands of Congress and of the President,
the exercise of e,·ery power they can lawfully put forth for ils
destruction, not as /lit object of the war, but as a means of terminating the rebellion, if by ,lc1,troying slavery the republic may be
s:wed. These considerations and others have led the author to
the conclusion stated in the following pages, "that Congress
ha~ tho right to abolish slavery, when in time of war its abolishment is necessary to airl the comm:tn1lcr-in-chief in maintaining
the 'common defence.'"

W . W.

CONSTITUTION
OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

INTRODUCTION.
'rflE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT WAS FOUNDED.

THE Constitution of the United States, as declared in
the preamble, was ordained and established by the
people, "in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the
common defence, promote the general welfare, ancl
secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their
posterity."
HOW IT HAS BEEN VIOLATED.

A handful of slave-masters have broken up that Union,
have overthrown justice, and have destroyed domestic
tranquillity. Instead of contributing to the common
defence and public welfare, or securing the blessings of
liberty to themselves and their posterity, they have
waged war upon their country, and have attempted to
establish: over the ruins of the Republic, an aristocratic
government founded upon Slavery.
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
"'!'HE INSTITUTION" vs. THE CONSTITUTION.

It is the conviction of many thoughtfnl persons, that

slavery has now become practically irreconcilable with
republican institutions, and that it constitutes, at the
present time, the chief obstacle to the restoration of
the Union. They know that slavery can triumph only
by overthrowing the republic; they believe that the
republic can triumph only by overthrowing slavery.
"'!'HE PRIVILEGED CLASS."

Slaveholding communities constitute the only "priVltleged class" of persons who have been admitted into the
Union. They alone have the right to vote for their
praperty as well as for themselves. In the free States
citizens vote only for themselves. The former are
allowed to count, as part of their representative numbers, three fifths of all slaves. If this privilege, which
was accorded only to the original States, had not been
extended ( contrary, as many jurists contend, to the
true intent and meaning of the constitution) so as to
include other States subsequently formed, the stability
of government would not have been seriously endangered by the temporary toleration of this "institution,"
although it was inconsistent with the principles which
that instrument embodied, and revolting to the sentiments cherished by a people who had issued to the
world the Declaration of Independence, and had fought
through the revolutionary war to vindicate and maintain the rights of man.
UNEXPECTED GROWTH OF $LAVERY.

The system of involuntary servitude, which had
received, as it merited, the general condemnation of
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the leading southern and northern statesmen of the
country, - of those who were most familiar with its
evils, and of all fair-minded persons throughout the
wor1d, - seemed, at the time when our government was
founded, about to vanish and disappear from this continent, when the spinning jenny of Crompton, the loom
of Wyatt, the cotton gin of Whitney, and the manufacturing capital of Eng1and, combined to create a new
and unlimited demand for that which is now the chief
product of southern agriculture.
uddenly, as if by
magic, the smouldering embers of slavery were rekindled, and its flames, like autumnal fires upon the
prairies, have rapidly swept over and desolated the
southern states; and, as that local, domestic institution,
which seemed so likely to pass into an ignominious and
unlamented grave, has risen to c1aim an unbounded
empire, hence the present generation is called upon to
solve questions and encounter dangers not foreseen by
our forefathers.

..

SLAVERY ADOLTSEIED DY EUROPEA:S- GOVl:RXMENTS.

In other countries the scene has been reversed.

France, with unselfish patriotism, abolished slavery in
1794; and though Napoleon afterwards reestablished
servitude ii). most of the colonies, it was :finally abolished
in 1848. England has merited and received her highest
tribute of honor from the enlightened nations of the
world for that great act of Parliament in 1833, whereby
she proclaimed universal emancipation.
In 1844, King Oscar informed the Swedish states of
his desire to do away with involuntary servitude in his
dominions; in 1846 tlie legislature provided the peen-
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niary means for carrying that measure into effect; and
now all the slaves have become freemen.
Charles VIII., King of Denmark, celebrated the anniversary of the birth of the Queen Dowager by abolishing slavery in his dependencies, on the 28th of
July, 1847.
In 1862, Russia has consummated the last and grandest
act of emancipation of modern times.*
While Europe has thus practically approved of the
leading principle of the American constitution, as
founded on justice, and as essential to public welfare,
the United States, as represented by the more recent administrations, have practically repudiated and abandoned
it. Europe, embarrassed by conservative
,., and monarchical institutions, adopts the preamble to that instru.
ment, as a just exposition of the true objects for which
governments should be established, and accordingly
abolishes slavery - .while, in this country, in the mean
time, slavery, having grown strong,seeks by open rebellion to break up the Union, and to abolish republican democracy.
SLAVERY 1N 1862 NOT SLAVERY IN 1788.

However harmless that institution may have been in
1788, it is now believed by many, that, with few but
honorable exceptions, the slave-masters of the prese11 t
day, tlie privileged class, cannot, or will not, conduct them::-elves so as to render it longer possible, by peaceable
association ,vith them, to preserve " the Union," to
"establish justice," "insure domestic tranquillity, the
general welfare, the common defence, or the blessings
of liberty to ourselves or our posterity." And since the
wid~-spread but secret conspiracies of traitors in the
• To the above examples we must add that of the Dutch West Indies,
where the law ema:-icipating th e slaves goes into operation in July, 1863.
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el:we states for the last thirty years; their hatred of the
Union, and determination to destroy it; their abhorrence of republican institutions, and of democratic
government; their preference for an "oligarchy with
slavery for its corner stone," have become known to the
people, - their causeless rebellion; their seizure of the
territory and property of the United States; their siege
of Washington; their invasion of States which have
refused to join them ; their bitter, ineradicable, and
universal hatred of the people of the free States, and
of all who are loyal to the government, have produced
a general conviction that slavery ( which alone has
cansed these results, and by which alone the country
has been brought to the verge of ruin) must itself be
terminated; and that this" privileged class" mitst be abolislted; otherwise the unity of the American people must
be destroyed, the government overthrown, and constitutional liberty abandoned.
To secure domestic tranquillity is to make it certain
by controlling power. It cannot be thus secured while
a perpetual uncontrollable cause of civil war exists.
The cause, the means, the opportunity of civil war must
be removed; the perennial fountain of all our national
woes must be destroyed; otherwise " it will be in vain
to cry; Peace ! peace ! There is no peace."
ARE SLAVEHOLDERS ARBITERS 0~' PEACE AND WAR/

Is the Union so organized that the means of involving
the whole country in ruin must be left in the hands of
a small privileged class, to be used at their discretion ?
Must the blessing of peace and good government be
dependent upon the sovereign will and pleasure of a
handful of treasonable and unprincipled slave-masters?
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Has the constitution bound together the peaceable
citizen with the insane assassin, so that his murderous
knife cannot lawfully be wrenched from his grasp even
in self-defence ?
If the destruction of slavery be necessary to save
the country from defeat, disgrace, and ruin, -and if, at
the same time, the constitution guarantees the perpetuity of slavery, whether the country is saved or lost,
- it is time that the friends of the government should
awake, and realize their awful destiny. If the objects
for which our government was founded can lawfully be
secured only so far ns they do not interfere with the
pretensions of slavery, we must admit that the interests of slave-masters stand first, and the welfare of the
people of the United States stands last, under the
guarantees of the constitution. If the Union, the constitution, and the laws, like Laocoon and bis sons, are
to be strangled and crushed, in order that the unrelenting serpent may live in trinmph, it is time to
determine which of them is most worthy to be saved.
Such was not the Union formed by our forefathers.
Such is not the Union the people intend to preserve.
They mean to uphold a Union, under the con:stitution,
interpreted by common sen:se; a government able to attain
results worthy of a great and free people, and for which
it was founded; a t'epublic, representing the sovereign
majesty of the whole nation, clothed with ample powers
to maintain its supremacy forever. They mean that
liberty and union shall be "one and inseparable."
WHY SLAVERY, THOUGH HA'fED, WAS TOLERATED.

It is true, that indirectly, and for the purpose of a more
equal di,stribution of di,.ect taxes, the framers of the ccn-
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stitution tolerated, while they condemned slavery; but
they tolerated it because they believed that. it would
soon disappear. They even refused to allow the charter of their own liberties to be po11uted by the mention
of the word "slave." Having called the world to witness
their heroic and unselfish sacrifices for the vindication
of their own inalienable rights, they could not, consistently with honor or self-respect, transmit to future
ages the evidence that some of them had trampled
upon the inalienable rights of others.
RECOGNITION OF SLAVERY NOT lNCONSIS'rENT WITH THE PERPETUI'.rY OF THE REPUBLIC.

Though slavery was thus tolerated by being ignored,
we should dishonor the memory of those who organized
that government to suppose that they did not intend
to bestow upon it the power to maintain its own
authority- the right to overthrow or remove slavery,
or whatever might prove fatal to its permanence, or
destroy its usefulness. We should discredit the good
sense of the great people who ordained and established
it, to deny that they bestowed upon the republic, createc! uy and for themselves, the right, the duty, and the
powers of self-defence. For self-defence by the government was only maintaining, through the people's agents,
the right o{ the people to govern themselves.
DIS'rINCTION BETWEEN THE OBJECTS AND THE MEANS OF WAR.

We are involved in a war of self-defence.
It is not the ob.feet and purpose of our hostilities to
lay waste lands, burn bridges, break up railroads,
tiink ships, blockade harbors, destroy commerce, capture, imprison, wound, or kill citizens; to seize, appro2
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priate, confiscate, or destroy private property; to
interfere with families, or domestic institutions; to
remove, employ, liberate, or arm slaves; to accnmulate national debt, impose new and burdensome taxes;
or to cause thousands of loyal citizens to be slain in
battle. But, as means of carrying on tlte contest, it has become necessary and lawful to lay waste, burn, sink, destroy, blockade, wound, capture, and kill; to accumulate
debt, lay taxes, and expose soldiers to the peril of deadly
combat. Such are the ordinary results and incidents of
war. If, in further prosecuting hostilities, the liberating,
employing, or arming of slaves shall be deemed convenient for the more certain, speedy, and effectual overthrow of the enemy, the question will arise, whether
the constitution prohibits those measures as acts of
legitimate war against rebels, who, having abjured that
constitution and having openly in arms defied the government, claim for themselve~ only the rights of belligerents.
I t is fortunate for America, that securing the liberties
of a great people by giving freedom to four millions of
bondmen would be in a.ccordance with the dictates of
justice and humanity. If the preservation of the Union
required the enslavement of four millions of freemen,
very different considerations would be presented.
LIBERAL AND S'rRIC'r CONSTR UC'rIONIS'rS.

The friends and defenders of the constitution of the
United States of America, ever since its ratification,
have expressed widely different opinions regarding the
limitation of the powers of government in time of
peace, no less than in time of war. Those who hnve
conten led for the most narrow and technical construe-
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tion, having stuck to the letter of the text, and not
appreciating the spirit in which it was framed, are
opposed to all who view it as only a frame of government, a plan-in-outline, for regulating the a:ft'tirs of an
enterprising and progressive nation. Some treat that
frame of government as though it were a cast-iron
mould, incapable of adaptation or alteration- as one
which a blow would break in pieces. Others think it a
hoop placed around the trunk of a living tree, whose
growth must girdle the tree, or burst the hoop. But
sounder judges believe that it more resembles the tree
itself,- native to the soil that bore it, - waxing strong
in sunshine and in storm, putting for~h branches, leaves,
and roots, according to the laws of its own growth, and
flourishing with eternal verdure. Our constitution, like
that of England, contains all that is required to adapt
itself to the present and future changes and wants of
a free and advancing people. This great nation, like a
distant planet in the solar system, may sweep round a
wide orbit; but in its revolutions it never gets beyond
the reach of the central light. The sunshine of constitutional law illumines its pathway in all its changing
positions. We have not yet arrived at the "dead point"
where the hoop must burst-the mould be shatteredthe tree girdled- or the sun shed darkness rather than
light. By a liberal construction of the constitution, our
government has passed through many storms unharmed.
Slaveholding States, other than those whose inhabitants
originally formed it, have found their way into the
Union, notwithstanding the guarantee of equal rights
to all. The territories of Florida and Louisiana have
been purchased from European powers. Conquest has
added a n<ttion to our borders. 'rhe purchased and the
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conquered regions are now legally a part of th~ United
States. The admission of new Sta,tes containing a privileged class, the incorporation into our Union of a foreign people, are held to be lawful and valid by all the
courts of the country. Thus far from the old anchorage haYe we sailed under the flag of" public necessity,"
"general welfare," or" common defence." Yet the great
charter of our political rights "still lives;" and the
q nestion of to-day is, whether that instrument, which
has not prevented America from acquiring one country
by purchase, and another by conquest, will permit her
to save herself.?
POWERS WE SHOULD EXPECT TO FIND.

If the ground-plan of our government was intended
to be more than a temporary expedient, -if it was designed, according to the declaration of its authors, for a
perpetual Union, - then it will doubtless be found, upon
fair examination, to contain whatever is essential to
carry that design into effect. Accordingly, in addition
to provisions for adapting it to great changes in the
situation and circumstances of the people by amendments, we find that powers essential to its own perpetuity are vested in the executive and legislative
departments, to be exercised aceording to thei,r discretion,
for the good of the country - powers which, however
dangerous, must be intrusted to every government, to
enable it to maintain its own existence, and to protect
the rights of the people. Those who founded a goverment for themselves intended that it should never be
overthrown; nor even altered, except by those under
whose authority it was established. Therefore they
gave to the President, and to Congress, the mean8
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essential to the preservation of the republic, but none
for its dissolution.
LAWS FOR PEACE, AND LAWS FOR WAR.

Times of peace have required the passage of numerous statutes for the protection and development of
agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial industry,
and for the suppression and punishment of ordinary
crimes and offences. A state of general civil war in
the United States is, happily, new and unfamiliar.
These times have demanded new and unusual legisfation to call into action those powers which the constitution provides for times of war.
Leaving behind us the body of laws regulating the
rights, liabilities, and duties of citizens, in time of public
tranquillity, we must now turn our attention to the
RESERVED and HITHERTO UNUSED powers contained in the
constitution, which enable Congress to pass a body of
laws to regulate the rights, liabilities, and duties of
citizens in time of war. We must enter and explore
the arsenal and armory, with all their engines of defence,
enclosed, by our wise forefathers for the safety of the
republic, within the old castle walls of that constitution ; for now the garrison is summoned to surrender;
and if there be any cannon, it is time to unlimber and
run them out the port-holes, to fetch up the hot shot,
to light the match, and hang out our banner on the
outer walls.
THE UNION IS GON E FOREVER U ' THE CONS'.rlTUTION DENIES THE
POWER TO SAVE IT.

The question whether republican constitutional government shall now cease in America, must depend upon
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the construction given to these hiilierto unused puwets.
Those who desire to see an end of this government
will deny that it has the ability to save itsel£ Many
new inquiries have arisen in relation to the existence
and limitation of its powers. Must the successful
prosecution of war against rebels, the preservation of
national honor, and securing of permanent peace,-if
attainable only by rooting out the evil which caused
and maintains the rebellion, - be effected by destroying rights solemnly guaranteed by the constitution
we are defending? If so, the next question will
be, whether the law of self-defence and overwhelming necessity will not justify the country in denying
to rebels and traitors in arms whatever rights they
or their friends may claim under a charter which
they have repudiated, and have armed themselves to
overthrow and destroy ? Can one party break the
contract, and justly hold the other party bound by it?
Is the constitution to be so interpreted that rebels and
traitors cannot be put down ? Are we so hampered, as
some have asserted, that even if war end in reestablishing the Union, and enforcing the laws over all the
land, the results of victory will be turned against us,
and the conquered enemy may then treat us as though
they had been victors? Will vanquished criminals be
able to resume their rightc, to the same political superiority over the citizens of Free States, which, as the
only "privileged class," they have hitherto enjoyed?
Have they who alone have made this rebellion, while
committing treason and other high crimes against the
republic, a protection, an immunity against punishment
for these crimes, whether by forfeiture of life or property, by reason of any clause in the constitution? Can
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government, the people's agent, wage genuine and effectual war against their enemy? or must the soldier of
the Union, wben in action, keep one eye upon his rifle,
and the other upon the constitution? Is the power to
make war, when once lawfully brought into action, to
be controlled, baffled, and emasculated by any obligation to guard or respect rights set up by or for belligerent traitors?
THE LEADING QUESTIONS STATED.

What limit, if any, is prescribed to the war-making
power of the President, as Oommander-i'n-Olzi'ef of the
army and navy of the United States? What authority
has Congress to frame laws interfering with the ordinary civil rights of persons and property, of loyal or
disloyal citizens, in peaceful or in rebellious districts;
of the enemy who may be captured as spies, as pirates,
as guerrillas or bush-whackers; as aiders and comforters
of armed traitors, or as soldiers in the battle-field?
Wbat rights has Congress, or the President, in relation
to belligerent di'stri'cts of country; in relation to slaves
captured or escaping into the lines of our army, or
escaping into Free States; or slaves used by the enemy
in military service ; or those belonging to rebels, not
so used? Whether they are contraband of war? and
whether they may be released, manumitted, or emancipated, and discharged by the civil or military authority?
or whether slaves may be released from their obligation
to serve rebel masters? and whether slavery may be
abolished with or without the consent of the masters,
as a military measure, or as a legislative act, required
by the public welfare and common defence? Where
the power to abolish it resides, under the constitution 1
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And whether there is any restraint or limitation upon
the power of Congress to punish treason ? What are
the rights of government over the private property of
loyal citizens? What are the rights and liabilities of
traitors? These and similar inquiries are frequently
made among the plain people; and it is for the purpose of explaining some of the doctrines of law applicable to them, that the following suggestions have been
prepared.

PUilLIC USE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY.
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CHAPTER I.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT TO APPROPRIATE PRIVATE PROPERTY TO PUBLIC USE, EITHER
IN TIME OF PEACE OR IN TIME OF WAR.

The general government of the United Staies has, in
tirne of peace, a "legal right, under the constitutwn, to appropriate to public use the private property of any subject, or
of any number of subjects, owing ii, allegiance.
Each of the States claims and exercises a similar
right over the property of its own citizens.
THE RIGB'J' IS FOUNDED IN REA.SON.

All permanent governments in civilized countries
assert and carry into effect, in different ways, the
claim of "eminent domain;" for it is essential to
their authority, and even to their existence. The
construction of military defences, such as forts, arsenals, roads, navigable canals, however essential to the
protection of a country in war, might be prevented by
private ·interests, if the property of individuals could
not be taken by the country, through its government.
Internal improvements in time of peace, however important to the interests of the public, requiring the
appropriation of real estate belonging to individuals,
might be interrupted, if there were no power to take,
without the consent of the owner, what the public use
requires. And as it is the government which protects
l;l.11 citizens in their rights to life, liberty, and property,
they are deemed to hold their property subject to the
3
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claim of the supreme protector to take it from them
when demanded by "public welfare." It is under this
quasi sovereign power that the State of Massachusetts
seizes by law the private estates of her citizens; and
she even authorizes several classes of corporations to
seize land, against the will of the proprietor, for public
use and benefit. Railroads, canals, turnpikes, telegraphs, bridges, aqueducts, could never have been
constructed were the existence of this great right
denied. And the TITLE to that interest in real estate,
which is thus acquired by legal seizure, is deemed by
all the courts of this commonwealth to be as legal, and
as constitutional, as if purchased and conveyed by deed,
under the hand and seal of the owner.
INDEMNITY IS REQUIRED.

But, when individuals are called upon to give up
what is their own for the advantage of the community, justice requires that they should be fairly compensated for it: otherwise public burdens would be
shared unequally. To secure the right to indemnifi,
cation, which was omitted in the original constitution
of the United States, an amendment was added, which
provides, (Amendments, Art. V, last clause,)" Nor shall
1n-ivate propedlJ be taken for public use witlwut just compenr
sation." *
The language of this amendment admits the right of
the United States to take private property for public
use. This amendment, being now a part of the consti•
tution, leaves that right no longer open to question, if
it ever was questioned.
• Similar provisions are found in the constitution of Massachusetts, and
several other states.
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In guarding against the abuse of the right to t.\ke
private property for public use, it is provided that the
owner shall be entitled to be fairly paid for it; and
thus he is not to be taxed more tlzan his due share for
public purposes.
It is not a little singular that the framers of the
constitution should have been less careful to secure
equality in distributing the burden of taxes. Sect. 8
requires duties, z'.mposts, and excises to be uniform through_
out the United States, but it does not provide that taxes
should be uniform. Although Art. I., Sect. 9, provides
that no capitation or other direct tax shall be laid unless
in proportion to the census, yet far the most important
subjects of taxation are still unprotected, and may be
UNEQUALLY assessed, without violating any clause of
that constitution, which so carefully secures equality
of public burdens by providing compensation for private property appropriated to the public benefit.
"PUBLIC USE."

What is "public use" for which private property ma.y
be taken?
Every appropriation of property for the benefit of the
United States, either for a national public improvement,
or to carry into effect any valid law of Congress for the
maintenance, protection, or security of national interests, is "public use." Public itJe is contradistinguished
from private itJe. That which is for the use of the count?'IJ,
however applied or appropriated, is for public use.
· Public use does not require that the property taken
shall be actually used. It may be disitJed, removed, or
destroyed. And destruction of private property may be
the best public use it can be put to.
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Suppose a bridge, owned by a private corporatio11,
were so located as to endanger a military work upon
the bank of a river. The destructwn of that bridge to
gain a military advanta,ge would be appropriating it to

public use.

So also the blowing up or demolition of buildings in
a city, for the purpose of preventing a general conflagration, would be an appropriation of them to public
use. The destruction of arms, or other munitions of war,
belonging to private persons, in order to prevent their
falling into possession of the enemy, would be applying
them to public use. Congress has power to pass ln.ws
providing for the common defence and general welfare,
under Art. I. Sect. 8 of the constitution ; and whenever,
in their judgment, the common defence or genernl
welfcuie requires them to authorize the appropriation of
private property to public use, - whether that use be
the emphlJnient or destruction of tlze property taken, - they
have the right to pass such laws; to appropriate private property in that way; and whatever is done with
it is" public use," and entitles the owner to just compensation therefor.
AL!. KINDS OF PROPERTY, INCLUDING SLAVJ<:S, MAY Bl~ SO APl'.ROPRIATED.

There is no restriction as to the kind or cliaracter of
private property which may be lawfully thus appropriated, whether it be real estate, personal estate, rights
in action or in possession, obligatwns for 11io1U!/J, or for
tabor and service. Thus the obligations of minor children to their parents, of apprentices to their master',
and of other persons owing labor and service to their
mastNs, may lawfully be appropriated to public use, 0 1·
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discharged and destroyed, for public benefit, by Congress, with the proviso that just compenRation shall be
allowed to the parent or master.
Our government, by treaty, discharged the claims
of its own citizens against France, and thus appropriated private property to public use. At a later
date the United States discharged the claims of certain
slave owners to labor and service, whose slaves had
been carried away by the British contrary to their
treaty stipulations. In both ca.ses indemnity was
promised by our government to the owners; and in
case of the slave masters it was actually paid. By
abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia, that
which was considered for the purposes of the act as
private property was appropriated to public use, with
just compensation to the owners; Congress, in this
instance, having the right to pass the act as a local,
municipal law; but the compensation was from the
treasury of the United States.
During the present rebellion, many minors, a,pprentices, and slaves have been relieved from obligation to
their parents and masters, the claim for their services
having been appropriated to public use, by employing
them in the military service of the country.
That Congress should have power to appropriate cver11
dcscnption of private property for public benefit in time
of war, results from the dut11 imposed on it by the
constitution to pass laws "providing for the common
defence and general welfare."
Suppose that a large number of apprentices desired
to join the army as volunteers in time of sorest need,
hut were restrained from RO doing only by reason of
their owing labor and service to their employers, who
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were equally with them citizens and subjects of this
government; would any one doubt or deny the right
of government to accept these apprentices as soldiers, to discharge them from the obligation of their
indentures, providing jnst compensation to their employers for loss of their services ? Suppose that
these volunteers owed labor and service for life, as
slaves, instead of owing it for a term of years ; what
difference could it make as to the right of government
to use their services, and discharge their obligations,
or as to the liability to indemnify the masters ?
The right to use the services of the minor, the
apprentice, and the slave, for public benefit, belongs
to the United States. 'l'he claims of all American
citizens upon their services, whether by local law, or
by common law, or by indentures, can be annulled by
the same power, for the same reasons, and under the
same restrictions that govern the appropriation of any
other private property to public use.
"
l'HE UNITED STATES MAY REQUffiE A LL SUnJECTS

nu•ry.

•ro

DO MILITARY

Slaves, as well as apprentices and minors, are
equally sub.fects of the United States, whether they
are or are not citizens thereof. The government of
the United States has the right to call upon all its
subjects to do military duty. If those who owe labor
and service to others, either by contract, by indenture, by common or statute law, or by local usage,
could not be lawfully called upon to leave their employments to serve their country, no inconsiderable
portion of the able-bodied men would thus be ex
empt, and the constitution and laws of the land
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providing for calling out the army and navy wol.ld be
set at nought. But the constitution makes no such
exemptions from military duty. Private rights cannot
be set up to overthrow the claims of the country to
the services of every one of its subj ects who owes it
allegiance.
How far the United States is under obligation to
compensate parents, masters of apprentices, or masters
of slaves, for the loss of service and labor of those
subjects who are enlisted in the army and navy, has
not been yet decided.* The constitution recognizes
slaves as "persons helil to 'labor or service." So n.lso are
apprentices and minor children " persons held to labor
and service." And, whatever other claims may be set
up, by the laws of either of the slave states, to any
class of "persons," the constitution recognizes only the
claim of individuals to tlie 1,abor and service of other individuals. It seems difficult, therefore, to state any
sound principle which should require compensation in
one case and not in the other.
WILL SLAVEHOLD};RS BE ENTITLED TO INDEMNITY TF TIIEIR SLAVES
ARE USED •'OR MILITARY PURPOSES?

It is by no means improbable, that, in the emergency
which we are fast approaching, the right and duty
of the country to call upon all its loyal sul>jects to aid
in its military defence will be deemed paranwunt to tlze
claims of any private person upon such subjects, and that the
• If au apprentice enlist in tho army, the courts "ill not, upon n habeas
corpus, issued at the relation of the master, ,·emand the apprentice to his
custody, if he be w1willi11g to return, but will leave the master to his suit
against the officer, who, hy Stat. 16 Mar. 1802, was forbidden to enlist him
•vithout the master's consent. Commonwealth v. Robin$011, 1 S. & R. 353 ;
Commnnwealtl1 v. Han-is, 7 P a. L. J. 283.
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loss of 1,abor and service of certain citizens, like the luss
of life ahd property, which always attends a state of
war, must be borne by those upon whom the misfortune
happens to fall. It may become one of the grea,t political questions hereafter, whether, if slavery should as ti
civil act in time of peace, or by treaty in time of war,
be wholly or partly abolished, for public benefit, or public defence, such abolishment is an appropricdion of privcde
property for public use, wiihin the meaning of the constitution.
INDEMNITY TO MORMONS.

The question ha,s not yet arisen in the courts of the
United States, whether the act of Congress, which,
under the form of a statute against polygamy abolishes
Mormonism, a domestic institution, sustained like slavery
only by local law, is such an appropriation of the claims
of Mormons to the labor and service of their wives as
requires just compensation under the constitution ? A
decision of this question may throw some light on the
point now under consideration.
~:FFEC'r 01'' NATURALIZATION AND M'J'.LITIA LAWS ON THE QUES·
TION OF INDEMNITY TO SLAVE-MASTERS.

A further question may arise as to the application
of the "compensation" clause above referred to. Congress has the power to pass naturalization laws, by Art.
I. Sect. 8. This power has never been doubted. The
only question is, whether this power is not exclusive.'~
Congress may thus give the privileges of citizenship to
• See Chirac v. Oliimc, 2 Whea. 269; U. S. v. Villato, 2 Dall. 372;
Thirlow v. Mass., 5 How. 585; S1nitlt v. Turne,-, 7 ib. 556; Golrkn v. Prince,

3 W. C. C. Reports, 314.
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any persons whatsoever, black or white. Colored men,
having been citizens in some of the States ever since they
were founded, having acted as citizens prior to 1788 in
various civil and military capacities, are therefore citizens of the United States.*
Under the present laws of the United States, according to the opinion of the attorney-general of Massachusetts, colored men are equally with white men 1·eqziired to
be enrolled in the militia of the United States, t although
such was not the case under the previous acts of 1792
and 1795. "The general government has authority to
determine who shall and who may not compose the
militia of the United States; and having so determined,
the state government has no legal authority to prescribe
a different enrolment.! If, therefore, Congress exercise
either of these undoubted powers to grant citizenslzip to
all colored persons residing or coming within either
of the States, or to pass an act requiring the enrolment
of all able-bodied persons within a prescribed age,
whether owing labor and service or not, as part of
tlie militia of the United States, and thereby giving to all,
as they become soldiers or seamen, their freedom from
obligations of labor and service, except military labor
and service, then the question would arise, whether
government, by calling its own subjects and citizens
into the military service of the country, in case of overwhelming necessity, could be required by the constitution to recognize the private relations in which the
soldier might stand, by local laws, to persons setting up

)

* See case of JJred Scott; which in no part denies that if colored men
were citizens of either of the states which adopted the constitution, they
were citizens of the United States.
t ~ee Stat. U. S. July 17, 1862.
t 8 Gray's R. 615.
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claims against him ? If white subjects or citizens, owe
labor and service, even by formal indentures, such
obligations afford no valid excuse against the requisition
of government to have them drafted into the militia to
serve the country. The government does not compensate
those who claim indemnity for the loss of such "labor
and service." Whether the color of the debtor, or the
length of time during which the obligation (to labor and
service) has to run, or the evidence by which the existence
of the obligation is proved, can make an essential difference between the different kinds of labor and service,
remains to be seen. The question is, whether the
soldier or seaman, serving his country in arms, can be
deemed private property, as recognized in the constitution
of the United States?
DOES 'rIIE WAR POWER OF SEIZURE SUPERSEDE THE CIVIL POWER
OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PRIVA'l'E PROPERTY ·ro PUBLIC
USE?

That the property of any citizen may, under certain
circumstances, be seized in time of war, by military officers,
for public purposes, is not questioned, j ust compensation
being offered, or provided for; but the question has
been asked, whether this power does not supersede
the right of Congress, in war, to pass laws to take away
what martial law leaves unappropriated?
This inquiry is conclusively answered by reference to
the amendment of the constitution, above cited, which
admits the existence of that power in CONGRESS;* but in
addition to this, there are other clauses which devolve
powers and duties on the legislature, giving them a
large and important share in instituting, organizing,
carrying on, regulating, and ending war; and these
duties ~ould not, under all circumstances, be discharged
• Amendments, Art. V. la~t clause.
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rn war, without exercising the right to take for public
use the property of the subject. It would seem strange
if private property could not be so taken, while it is
undeniable that in war the government can call into
the military service of the country every able-bodied
citizen, and tax his property to any extent.
REFERENCES AS TO THE CONS1'l 1'UTION, SHOWING THE WAR POWERS OF CONGRESS.

The powers of the legislative department in relation
to war are contained chiefly in the following i:;ections
in the constitution : Art. I., Sect. 8, Cl. 11. Congress may institute war by
declaring it against an enemy. The President alone
cannot do so. Also, Congress may make laws concerning captures on land, as well as on water.
Art. I., Sect. 8, Cl. 12. Congress may raise and
support armies : and provide and maintain a navy.
Art. I., Sect. 8, Cl. 14. Congress may make laws
for the government of land and naval forces.
Art. I., Sect. 8, Cl. 15. Congress may provide for
calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union,
suppress insurrection, and repel invasion.
Art. I., Sect. 8, Cl. 16: And may provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for
governing such part of them as may be employed in the
service of the United States.
The preamble to the constitution declares the objects
for which it was framed to be these : "to form a more
perfect Union; establish justice; insure domestic tranquillity; provide for the common defence; promote the
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to
)urselves and our posterity." In Art. I., Sect. 8, Cl. 1,
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the first power given to Congress is to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts,
and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States. And in the same article ( the
eighteenth clause) express power is given to Congress
to make all '/a,ws wlziclz shall be necessary and proper for carrying i'nto execution the foregoi'ng and all other powers vested by
the constuutwn in the government of the United States, or i'n any
department or officer thereof"
SLAVE PROPER'fY SUBJECT TO THE SA:IIE LIABILITY AS OTHER
PROPERTY TO BE APPROPRIATEO FOR WAR PURPOSES.

If the puUie welfare and common defence. in time of war,
require that the claims of masters over their apprentices or slaves should be cancelled or abrogated, against
their consent, and if a general law carrying into execution such abrogation, is, in the judgment of Congress," a
necessary and proper measure for accomplishing that
object," there can be no question of the constitutional
power and right of Congress to pass such laws. The
only doubt is in relation to the right to compensation.
If it should be said that the release of slaves from their
servitude would be tantamount to impairing or destroying the obligation ofcontracts,it may be said, that though
states have no right to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, Congress is at liberty to pass such
hws. It will be readily perceived that the right to
abrogate and cancel the obligations of apprentices
and slaves does not rest solely upon the power of
Congress to appropriate private property to public use;
but it may be founded upon their power and obligation
to accomplish one of the chief objects for which the
Union was formed, viz., to provide for the common defence
and g'meral welfare of the United States.
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IMPORTANCE A.ND DANGER OF THIS POW~,R.

The powers conveyed in this 18th clause of Art. 1.,
Sect. 8, are of vast importance and extent. It may be
said that they are, in one sense, unlimited and <liscretionary. They are more than imperial. But it was intended by the framers of the constitution, or, what is
of more importance, by the people who made and adopted it, that the powers of government in dealing with
civil rights in time of peace, should be defined and limited; but the powers "to provide for the general welfare
and the common defence" in time of war, should be unlimited. It is true that such powers may be temporarily
abused; but the remedy is al ways in the hands of the
people, who can unmake laws and select new representatives and senators.
POWERS OF THE PRESIDEN'r NOT IN CONFLICT WITII THOSE OF
CONGRESS.

It is not necessary here to define the extent to ·which
congressional legislation may justly control and regulate the conduct of the army and navy in servic~; or
where fal ls the dividing line between civil and martial
law. But the power of Congress to pass laws on the
snl.,jects expressly placed in its charge by the terms of
the constitution cannot be taken away from it, by reason of the fact that the President, as commander-in-chief
of the army and navy, also has powerr;:;, equally constitutional, to act upon the same subject-matters. It does
not follow that because Congress has power to abrogate the claims of Mormons or slaveholders, the President, as commander, may not also do the same thing.
These powers are not i"nconsistent, or conflicting.
Congr<'ss may pass laws concerning captures on laud
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and on the water. Ifslaves are captured, and are treated
as " captured property," Congress should determine
what is to .be done with them;* and it will be the
President's duty to see that these as well as other laws
of the United States are executed.
CONGRESS HAS POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION TO A.BOLISH

SLAVERY.

Whenever, in the judgment of Congress, the common
defence and public welfare, in time of war, require the
removal of the condition of slavery, it is within the
scope of their constitutional authority to pass laws for
that purpose.
If such laws are deemed to take private property for public use, or to destroy private property
for public benefit, as has been shown, that may be done
under the constitution, by providing just compensation;
otherwise, no compensation ca.n be required. It has
been so long the habit of those who engage in public
life to disclaim any intention to interfere with slavery
in the States, that they have of late become accustome::l
to deny the rigl1t of Congress to do so. But tlie constitution contains no clause or sentence prohibiting the exercise by
Congress of the plenary power of abrogating involuntary servi,.
tude. The only prohibition contained in that instrument
relating to persons held to labor and service, is in Art. IV.,
which provides that, "No person held to labor and service
in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another,
shall, in consequence of any law or regulation "therein,"
be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be
delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." Thus, if a slave or appren•
• Uonstitution, Art. I., Sect. 8, Cl. 11.
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tice, owing service to his employer in Maryland, esca1ies
to New York, the legislature of New York cannot, by
any law or regulation, legally discharge such apprentice
or slave from his liability to his employer. Tltis restric•
tion is, in express terms, applicab'le only to State legislatures,
and not to Congress.
Many powers given to Congress are denied to the
States; and there are obvious reasons why the supreme
government alone should exercise so important a right.
That a power is withdrawn from the States, indicates,
by fair implication, that i~ belongs to tlte United States,
unless expressly prohibited, if it is embraced within
the scope of powers necessary to the safety and preservation of the government, in peace or in civil war.
It will be remarked that the provision as to slaves
in the constitution relates only to fugitives from labor
escaping from one state into another; not to the status
or condition of slaves in any of the states where they
are held, while another clause in the constitution
relates to fuguives from justice.''' Neither clause has
any application to citizens or persons who are not
fugitives. And it would be a singular species of reasoning to conclude that, because the constitution prescribed certain rules of conduct towards persons escaping
from one State into another, therefore there is no power
to make rules relating to other persons who do not escape
from one State inio aiwtlwr. If Congress were expressly
empowered to pass laws relating to persons wlten
escaping from justice or labor by fleeing from their
own States, it would be absurd to infer that there
could he no power to pass laws relating to these
same persons when staying at home. The govern•
• Constitution, Art. IV. Sect. 2.
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ment may pass laws requiring the return of fugitives:
they may pass other laws punishing their crimes,
or relieving them from penalty. The power to do th~
one by no means negatives the power to do the other.
If Congress should discharge the obligations of slaves
to render labor and service, by passing a law to that
effect, such law would supersede and render void all
rules, regulationa, customs, or laws of either State to the
contrary, for the constitution, treaties, and laws of the
United States are the supreme law of the land. If
slaves were released by act of Congress, or by the act
of their masters, there would be no person held to labor
as a slave by the laws of any State, and therefore there
would be no person to whom the clause in the constitution restraining State legislation could apply. This
clause, relating to fugitive slaves, has often been misunderstood, as it bas been supposed to limit the power of
Congress, w bile in fact it applies i'n plain and express terms
only to the States, controlling or limiting their powers, hut
having no application to the general government. If
the framers of the constitution intended to take from
Congress the power of passing laws relating to slaves
in the States or elsewhere, they would have drafted a
clause to that effect. They did insert in that instrument a proviso that Congress should pass no law prohibiting the "importation of such persons as any of ·
the States should think proper to admit" ( meaning
slaves) "prior to 1808." * And if they did not design that the legislature should exercise control over
the subject of domestic slavery, whenever it should
assume such an aspect as to involve naiwnal interests,
the introduction of the proviso relating to the slave
• Constitution, Art. 1. Sect. 9.
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trade, and of several other clauses in the plan of government, makes the omission of any prohibition of
legislation on slavery unaccountable.
CONCLUSION.

Thus it bas been shown that the government have
the right to appropriate to public use private property of
every description; that "public use" may require the
employment or the destruction of such property; that
if the "right to the labor and service of others," as
slaves, be recognized in the broadest sense as "property," there is nothing in the constitution which
deprives Congress of the power to appropriate "that
description of property" to public use, by terminating
slavery, as to all persons now held in servitude, whenever laws to that effect are required by "the public
welfare and the common defence " in time of war ;
that this power is left to the discretion of Congress,
who are the sole and exclusive judges as to the occa:sions when it shall be exercised, and from whose judgment there is no appeal. The right to "just compensation " for private property so taken, depends upon
the circumstances under which it is taken, and the
loyalty and other legal conditions of the claimant.
NOTE. - As to the use of discretionary powers in other departments, see
Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 29-31; Luther v. Borden, 7 Row. 44, 45.
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TO CHAPTER II.

THE Constitution, Art. I., Sect. 8, clause 18, gives Congress power "to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or officer
thereof."
Art. II., Sect. 2, clause 1, provides that "the President shall be Oommander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
Militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the
Uuited States."
Art. I., Sect. 8, declares that " Congress shall have power to provide for
calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions."
As the President is, within the sense of Art. I., Sect. 8, clause 18, " an
officer of govemnient;" and by vfrtue of 1frt. II., Sect. 2, clause 1, he is
Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy; and as, by virtue of Art, II.,
Sect. 2, clattse 1, and Art. I., Sect. 8, the powel' is vested in him as "an
ojjicer of the government" to suppress rebellion, repel invasion, and to
maintain the Constitution by force of arms, in time of war, and for that
purpose to overthrow, conquer, and subdue the enemy of bis country, so
completely as to "insure domestic tranquillity," -it follows by Lfrt. I.,
Sect. 8, claii.se 18, that Congress may, in time of war, pass all laws which
shall be necessary and proper to enable the President to carry into execution" all bis military powers.
It is his duty to break down the enemy, and to deprive them of their
means of maintaining war: Congress is therefore bound to pass such laws
as will aid him in accomplishing that object.
If it has power to make laws for carrying on the government in time of
peace, it has the power and duty to make laws to preserve it from destruction in time of war.

NoTE. -The reader is referred to the Prnface, pages 3 and 4, for remarks
upon the Constitution, Art. 1., Sect. 8, clause 1, relating to the alleged
power of Congress " to provide for the general welfare and common defence," and, in addition to the authorities there cited, reference may be bad
to the speeches of Patrick Henry, who fully sustains the views of Mr. J efferson.
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CHAPTER II.
WAR POWERS OF CONGRESS.•

CONGRESS has power to frame statutes not only for the
punishment of crimes, but also for the purpose of aiding the President, as commander-in-chief of the army
and navy, in suppressing rebellion, and in the final and
permanent conquest of a public enemy. "It may pass
such laws as it may deem necessary," says Chief Justice
Marshall," to carry into execution the great powers
granted by the constitution ; " and " necessary means,
in the sense of the constitution, does not import an
absolute physical necessity, so strong that one thing
cannot exist without the other. It stands for any
means calculated to produce the end."
RULES OF INTF:RPRETATION.

The constitution provides _that Congress shall have
power to pass "all laws necessary and proper" for carrying into execution all the powers granted to the government of the United States, or any department or
officer thereof. The word " necessary," as used, is not
limited by the additional word "proper," but enlarged
thereby.
"If the word necessary were used in the strict, rigorous sense, it
would be an extraordinary departure from the usual course of the
human mind, as exhibited in solemn instruments, to add another word,
the only possible effect of which is to qualify thiit strict and rigorous
meaning, and to present clearly the idea of a choice of means in the
course of legislation. If no means are to be resorted to but such as
• F01· reference~ to the clauses of the Constitution containing the war
powers of Congress, see ante, pp. 27, 28.
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are indispensably necessary, there can be neither s~nse n ,r utility in
adding the word 'proper,' for the indispensable necessity would shut
out from view all consideration of the propriety of the means." *

Alexand~r Hamil ton says, -

"The authorities essential to the care of the common defence are
these : To raise armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for
the gu,crnment of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their
support. These powers ought to exist WITHOUT LHffl'ATION, because
it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent nnd variety of national
exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means
necessary to satisfy them. T he circumstances which endanger the
safety of nations are infinite ; and for this reason no constitutional
shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it
is committed. . . . This power ought to be under the direction of the
same councils which are appointed to preside over the common defence.
. . . It must be admitted, as a necessary consequence, that there can
be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defence
and protection of the community in any matter essential to its efficacy
- that is, in any matter essential to the formation, direction, or support of the NATIONAL FORCES,"

This statement, Hamilton says, " Rests u pon two axioms, simple as they are universal : the means
ought to be proportioned to the end; the persons from whose agency
the attai,nuent of the end is expected, ought to possess the means by
which it is to be attained." t

The doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United
States, announced by Chief J nstice Marshall, and approved by Daniel Webster, Chancellor K ent, and J udge
Story, is thus stated : " The government of the United States is one of enumerated powers, and it can exercise only the powers granted to it; but though
limited in its powers, it is supreme within its sphere of action. I t is
the government of the people of the United States, and emanated
from them. Its powers were delegated by all, and it represents all,
and acts for all.
·• There is nothing in the constitut.ion which excludes incidental or
• 3 Story's Commentaries, Sec. 122.

t Federalist, No. 23, pp. 95, 96.
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implied power.~. The Articles of Confederation ga,c nothing to the
United States but what was expressly granted; but tbe new constitution dropped the word expressly, and left tbe question whether a particular power was granted to depend on a fair construct.ion of the w ho1e
instrument. No constitution can contain an accurate detail of all tl1e
subdivisions of its powers, and all the means by which they might be
carried inl.o execution. It would render it too prolix. Its nature
requires that only the great outlines should be marked, and its important objects designated, and all the minor ingredients left to be deduced from the nature of those objects. The sword and tbe purse,
all the external relations, and no inconsiderable portion of the industry
of the nation, were intrustecl to the gene1·al government; and a government intrusted with such ample powerio, on the due execution of
which the happiness and prosperity of the people vitally depended,
must also be intrusted with ample means of their execution. Unless
the words imperiously require it, we ought not to adopt a construction
which would impute to the framers of the constitution, wheu granting
great powers for the public good, the intention of impeding their exercise by withholding a choice of means. The powers gi,en to the
government imply the ordinary means of execution; and the government, in all sound reason and fair interpretation, must have the choice
of the means which it deems the most convenient and appropriate to
the execution of the power. The constitution has not left the right
of Congress to employ the necesssary means for the execution of its
powers to general reasoning. Art. I, Sect. 8, of the constitution,
expressly confers on Congress the power 'to make all laws that may
be necessary and proper to carry into execution the foregoing power$.'
" Congress may employ such means and pass such laws as it may
deem necessary to carry into execution great powe1·s granted by the
constitution ; and necessary means, in the sense of the constitution,
does not import an absolute physical necessity, so strong that one
thing cannot exist without the other. It stands for any means calculated to produce the end. The word necessary admits of all degrcss
of comparison. A thing may be necessary, or very necessary, or
absolutely or indispensably necessary. The word is used in various
senses, and in its construction the subject, the context, the intention,
are all to be taken into view. Ttie powers of the government were
given for the welfare of the nation. They were intended to endure
for ages to come, and to be adapted to the various crises in uuman
affairs. To prescribe the specific means by which government should
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in all future time execute its power, and to confine the choice of mJans
to such narrow limits as should not ]eave it in the power of Congress
to adopt any which might be appropriate and conducive to the end,
would be most unwise and pernicious, because it would be an attempt
to provide, by immutabic rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at
all, must have been foreseen dimly, and would deprive the legislature
of the capacity to avail itself of experience, or to exercise its reason,
and accommodate its legislation to circumstances. If the end be legitimate, and within the scope of the constitution, all means which are
appropriate, and plainly adapted to this end, and which are not prohibited by the constitution, are lawful."*

Guided by these principles of interpretation, it is
obvious that if the confiscation of property, or the liberation of slaves of rebels, be" plainly ndapted to the end,"
- that is, to the suppression. of rebellion, - it is within
the power of Congress to pass laws for those purposes.
Whether they are adapted to produce that result is for
the legislature alone to decide. But, in considering the
war powers conferred upon that department of government, a broad distinction is to be observed between
confiscation or emancipation laws, passed in time of
peace, for the punishment of crime, and similar law8,
passed in time of war, to aid the President in suppressing rebellion, in carrying on a civil war, and in securing
"the public welfare" and maintaining the "common
defence" of the country. Congress may pass such laws
in peace or in war as are within the general powers conferred on it, unltss they fall within some express prohibition of the constitution. If confiscation or emancipation laws are enacted under the war powers of Congress, we must determine, in order to test their validity,
whether, in suppressing a rebellion of colossal proportions, the United States are, within the meaning of
• On the interpretation of constitutional power, see 1 Kent's Com. 351,
352; l,fcOulloch v. The State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. R. 413-120.
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the constitution, rd war with its own citizens ? whether
confiscation and emancipation are sanctioned as belligerent rights by the law and usage of civilized nations?
and whether our government has full belligerent rights
against its rebellious subjects?
ARE 'l'HE UNl'l'J,:O S'l'A'l'ES AT WAR?

War may originate in either of several ways. The
navy of a European na,tion may attack an American
frigate in a remote sea. Hostilities then commence
without any invasion of the soil of America, or any
insurrection of its inhabitants. A foreign power may
send troops into our territory with hostile intent, and
without declaration of war; yet war would exist solely
by this act of invasion. Congress, on one occasion,
passed a resolution that "war existed by the act of ·
Mexico;" but no declaration of war bad been made
by either belligerent. Civil war may commence either
as a general armed insurrection of slaves, a servile
war; or as an insurrection of their masters, a rebellion; or as an attempt, by a considerable portiou
of the subjects, to overthrow their governmentwhich attempt, if successful, is termed a revolution.
Civil war, within the meaning of the constitution,
exists also whenever any combination of citizens is
formed to resist generally the execution of any one or
of all the laws of the United States, if accompanied with
o-vert acts to give that resistance effect.
DECLARATION OF WAR NOT NECESSARY ON 'l' HE PART OF THE
GOVERNMENT '1'0 GIVE IT FULL BELLIGERJ,;NT POWERS.

A state of war may exist, arising in either of the modes
above mentioned, without a declaration of war by either
of the hostile pa.rties. Congress has the sole power,
qntler the constitution, to make that declaration, and
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to sanction or authorize the commencement of <!lf'ensive
war. If the United States commence hostilities against
a foreign nation, such commencement is by proclamation,
which is equivalent to a decln.ration of war. But this is
quite a different case from a defensive or a civil war. The
constitution establishes the mode in which this government shall commence wars, and what authority shall ordain,
and what declarations shall precede, any act of hostility;
but it has no power to prescribe the manner in which
others should begin war against us. Hence it follows,
that when war is commenced against this country, by
aliens or by citizens, no declaration of war by the government is necessary. The fact that war is levied
against the United States, makes it the duty of the
President to call out the army or navy to subdue the
enemy, whether foreign or domestic. The chief object
of a. declaration of war is to give notice thereof to
neutrals, in order to :fix their rights, and liabilities to
the hostile powers, and to give to innoceut parties
reasonable time to withdraw their persons a1:1d property
from danger. If the commander-in-chief could not
call out his forces to repel an invasion until Congress
shonl<l have made a formal declaration of war, a foreign
army might march from Canada to the Gulf before
such declaration could be made, if it should commence the campaign while Congress was not in session. Before a majority of its members· could be
convened, our navy might be swept from the seas.
The constitution, made as it was by men of sense,
never leaves the nation powerless for self-defence.
That instrument, which gives the legislature authority
to declare war, whenever war is initwted by the United
States, also makes it the duty of the President, a{l com
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mander-in-chief, to engage promptly and effectually in
war; or, in other words, to make the United States a
belligerent nation, without declaration of war, or any
other act of Congress, whenever he· is legally called
upon to suppress rebellion, repel invasion, or to execute
the laws against armed and forcible resistance thereto.
The President has his duty, Congress have theirs; they
are separate, and in some respects independent. Nothing is clearer than this, that when such a state of hostilities exists as justifies the President in calling the
army into actual service, without the authority of Congress, no declaration of war is requisite,either in form or
substance, for any purpose whatsoever. Hence it follows, that government, while engaged in suppressing a
rebellion, is not deprived of the rights of a belligerent
against rebels, by reason of the fact that no formal declaration of war has been made against them; as tp.ough
they were an a1ien enemy, - nor by reason of the circumstance that this great civil war originated, so far as
we are parties to it, in an effort to resist an armed
attack of citizens upon the soldiers and the forts of the
United States. It must not be forgotten that by the
law of nations and by modern usage, no formal declaratwn
of war to tlie enemy is made or deemed necessary.* All
that is now requisite is for each nation to make suitable declarations or proclamations to its own citizens, to
enable them to govern themselves accordingly. These
have been made by the Presi9.ent.
BAS GOVERNMENT FULL WAR POWERS AGAL~ST REBEL CITIZENS!

Some persons have q nestioned the right of the
United States to make and carry on war against citi• See 1 Kent's Com. p. 54.
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zens and subjects of this country. Conceding that the
President may be authorized to call into active service
the navy and army "to repel invasion, or suppress
rebellion," they neither admit that suppressing rebellion places the country in the attitude of making war
on rebels, nor that the commander-in-chief has the constitutional right of conducting his military operations
as he might do if he were actually at war (in the ordinary sense of the torm) against an alien enemy. Misapprehension of the meaning of the constitution on
this subject has led to confusion in the views of some
members of Congress during the last session, and has in
no small degree emasculated the efforts of the majority
in dealing with the questions of emancipation, confiscation, and enemy's property.
Some have assumed that the United States are not
at war with rebels, and that they have no authority to
exercise the rights of war against them. They admit
that the army has been lawfully called into the field,
and may kill those who oppose them; they concede
that rebels may be taken captive, their gunboats may
be sunk, and their property may be seized; that martial law may be declared in rebellious districts, and its
pains and penalties may be enforced; that every armed
foe may be swept out of the country by military
power. Yet they entertain a vague apprehension that
something in the constitution takes away from these
military proceedings, in suppressing rebellion and in
resisting the attacks of the rebels, the quality and
character of warfare. All these men in arms are not,
they fancy, "making war." When the citizens of Charleston bombarded Fort Sumter, and captured property
exclusively owned by the United States, it is not
6
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denied that tltey were "waging war" upon the government. When Major Anderson returned the enemy's
fire and attempted to defend the fort and the guns
from capture, it is denied that the country was " waging
war." While other nations, as well as our own, had
formally or informally conceded to the rebels the character and the rights usually allowed to belligerents, that is, to persons making war on us, - we, according to
the constitutional scruple above stated, were not entitled to the rights of belligerents against them. It
therefore becomes important to know what, according
to the constitution, the meaning of the term "levying
war" really is; and as the military forces of this country
are in actual service to suppress rebellion, whether such
military service is makziig war upon its own citizens; and
if war actually exists, whether there is any thing in the
constitution that limits or controls the full enjoyment
and exercise by the government of the rights of a belligerent against the belligerent enemy?
l S .. SUPPRESSING REBELLION" BY ARMS MAKING WAR ON 'l'll~;
Cl'l'IZENS OF THE UNI'l'ED S'l'A'l'ES, IN THE SENSE OF 'l'BE CON ·
S'l'ITU'l'ION !

To "repel invasion" by arms, all admit, is entering
upon defensive war against the invader. War exists
wherever and whenever the army or navy is in active
service against a public enemy.
When rebel,s are organized into armies in large numbers, overthrow the government, invade the territory
of States not consenting thereto, attack, and seize, and
confiscate the property not of the government only, but
of all persons who continue loyal, such proceedings
constitute war in all its terrors - a war of subjugation
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anJ of conquest, as well as of rebellion. Far less than
these operations constitutes the levying of war, as those
terms are explained in the language of the consti•
tution.
" War is levied" on the United States wherever and
whenever the crime of treason is committed, (see Constitution, Art. III., Sect. 3, Cl. 3,) and under that clause,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, "war is levwd"
when there exists a combination resorting to overt acts
to oppose generally the execution of any law of the
United States, even if no armed force be used. The language of the constitution is clear and express. " Trea•
son shall consist only in levying war upon the United
States, or in giving aid and comfort to the enemy."
If, therefore, any person, or collection of persons, have
committed the crime of treason, the constitution declares them to have levied war. As traitors they have
become belligerent, or war levying enemies.
War may be waged against the government or by the
government; it may be either offensive or defensive.
Wherever war exists there must be two parties to it.
If traitors (belligerents by the terms of the constitution) are one party, the government is the other party.
If, when treason is committed, any body is at war, then
it follows that the United States are at war. The
inhabitants of a section of this country have issued a
manifesto claiming independence; they have engaged
in open war on land and sea to maintain it; they have
invaded territory of peaceful and loyal sections of the
Union ; they have seized and confiscated ships, arsenals,
arms, forts, public and private property of our govern•
ment and people, and have killed, captured, and imprisOMd soldiers and private citizens. Of the million of
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men in arms, are those on one side levying war, and
are those opposed to them not levying war?
As it takes two parties to carry on war, either party
may begin it. That party which begins usually declares war. But when it is actually begun, the party
attacked is as much at war as the party who made the
attack. The United States are AT WAR with rebels, in
the strictly legal and constitutional sense of the term,
and have therefore all the rights against them which
follow from a state of war, in addition to those which
are derived from the fact that the rebels are also
subjects.
RJ.BELS MAY BE TREATED AS BELLIGERENTS AND AS SUBJECTS.

Wars may be divided into two classes, foreign and
civil. In all civil wars the government claims the belligerents, on both sides, as subjects, and has the legal
right to treat the insurgents both as subjects and as
belligerents; and they therefore may exercise the full
and untrammelJed powers of war against their subject.q,
or they may, in their discretion, relieve them from any
of the pains and penalties attached to either of these
characters. The right of a country to treat its rebellious citizens both as belligerents and as subjects has long
been recognized in Europe, and by the Supreme Court
of the United States. In the civil war between St.
Domingo and France, such rights were exercised, and
were recognized as legitimate in Rose v. Himel;;, 4
Cranch, 272. So in Olierriot v. Foussatt, 3 Binney, 252.
In Dobrie v. Napier, 3 Scott R. 225, it was held that a
blockade of the coast of Portugal, by the Queen of
that country, was lawful, and a vessel was condemned
as a lazeful prize for running the blockade. The cases

WAlt POWERS OF CONGRESS.

45

of the Santishna Trz"nidad, 7 Wheat. 306, and Uniied
Staies v. Palmer, 3 W. 635, confirm this doctrine. By
the terms of the constitution defining treason, a traitor
must be a subfect and a belligerent, and none but a belligerent subject can be a traitor.
'l'he government have in fact treated the insurgents
as belligerents on several occasions, without recognizing
them in express terms as such. They have received
the capitulation of rebels at Hatteras, as prisoners of
war, in express terms, and have exchanged prisoners
of war as such, and have blockaded the coast by
military authority, and have officially informed other
nations of such blockade, and of their intention to
make it effective, under the present law of nations.
They have not exercised their undoubted right to
repeal the laws making either of the blockaded harbors ports of entry. They have relied solely on their
belligerent rights, under the law of nations.
Having thus the full powers and right of making
and carrying on war against rebels, both as subjects
and as belligerents, this righ:t frees the President and
Congress from the difficulties which might arise if
rebels could be treated onl/J as SUBJECTS, and if war
could not be waged upon them. If conceding to rebels
the privileges of belligerents should relieve them from
some of the harsher penalties of treason, it will subject
them to the liabilities of the belligerent character. .
The privileges and the disadvantages are correlative.
But it is by no means conceded that the government
may not exercise the right of treating the same rebels
both as subjects and as belligerents. The constitution
,Jefines a rebel who commits treason as one who "levies
war" on the United States; and the laws punish this
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highest of crimes with death, thus expressly tieatiug
the same person as sub.feet and as belligerent. Those who
save their necks from the halter by claiming to be
treated as prisoners of war, and so to protect themselves under the shield of belligerent rights, must bear
the weight of that shield, and submit to the legal consequences of the character they claim. They cannot
sail under two flags at the same time. But a rebel
does not cease to be a subject because be has turned
traitor. The constitution expressly authorizes Congress
to pass laws to punish traitor-that is, belligerentsubjects ; and suppressing rebellion by armed force is
making war. Therefore the war powers of government
g ive full belligerent rights against rebels in arms.
TIIE LAW OF NATJOYS IS ABOVE TIIE CONSTITUTION.

Having shown that the United States being actnall_y
engaged in civil war, - in other words, having become a
belligerent power, without formal declaration of war, it is important to ascertain what some of the n'glds of
belligerents are, according to the law of nations. It will
be- observed that the law of nations is above the constitution of any government; and no people would be
justified by its peculiar constitution in violating the
rights of other nations. Thus, if it had been provided
in the Articles of Confederation, or in the present con~titution, that all citizens should have the inalienable
right to practise the profession of piracy upon the ships
and property of foreign nations, or that they should be
lawfully empowered to make incursions into England,
France, or other countries, and seize by force and bring
home such men and women as they should select, and,
if these privileges should be put in practice, England
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and France would be justified in treating us as a nest
of pirates, or a band of marauders and outlaws. The
whole civilized world would turn against us, and we
should justly be exterminated. An association or
agreement on our part to violate the rights of others,
by whatever name it may be designated, whether it be
called a constitution, or league, or conspiracy, or a domestic institution, is no justification, under the law of
nations, for illegal or immoral acts.
INTERNATIONAL BELLIGERENT RIGHTS .ARE DETERMINED BY THE
LAW OF NATION$.

To determine what are the rights of different nations
when making war upon each other, we look only to
the law of nations. The peculiar forms or rights of
the subjects of one of these war-making parties under
their own government give them no rights over their
enemy other than those which are sanctioned by international law. In the great tribunal of nations, there
is a "higher law" than that which has been framed
by either one of them, however sacred to each its
own peculiar laws and constitution of government
may be.
But while this supreme law is in full force, and is
binding on all countries, softening the asperities of war,
and guarding the rights of neutrals, it is not conceded
that the government of the United States, in a civil
war for the suppression of rebellion among its own cit,.
izens, is subject to the same limitations as though the
rebels were a foreign nation, owing no allegiance to
the country.
With this caveat, it will be desirable to state some
of the right.c:; of belligerents.
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BELLIGERENT IHGEIT OF CONFISCATION OP PERSONAL ESTATF..

Eiiher belligerent ma,!! seize and confiscate al/, the properflJ
of the enemy, on land or on the sea, including real as well as
personal estate.
PUJZE COURTS.

As the property of all nations has an equal right
upon the high seas, ( the highway of nations,) in order
to protect the commerce of neutrals from unlawful
interference, it is necessary that ships and cargoes
seized on the ocean should be brought before some prize
colll't, that it may be judicially determined whether
the captured vessel and cargo were, in whole or in part,
enemy's property or contraband of war. The decision
of any prize court, according to the law of nations, is conclusive against all the world. Where personal property
of the enemy is captured from the enemy, on ]and, in the
enemy's country, no decision of any court is necessary
to give a title thereto. Capture passes the title. This
is familiar law as administered in the courts of Europe
and America.*
TITLE BY CAPTURE.

Some persons have questioned whether title passes
in this country by capture or confiscation, by reason of
some of the limiting clauses of the constitution; and
others have gone so far as to assert that all the proceedings under martial law, such as capturing enemy's
property, imprisonment ofspies and traitors, and seizures
of articles contraband of war, and suspending the habeas
corpus, arc in violation of the constitution, which declares that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
• Alexa11der v. Duke ofWellington, 2 Russ. & Mylne,35. Lord Brougham
sni<l that military prize rests upon the same principles of law as p1·izf!
at sea, though in general no statute passes with respect to it. See I
Kent's Comm. 357.
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property without due process of law;* that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation; that unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be made;! that freedom of speech and
of the press shall not be abridged; § and that the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed, II

t

THESE PROVISIONS ..NO'l ' APPLICABLE TO A STATE OF WAR.

If these rules are applicable to a state of war, then
capture of property is illegal, and does not pass a title;
no defensive war can be carried on; no rebellion can
be suppressed; no invasion can be repelled ; the army
of the United States, when called into the .field, can do
no act of hostility. Not a gun can be fired constitutionally, because it might deprive a rebel foe of his life
without due process of law - firing a gun not being
deemed" due process of law."
Sect. 4 of Art. IV. says, that" the United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a republican
form of government, and shall protect each of them
against invasion, and, on application of the legislature,
or of the Executive, when the legislature cannot be
couvened, against domestic violence."
Art. I. Sect. 8, gives Congress power to declare war,
raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy;
to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the
laws of the Union, suppress insurrection and repel invasion ; to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as
may be in the service of the United States.
• Constitutional Amendments, Art. V.
§ Ibid. Art. J.
1 Ibid. Art. IV.

7

t

Ibid. Art. V.

II Ibid. Art. II.
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If these rules above cited have any application in n
time of wa.r, the United States cannot protect each of the
States from invasion by citizens of other States, nor
ag1inst domestic violence; nor can the army, or militia,
0 1 navy be used for any of the purposes for which the
constitution authorizes or requires thefr employment.
If all men have the right to "keep and bear arms,"
what right has the army of the Union to take them
a way from rebels? If "no one can constitutionally
be deprived of life, liberty, or proper ty, without due
process of law," by what right does government seize
and imprison traitors? By what right does the army
kill rebels in arms, or burn up their military stores ?
If the only way of dealing constitutionally with rebels
in arms is to go to law with them, the President should
convert his army into lawyers, justices of the peace,
and constables, and serve " summonses to appear a.nil
answer to complaints," instead ofa summons to surrende1·.
H e should send "GREETINGS" instead of sending rifle shot.
H e should load his caissons with "pleas in abatement
and demurrers," instead of thirty-two pound shell and
grape shot. In short, he should levy w.rits of execution,
instead of levying war. On the contrary, the commander-in-chief proposes a different application of the
due process of law. His summons is, that rebels should
lay down their arms ; his pleas are batteries and gunboats; his arguments are hot shot, and always" to the
point;" and when his fearful execution is " levied on
the body," all that is left will be for the undertaker.
'l'RUE APPLICATION 0}' 'l'l·IESF, CONSTI'l'IJ'l'IONAL GUARAN'l'EES.

The clauses which have been cited from the amendments to the constitution were intended as declarations
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of the rights of peaceful and loyal citizens, and safe.
guards in the administration of justice by the civil tribunals; but it was necessary, in order to give the government the means of defending itself agairn,t domestic
or foreign enemies, to maintain its authority and dignity, and to enforce obedience to its laws, that it should
have unlimited war powers; and it must not be forgotten that the same authority which provides those
safeguards, and guarantees those rights, also imposes
upon the President and Congress the duty of so carrying on war as of necessity to supersede and hold in
temporary suspense such civil rights as may prove inconsistent with the complete and effectual exercise of
such war powers, and of the belligerent rights resulting from them. The rights of war and the rights of
peace cannot coexist. One must yield to the other.
Martial law and civil law cannot operate at the same
time and place upon the same subject matter. Hence
the constitution is framed with foll recognition of that
fact; it protects the citizen in peace and in war; but
his rights enjoyed under the constitution, in time of
peace are different from those to which he is entitled
in time of war.
WHETHER DELLIGERlslH'S SHALL BE ALLOWED CIVIL RIGH'l'S UNDER
'.fllE CONSTITUTION DEPENDS UPON THE POLICY OF GOVERNMEN'l'.

None of these riglits, guaranteed to peaceful e£tizens, by tlw
eonstiiut£on bekmg to them after they have become belligerents
against their own government. They thereby forfeit all
protection under that sacred charter which they have
thus sought to overthrow and destroy. One party to
a contract c:mnot brea,k it and at the same time hold
the other to perform it. It is true that if the govern-
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ment elects to treat them as subjects and to hold theru
liable only to penalties for violating statutes, it must
concede to them all the legal rights and privileges
which other citizens would have when under similar
accusations; and Congress must be limited to the provisions of the constitution in legislation against them
as citizens. But the fact that war is waged by these
miscreants releases the government from. all obligation
to make that concession, or to respect the rights to life,
liberty, or property of its enemy, because the constitution makes it the duty of the President to prosecute
war against them in ~rder to suppress rebellion and
repel invasion.
THE CONS'rITUTION ALLOWS CONFISCATION.

Nothing in the constitution interferes with the belligerent right of confiscation of enemy property. The
right to confiscate is derived from a state of war. It is
one of the rights of war. It originates in the principle
of self-preservation. It is the means of weakening the
enemy and strengthening ourselves. The right of confiscation belongs to the government as the necessary
consequence of the power and duty of making waroffensive or defensive. Every capture of enemy ammunition or arms is, m substance, a confiscation, without its formalities. To deny the right of confiscation
is to deny the right to make war, or to conquer an
enemy.
If authority were needed to support the right of confiscation, it may be found in 3 Dalla-s, 227 ; Vat. lib.
iii., ch. 8, sect. 188; lib. iii., ch. 9, sect. l 61; Sm£th v.
Mansfield, Cranch, 306-7 ; Oooper v. T eifa£r, 4 Dallas ;
Brown v. U. 8., 8 Cranch, 110, 228, 229.
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I'he following extract is from 1 Kent's Com., p. 59: " But however strong the current of authority in favor of the modern and milder construction of the rule of national law on this subject,
the point seems to be no longer open for discussion in this country;
and it has become definitively settled in favor of the ancient and
sterner rule by the Supreme Court of the United States. Brown v.
United States, 8 Cranch, 110 ; ibid. 228, 229.
" The effect of war on British property found in the United States
ou lanrl, at the commencement of the war, wa.c; learnedly discussed
11.nd thoroughly considered in the case of Brown, and the Circuit Court
of the United States at Boston decided as upon a settled rule of the
law of nations, that the goods of the enemy found in the country, and
all vessels and cargoes found afloat in our ports at the commencement
of hostilities, were liable to seizure and cotrfiscation ; and the exercise
of tl1e right vested in the discretion of the sovereign of the nation.
" When the case was brought up on appeal before the Supreme
Court of the United States, the broad principle was assumed that war
gave to the sovereign the full right to take the persons and confiscate
the property of the enemy wherever found; and that the mitigations
of this rigid n1le, which the wise and humane policy of modem times
had introduced into practice, might, more or less, affect the exercise
of the right, but could not. impair the right it-self.
" Commercial nations have always considerable property in posses•
sion of their neighbors; and when war breaks out, the question, What
shall be done with enemy property found in the country? is one rather
of policy than of law, and is one properly addressed to the considera.
tion of the legislature, and not to the courts of Jaw.
" The strict right of confiscation of that species of property existed
in Congress, and without a legislative act authorizing its confiscation
it could not be judicially condemned ; and the act of Congress of 1812
declaring war against Great Britain was not such an act. Until some
statute directly applying to the subject be passed, the property would
continue under the protection of the law, and might be claimed by the
British owner at the restoration of peace.
" Though this decision established the right contrary to roach of
modern authority and practice, yet a great point was gained over the
rigor and violence of the ancient doctrine, by making the exercise of
the right depend upon a special act of Congress."

From the foregoing authorities, it is evident that the
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government has a right, as a belligerent power, to capture o~ fo confiscate any and all the personal property
of the enemy; that there is nothing in the constitution
· which limits or controls the exercise of that right; and
that capture in war, or confiscation by law, pa ses a
complete title to the property taken; and that, if judicial condemnation of enemy" property be sought, in
order to pass the title to it by formal decree of ~ourts,
by mere seizure, and without capture, the confiscation
must have been decln.red by act of Congress, a mere
declaration of war not being ea: vi termini sufficient for
that purpose. The army of the Union, therefore, have
the right, according to the law of nations, and of the
constitution, to obtain by capture a legal title to all the
personal property of the enemy they get possession
of, whether it consist of arms, ammunition, provision::;,
slaves, or any other thing which the law treats as personal pi·operty. No judicial process is necessary to
give the governme_n t full title thereto, and when once
captur~d, the government may dispose of the property
as absolute owner thereof, in the same manner as
though the title passed by bill of sale: and Congres~
have plenary authority to pass such confiscation law,.;
ngainst belligerent enemies as they deem for the public
good.
lt~I.T1'AltY GOVERNltENT UNDER :.lli\RTIAL LAW.

In nddition to the right of conftScatin9 pers<mal properf!J
of the enemy, a state of was also confers upon t he
government other not less important belligerent rightl'I,
and among them, the right to seize and hold conquered
territory by militm·y force, and of instituting and maintain.ing military government over it, thereby suspending in part, or in the whole, the ordinary civil adrninis-
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tration. 'l'he exercise of this right has been sanction ed
by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the case of California.* And it is founded upon
well-established doctrines of the law ofnationi,:. Without·
the right to make laws and administer justice in conquered territory, the inhabita.nts would be plunged in to
ann.rchy. The old government being overthrown, and nc.,
new one being established, there would be none to whom
allegiance would be due - none to restmin la.wlessnes,-,
none to secure to any persons any civil rights whatever. Hence, from the necessity of the case, the conqueror has power to establish a quasi military civil administration of government for the protMtion of the
innocent, the restraint of the wicked, and the security
of that conquest for which war has been waged.
It is under this power of holding and establishing military rule over conquered territory, that all
provisional governments are instituted by conquerors. The President, as commander-in-chief, has formally appointed Andrew Johnson governor of Tennessee, with all the powers, duties, and func"tions pertaining to that office, during the pleasure of the President, or until the loyal inhabitants of that State shall _
organize a civil government in accordance with t he constitution of the United States. To legalize these powers
and duties, it became expedient to give him .a military
position; hence he was nominated as a brigadier genera], and his nomination was confirmed by the Senate.
Mr.Stanley acts as provisional military governor of North
f'aroliun, under similar authority. All acts of military
government which are within the scope of theit authority, are as legal and constitutional as any other military
• Crea, v. Barriso11, 16 How. 1C4.
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proceeding. Ilence any section of this country, which,
having joined in a general rebellion, Rball have been
subdued and conquered by the military forces of the
United States, may be subjected to military government, and the rights of citizens in those districts are
subject to martial law, so long as the war lasts. What,.
ever of their rights of property are lost in and by
the war, are lost forever. No citizen, whether loyal or
rebel, is deprived of any right guaranteed to him in
the constitution by reason of bis subjection to martial law, because martial law, when in force, is constitutional law. The people of the United States, through
their lawfully chosen commander-in-chief, have the constitutional right to seize and hold the territory of a belligerent enemy, and to govern it by martial law, thereby
supersed ing the local government of the place, ~nd all
rights which rebels might have had as citizens of the
United Sta,tes, if they had not violated the laws of the
land by making war upon th~_?ntry.
By martial law, loyal citi'zen~ may be for a time debarred from enjoying the rights it.bey would be entitled
to in time of peace. Individual rights must always be
held subj ect to the exigencies of national safety.
In war, when martial law is i'n force,..the laws of war
are the laws which the constitution expressly authorizes
and requires to be enforced. The cocistitution, when it
calls into action martial law, for the time changes civu
rights, or rights which the citizen would be entitled to
in peace, because the rights of persons-··in one of these
cases are totally incompatible with the ·obligations of,
persons in the other. Peace and war cannot exist
together; the laws of peace and of war cannot operate
together; the rights and procedures of peaceful time~

WAR POWERS OF CONGRESS.

57

are incompatible with those of war. It is an cbvious hut
pernicious error to suppose that in a state of war, the
rules of rµartial law, and the consequent modification
of the rights, duties, and obligations of citizens, private and public, are not autllOrized strictly under the
constuution. And among the rights of martial law, none
is more familiar than that of seizing and establishing
a military government over territory taken from the
enemy; and the duty of thus protecting such territory
is imperative, since the United States are obligated to
guarantee to each State a republican form of government.* That form of government having been over•
thrown by force, the country must take such steps,
military and civil, as mn.y tend to restore it to the loyal
citizens of that State, if there be any; and if there
be no persons who will submit to the constitution
and laws of the United States, it is their duty to
hold that State by military power, and under military
rule, until loyal citizens shall appear there in sufficient
numbers to entitle them to receive back into their own
hands the local government.
A SEVF;RE RULJ<: OF BELLIGERENT LAW.

" Property of persons residing in the enemy's country
is deemed, in law, hostile, and subject to condemnation
without any evidence as to the opinions or predilections
of the owner." If he be the subject of a neutral, or a
citizen of one of the belligerent States, and has expressed no disloyal sentiments towards his countt·y,
still his residence in the enemy's country impresses
upon his property, engaged in commerce and found
· upon the ocean, a hostile character, and subjects it to
• Constitution, Art. IV., Sect. 4., Cl. 1.

8

58

CONSTITUTION OF TIIE UNITED ST.A.TES.

condemnation. This familiar principle of law is sanctioned in the highest courts of England and of the
United States, and has beeu decided to apply to cases
of civil as well as of foreign war."'
Thus personal property of every kind, ammunition,
provisions, contraband, or slaves, may be lawfully
seized, whether of wyal or diswyal citizens, and is by law
presumed lwstile, and liable to condemnation, if captured
witldn tlw rebellwus districts. This right of seizure and
concfemnation is harsh, as all the proceedings of war
are harsh, in the extreme, but it is nevertheless lawful.
It would be harsh to kill in battle a loyal citizen who,
having been impressed into the ranks of the rebels, is
made to fight against his country; yet it is lawful to
do so.
Against all persons in arms, and against all property
situated and seized in rebellions districts, the laws of
war give the President full belligerent rights; and
when the army and navy are once lawfnlly called out,
!here are no limits to the war-making power of the
President, other than the law of nations, and such rules
as Congress may pass for their regulation.
"The statute of 1807, chap. 39," says a learned judge,t
"provides that whenever it is ]awful for the President
to call forth the militin. to suppress an insurrection, he
may employ the land and naval forces for that purpose.
'rhe authority to use the army is thus expressly confirmed, but the manner in which they are to be used is
not prescribed. That is left to the discretion of the
President, guided by the usages and principles of civilized war."
• The Venus, 8 Cranch Rep.; The Doop, I Robinson, 196, -- and casee
there cited. 'l'l1e Amy Warwick, opinion of Judge Sprague.
t Judge Sprague.
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As a matter of expediency, Congress may di1 ect that

,w property of loyal citizem, residing in disloyal States,

should be seiied by military force, without compensation. This is an act of grace, which, though not required by the laws of war, may well be granted. The
commander-in-chief may also grant the same indulgence. But the military commanders are always at
liberty to seize, in an enemy's count ry, whatever property they deem necessary for the sustenance of troops,
or military stores, whether it is the property of
friend or enemy; it being usual, however, to pay for
all that is taken from friends. These doctrines have
been carried into effect in Missouri.
The President having adopted the policy of protecting loyal citizens wherever they may be found, all
seizure of their property, and all interference with them,
have so far been forborne. But it should be understood
that such forbearance is optional, not compulsory. It
is done from a sense of justice and humanity, not because law or constitution render it inevitable. And
this forbearance is not likely to be carried to such an
extent as to endanger the success of the armies of the
Union, nor to despoil them of the legitimate fruits of
victory over rebels.
CIVIL RIGHTS OF LOYAL CITIZENS IN LOYAL DISTRICTS ARE l!IODJFIED BY THE EXIS'l'ENCE OF WAR.

While war is raging, many of the rights held sacred
by the constitution- rights which cannot be violated by
any acts of Congress - may and must be suspended and
held in abeyance. If this were not so, the government
might itself be destroyed; the army and navy might
be sacrificed, and one part of the constitution would
NULLTl1 Y the rest.
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If freedom of speech cannot be suppressed, sp~es cannot be caught, imprisoned, and hung.
If freedom of the press cannot be interfered with, all
our military plans may be betrayed to the enemy.
If no man can be deprived of life without trial by jwy,
a soldier cannot slay the enemy in battle.
If enemy's property cannot be taken without "due
process of law," how can the soldier disarm his foe and
seize his weapons ?
If no person can be arrested, sentenced, and shot, without trz'al by jury in the county or State where bis crime
is alleged to have been committed, how can a deserter
be slwt, or a spy be hung, or an enemy be taken prisoner.?
It has been said that "amidst arins the laws are silent.''
It would be more just to say, that while war rages, the
rigkts, which in peace are sacred, must and do give way
to the higher right - the right of public safety - the
right which the COUNTRY, the whole count1y, claz'nzs to
be protected from its enemies, domestic and foreign from spies, from conspirators, and from traitors. The
sovereign and almost dictatorial powers - existing
only in actual war; ending when war ends- to be
used in self-defence, and to be laid down when the occasion has passed, are, while they last, as lawful, as constitutional, as sacred, as the administration of justice by
judicial courts in times of peace. They may be dangerous; war itself is dangerous; but danger does not
make them unconstituti'onal. If the commander-in-chief
orders the army to seize the arms and ammunition of
the enemy; to capture their persons; to shell out their
batteries; to hang spies or shoot deserters; to destroy
the armed enemy in open battle; to send traitors to
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fqrts and prisons ; to stop the press from aiding and
comforting the enemy by betraying our military plans;
to arrest within our lines, or wherever they can be
seized,. persons against whom there is reasonable evidence of their having aided or abetted the rebels, or of
intending so to do, - the pretension that in so doing
he is violating the constitution is not only erroneous,
but it is a plea in behalf of treason. To set up the
. rules of civil administration as overriding and controlling the laws of war, is to aid and abet the enemy. It
falsifies the clear meaning of the constitution, which
not only gives the power, but makes it the plain duty
of the President, to go to war with the enemy of his
country. And the restraints to which he is subject
when in war, are not to be found in the municipal
regulations, which can be administered only in peace,
but in the laws and usages of nations regulating the
conduct of war.
BELLIGEREN'l' RlGHT TO CONFISCATE ENEMY'S REAL ESTATE.

The belligerent 1-iglli of the government to confiscate
enemy's real estaie, situated in this country, can hardly admit
of a question. The title to no inconsiderable part of
the real estate in each of the original States of the
Union, rests upon the validity of confiscation acts,
passed by our ancestors against loyal adherents to the
crown. Probably none of these States failed to pass
and apply these laws. English and American acts of
confiscation were recognized by the laws of both countries, and their operation modified by treaties; their
validity never was denied. The only authority which either
of the States or colonies ever bad for passing such
laws was derived from the fact that they were beliigere11is.
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It will be observed that the question as to the belli.
gerent right to confiscate enemy's real estate situated
in the United States, is somewhat different from the
question whether in conquering a foreign country it
will be lawful to confiscate the private real estate of
the enemy.
It is unusual, in case of conquest of a foreign country,
for the conqueror to do more than to displace its sovereign, and assume dominion over the country. On a
mere change of sovereignty of the country, it would be
harsh and severe to confiscate the private property
and annul the private rights of citizens generally. And
mere conquest of a country does not of itself operate as
confiscation of enemy's property; nor does the cession
of a country by one nation to another destroy private
rights of property, or operate as confiscation of personal or real estate/' So it was held by the Supreme
Court in the case of the transfer by treaty of Florida
to the United States; but it was specially provided in
that treaty that private property should not be interfered with. The forhearance of a conqueror from confiscating the entire property of a conquered people is
usually founded in good policy, as well as in humanity.
The object of foreign conquest is to acquire a permanent addition to the power and territory of the conqueror. This object would be defeated by stripping
his subjects of every thing. The case is very different where confiscation will only break up a nest of
traitors, and drive them away from a country they have
betrayed.
Suppose that certain Englishmen owned large tracts
• United Statu v. Juan Ricltmond, 7 P eters, 51.
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of real estate in either of the United States or territories thereof, and war should break out; would any one
doubt the right of Congress to pass a law confiscating
such estate ?
The laws of nations allow either belligerent to seize
and appropriate whatever property of the enemy it can
gain possession of; and, of all descriptions of property
which government could safely permit to be owned or
occupied by an alien enemy, real estate within its own
dominion would be the last.
No distinction can be properly or legally made between the different kinds of enemy property, whether
real, personal, or mixed, so far as regards their liability
to confiscation by the war power. Lands, money,
slaves, debts, may and have been subject to this liability. The methods of appropriating and holding
them are different - the result is the same. And,
considering the foundation of the right, the object for
which it is to be exercised, and the effects resulting
from it, there is nothing in law, or in reason, which
would indicate why one can and the other cannot be
taken away from the enemy.
In Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch, p. 123, the Supreme
Court of the United States say, " Respecting the power of government, no doubt is entertained.
T hat war gives to the sovereign the full right to take the persons and
confiscate the property of the enemy, wherever found, is conceded.
The mitigations of this rule, which the humane and wise policy of
modern times has introduced into practice, will more or less affect the
exercise of this right, but cannot impair the right itself- that remains
undiminished ; and when the sovereign authority shall choose to bring
it into operation, the judicial department must give effect to its will."
" It may be considered," they say, "as the opinion of all who have
\Vl'itten on the Jus belli, that war gives the right to confiscate," &c.
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Chancellor Kent says, " When Wat' is duly declared, it is not merely a war between tnis
and the adverse government in their political characters. Every
man is, in judgment of law, a party to the acts of his own go·vernment, and a war between the government of two nations is a war
between all the i~dividuals of the one and all tJ1e individuals of which
the other nation is composed. Government is the representative of the
will of the people, and acts for the whole society. This is foe theory
of all governments, and the best writers on the law of nations concur
in the doctrine, that when the sovereign of a state declares war
against another sovereign, it implies that the whole nation declares
war, and that all the subjects of the one are enemies to all the subjects
of the other."
"Very important consequences concerning the obligations of subj ects are deducible from this principle. When hostilities have commenced, · the first objects that present themselves for detention and
capture are the persons and property of the enemy found within the
territory on the breaking out of war. According to strict authority, a
state has a right to deal as an enemy with persons and property so
found within its power, and to confiscate the property and detain the
persons as prisoners of war." •

We thus see, that by the law of nations, by the practice of our own States, by the decisions of courts, by
the highest authority of legal writers, an,d by the deductions of reason, there can be no question of the constitutional right of confiscation of enemy real estate of
which we may gain possession. And the legal presumption that real estate situated in rebellious districts
is enemy property, would seem to be as well founded
as it is in case of personal property.t
It is for the government to decide how it shall
use its belligerent right of confiscation. 'l'he n umber of slaveholders in the rebellious States, who
• 1 Kent's Com., p. 55. See also Grotius, B. III. ch. 3, sect. 9 ; ch. 4,
sect. 8. Burlamaqu.i, Part IV. ch. 4, sect. 20. Vattel, B. III. ch. 5, sect. 70.
t See p9ge 57.
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al'e the principal land owners in that ret:)on, and
who are the chief authors and supporters of this rebellion, constitute, all told, less than one in one hundred
rind twenl,lJ eigl1t of the people of the United States,
and less than one jiftietli part of the inhabitants of their
own districts, being far less in proportion to the
whole population of the country than the old tories
in the time of the revolution were to the colonists.*
• In confirmation of these views of the Wnr Powers of Congress, see ilie
chapter on the ·w ar Powers of the President, and No·rBS thereon.
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C HAPTER III.
WAR PO~"ER OF TIIE PRESIDE~T TO E:\IANCIP.\.TE SlAVES.

THE power of the President, as commander-in-chief
of the army and navy of the United States, when iu
actual service, to emancipate the slaves of any belligerent section of the country, if such a measure becomes necessary to save the government from destruction, is not, it is presumed, denied by any respectable
authority."'
WHY THE POWER EXISTS.

The liberation of slaves is looked upon as a means of
embarrassing or weakening the enemy, or of strength•
ening the military power of our army. If slaves be
treated as contraband of war, on the ground that
they may be used by their masters to aid in prosecuting war, as employees upon military works, or as
laborers furnishing by their industry the means of carrying on hostilities ; or if they be treated as, in law,
belligerents, following the legal condition of their
owners; or if they be deemed loyal subjects having a
just claim upon the government to be released from
their obligations to give aid and service to disloyal and
belligerent masters, in order that they may be free to
perform their higher duty of allegiance and loyalty to
the United States ; or if they be regarded as subjects
• It has been shown in a previous chapter that the government has a
right to treat rehels either as belligere11ts or as subjects, and to subject
them to the severities of international belligerent law.
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of the United States, liable to do military duty; or if
they be made citizens of the United States, and soldiers;
or if the authority of the masters over their slaves is
the means of aiding and comforting the enemy, or of
throwing impediments in the way of the government,
or depriving it of such aid and assistance in successful
prosecution of the war, as slaves would and could
nfford, if released from the control of the enemy, - or
if releasing the slaves would embarrass the enemy, and
make it more difficult for them to collect and maintain
large armies; in either of these cases, the taking away
of these slaves from the "nid and service" of the
enemy, and putting them to the aid and service of the
United States, is justifiable as an act of war. The
ordinary way of depriving the enemy of slaves is by
declaring emancipation.
'l'HE PRESIDENT IS 'l'RE SOLE JUDGE.

"It belongs exclusively to the President to judge
when the exigency arises in which he has authority,
under the constitution, to call forth the militia, and his
decision is conclusive on all other persons."'~
The constitution confers on the Executive, when in
actual war, full belligerent powers. The emancipation
of enemy's slaves is a belligerent right. It belongs
exclusively to the President, as commander-in-chief, to
judge whether he shall exercise his belligerent right to
emancipate slaves in those parts of the country which
are in rebellion. If exercised in fact, and while the
war lasts, his act of emancipation is conclusive and
• Such is the language of Chief Justice Taney, in delivering the opinion
of the Supreme Coui-t, j,-, J:fartin v. Mott, 12 Wheaton, 19.
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binding forever on all the departments of government,
and on all persons whatsoever.
POWERS OF THE PRESXDEN'l' NOT INCONSISTENT Wl TH POWERS
CONGRESS TO EMANCIPATE SLAVES.

o~•

The right of the Executive to strike this blow against
his enemy does not deprive Congress of the concurrent right or duty to emancipate enemy's slaves, if in
their Judgment a civil act for that purpose is required by
public welfare and common defence, for the purpose of
aiding and giving effect to such war measures as the
commander-in-chief may adopt.
The military authority of the President is not incompatible with the peace or war powers of Congress; but
both coexist, and may be exercised upon the same subject. Thus, when the army captures a regiment of
soldiers, the legislature may pass ~aws relating to the
captives. So may Congress destroy slavery by abolishing the laws which sustain it, while the commander of
the army may destroy it by capture of slaves, by
proclamation, or by other means.
IS LIBERATION OF ENE~lY'S SLAVES A BELLIGERENT RIGHT?

This is the chief inquiry on this branch of the subject. To answer it we must appeal to the law of
nations, and learn whether there is any commanding
authority which forbids the use of an engine so powerful and so formidable - an engine which may grind to
powder the disloyalty of rebels in arms, while it clears
the avenue to freedom for four millions of Americans.
It is ·only the law of nations that can decide this question, because the constitution, having given authority
~o gcvermnent to make war, has placed no limit what-
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ever to the war powers. T here is, therefore, no legal
control over the war powers except the law of nations,
and no moral control except the usage of modern civilized belligerents.
THE LAW OF NATIONS SANC'l'IONS EMANCJP.A'rION OF ENEMY'S
SLAVES.

I t is in accordance with the law of nations and with
the practice of civilized belligerents in modern times,
to liberate enemy's slaves in time of war by military
power. In the revolutionary war, England exercised
that unquestioned right by not less than three of her
military commanders - Sir Henry Clinton, Lord Dunmore, and Lord Cornwallis. That General Washington
recognized and feared Lord Dunmore's appeal to the
slaves, is show? by his letter on that subject.
" His strength," said Washington, " will increase as a snow-ball by
rolling faster and faster, if some expedient cannot be hit upon to convince the slaves and servants of the impotency of his designs."

The right to call the slaves of colonists to the aid of
the British arms was expressly admitted by Jefferson;
in his letter to Dr. Gordon. In writing of the injury
done to his estates by Cornwallis, he uses the following
language:" He destroyed all my growing crops and tobacco; he burned all
my barns, containing the same articles of last year. H aving first taken
what corn he wanted, he used, as was to be expected, all my stock of
cattle, sheep, and hogs, for the sustenance of his army, and carried off
all the horses capable of service. He carried off also about tliirty
slaves. Had this been to give them freerlom, lie would liave done riglt6.
. . . From an estimate made at the time on the best information I
could collect, I suppose the State of Virginia lost under Lord Cornwallis's hands, that year, about thirty thousand slaves.''.
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Great Britain, for the second time, used the same
1~ight against us in the war of 1812. Her naval a,nd
military commanders invited the slaves, by public proc·1amations, to repair to their standard, promising them
freedom.* The slaves who went over to them were liberated, and were carried away contrary to the express
· terms of the treaty of Ghent, in which it was stipulated
't hat they should not be carried away. England preferred to become liable for a breach of the treaty rather
t4an to break faith with the fugitives. Indemnity for
this violation of contract was demanded and refused.
The question was referred to the decision of the Emperor of Russia, as arbitrator, who decided that inqemnity should be paid by Great Britain, not because .she
had viQlated the law of nations in emancipating slaves,
but because she had broken the terms of the treaty.
In the arguments submitted to the referee, the Bri~
ish government broadly asserted the belligerent right
of liberating enemy's slaves, even if they were treated
as private property. Mr. 1\1.iddleton was instructed by
Mr. J. Q. Adams, then, in 1820, Secretary of State, to
deny that right, and to present reasons for that denial.
But that in this instance he acted in obediencP- to the
instructions of the President and cabinet, and against
his own opinions on the law of nations, is shown by his
subsequent statement in Congress to that e:ffect.t The
question of international law was left undecided by the
Emperor; but the assertion of England, that it is a
• For Admiral Cochrane's Proclamation, instigating the slaves to deser1
their masters, see Niles's Register, vol. vi. p. 242.
t "It was utterly against my judgment and wishes; but I was obliged
to submit, and prepared the requisite despatches." See Congressional
Globe, XXVII. Cong., 2d sess., 1841-2; vol. ii. p. 424.
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legitimate exercise of belligerent rights to liberate.
enemy's slaves, - a right which had previously been ·
enfoxced by her against the colonies, and by France .
agfl.inst her, and again by her against the United States,
- was entitled to grea.t weight, as a reiterated and . ,
authentic reaffirmance of the well-settled doctrine.
In speeches before the House of Representatives 011
the 25th of May, 1836, on the 7th of June, 1841; and
on the 14th and 15th of April; 1842, Mr. Adams explained and asserted in the amplest terms the powe1'S
of Congress, and the authority of the President, to free
enemy's slaves, as a legitimate act of war.* Thus leading statesmen of England and America have concurred
in the opinion that emancipation is a belligerent right.
St. Domingo, in 1793, contained more than fiye hundred thousand negroes, with many .mulattoes and
whites, and was held as a province of France. Intestine commotions had raged for nearly three years between the whites and mulattoes, in which the n~groes
had remained neutral. The Spaniards having effected an -alliance with the slaves who had revolted
in 1791, invaded the island and occupied several important military points. England, also, was making a
treaty with the planters to invade the country; and
thus the possession seemed about to be wrested from
France by the efforts of one or the other of its two
bitterest foes. One thousand French soldiers, a few
mulattoes and loyal slaveholders, were all the force
which could be mustered in favor of the government,
for the protection of this precious ~land, situated so
far away from France.
• For extracts from these speeches, see postea.
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Sonthonax and Polverel, the French commis::.ioners,
on the 29th of August, 1793, issued a proclamation,
under martial law, wherein they declared all the slaves
free, and thereby brought them over en masse to the
support of the government. The English troops landed
three weeks afterwards, and were repulsed principally
by the shwe army.
On the 4th of February, 1794, the National Convention of France confirmed the act of the commissioners,
and also abolished slavery in the other French colonies.
In June, 1794, Toussaint L'Ouverture, a colored man,
admitted by military critics to be one of the great
generals of modern times, having until then fought
in favor of Spain, brought his army of five thousand
colored troops to the aid of France, forced entrance
into the chief city of the island in which the French
troops were beleaguered, relieved his allies, and offered
himself and his army to the service of that government, which had guaranteed to them their freedom.
From that hour the fortunes of the war changed .
. The English were expelled from the island in 1708 ;
the Spaniards also gave it up; and in 1801 Toussaint
proclaimed the republic in the Spanish portion of the
island which had been ceded to France by the treaty
of 1795 ; thus extending the practical operation of
the decree of emancipation over the whole island, and
liberating one hundred thousand more persons who
had been slaves of Spaniards.
The island was put under martial law; the planters
were recalled by Toussaint, and permitted to hire their
former slaves; and his government wa-s enforced by
military power; and from that time until 1802, the
progress of the people in commerce, industry, and gen•
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eral prosperity was rapid and satisfactory. But in
1802 the influence of emigrant planters, and of the
Empress J osephine, a creole of Martinique, induced
Napoleon to send a large army to the isla,nd, to reestablish the slave trade and slavery in all the other islands except St. Domingo, with the design of restoring
slavery there after he should have conquered it. But
war, sickness, and disasters broke up his forces, a,ncl
the treacherous Frenchmen met the due reward of
their perfidy, and were, in 1804, totally driven from
the island. The independence of St. Domingo was
actually established in 1804. The independence of
Hayti was recognized by the United States in 1862.
From this brief outline it is shown, that France
recognizes the right, under martial law, to emancipate
the slaves of an enemy-having asserted and exer-.
cised that right in the case of St. Domingo."' And the
slaves thus liberated have retained their liberty, and
compose, at this day, the principal population of a government who have entered into diplomatic relation$
with the United States.
In Colombia slavery was abolished, first by the
Spani:sh General Morillo, and secondly by the American
General Bolivar. "It was abolished," says John Quincy
Adams, " by virtue of a military command given at the
head of the army, and its abolition continues to this
day. It was abolished by the laws of war, and not by
the municipal enactments; the power was exercised
• For the decree of the French Assembly, see Choi'.x de Rapports- Opinions et Di,1eours 7Jrononces a la Tl-ibune Nationale depuis 1789. Paris, 1821,
t. riv. p. 425. - See Abolition d' Esclavage, ( Colonies Francaises,}par Augustiri Cochin. Paris, 1861. Vol. i. pp. 14, 15, &c.
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by military commanders, under instructions, of course,
from their respective governments."
AUTH0RlTY

,U,7)

USAGE C0NFffilf Tn.E RlG0T.

It may happen that when belligerents on both sides
bold slaves, neither will deem it expedient, through fear
of retaliation, to liberate the slaves of his adversary;
but considerations of policy do not affect questions of
international rights; and forbearance to exercise a
power does not prove its non-existence. While no authority among eminent ancient writers on the subject
has been found to deny the right of emancipation, the
fact that England, France, Spain, and the South American republics have actually freed the slaves of thefr
enemies, conclusively shows that the law and practice
of modern civilized nations sanction that right.
HOW FAR TUE G0V.ER:OIENT 0~' TH£ UNITt:D S'l'A'l'.ES UNDElt F0Rlfl-:R
AIHITNlSTRATI0:-1S llATI SANCTIO)(E0 TllE Dl-~LLlGF.REXT RIGUT
01•' EMANCIPATING SLAVES 01> LOYAL AND OF DISLOYAL CJ'l'IZENS.

The government of the United States, in 1814, recognized the right of their military oflicer8, in time of war,
to appropriate to public use the slaves of loyal citizens
without compensation therefor; also, in 1836, the right
to reward slaves who bavt• 1>crformed public service,
by giving freedom to them and to their families ; also,
in 1838, the principle that slaves of loyal citizens, captured in war, should be emancipated, and not returned
to their masters; and that slaves escaping to the army
of the United States should be treated as prisoners of
war, and not as property of their masters. These propositions are supported by the cases of General Jackson,
General Jessup, General Taylor, and General Gainef<.
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" In Derember, 1814," says a distinguished writer and speaker,
" General Jackson impressed a large number of slaves at and near New
Orleans, and set them at work erecting defences, behind which his troops
won such glory on the 8th of January, 1815. The masters remonstrated. Jackson disregarded their remonstrances, and kept the siaves
at work until many of them were kLlled by the enemy's shot; yet his
action was approved by Mr. Madison, the cabinet, and by the Congress, which bas ever refused to pay the masters for their losses. I n
this case, the masters were professedly friends to the government; and
yet our Presidents, and cabinets, anrl generals have not hesitated to
emancipate their slaves, whenever in time of war it was supposed to
be for the interest of the country to do so. T his was done in the
exercise of the wnr power to which Mr. .Adams referred, and for
which he bad the most abundant authority."
"In 183 6 General Jessup engaged several fugitive slaves to act
as guides and spies, agreeing, if they would ·serve the government
faithfully, to secure to them the freedom of themselves and families.
They fulfilled their engagement in good faith. The general gave them
tbeir freedom, and sent them w the west. Mr. Van Buren's administration sanctioned the contract, and Mr. Tyler's administration approved the proceeding of the general in setting the slaves and their
families free."

The writer above quoted says," Louis, the slave of a man named Pacheco, betrayed :Major Dade's
battalion, in 1836, and when be had witnessed their massacre, he
joined the enemy. Two years subsequently he was captured. Pacheco claimed him; General Jessup said if he had time, he would try
him before a court martial and bang him, but would uot deliver him
to any man. He, however, sent him west, and the fugitive slave became a free men. General Jessup reported bis action to the War
Department, and Mr. Van Buren, then President, with his cabinet,
approved it. Pacheco then appealed to Congress, asking that body
to pay him for the loss of bis slave. The House of Representatives
voted against the bill, which was rejected. .All concurred in the opinion that General Jessup did right in emancipating the slave, instead
of returaing him to bis master.
"In 1838 General Taylor captured a number of negroes said to
be fugitive slaves. Citizens of Florida, learning what had been done,
immediately gathered ~round his camp, intending to ~ccure the slave,1
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who had e~capcd from them. General Taylor told them thnt he La.I
no prisoners but 'prisoners of war.' The claimants then desired to
look at them, in order to determine whether he was holding their
slaves as prisoners. The veteran wanior replied that no man should
oxamine his prisoners fox· such a purpose; and he ordered them to
depart. T his action, being reported to the War D epartment, was ap• ·
proved by the Executh·e. The slaves, however, were sent wes t, and
set free.
"In 1838 many fugitive slaves and Indians, captured in Florida,
had been ordered to be sent west of the Mississippi. Some of them
were claimed at New Orleans by their owners, under legal process.
General Gaines, commander of the military district, refused to deliver
them up to the sheriff, and appeared in court and stated his own
defence.
" Bis grounds of defence were, ' that the~e men, women, and children were captured in war, and held as prisoners of war ; that as
commander of that militury department he held them subject only to
the order of the national Executi,·e ; that ho could recognize no
other power in time of war, or by the laws of wiu·, as authorized to
take prisoners from his possession. Ile asserted that in time of war
all slaves were belligerents as much as their masters. The slnve men
cultivate the earth, and supply provisions. The women cook the food
and nm-se the sick, and contribute to the maintenance of the war, often
more than the same number of males. The sla,e children equally
contribute whatever they are able to the support of the war. The
military officer, he said, can enter into no judicial examination of the
claim of one man to the bone and muscle of another, as property; nor
could he, as a military officer, know what the laws of Florida were
while engaged in maintaining the federal government by force of
arms. In such case he could only be guided by the laws of war, anit
whatever may be the Jaws of any State, they must yield to the safety
of the federal government. He sent the sla,·es west, and they be<·nme free.'"•

On the 26th of May, 1836, in a debate in the House of
Representatives upon the joint resolution for dinrwzding
rations to the distressed fugitives from Indian hostilities
• This defence of Ocriernl Gaines mny be found in House Document
No. 225 of the 2d session of the 25th Congress.
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in the states of Alabama and Georgia, J orrN QU1NcY
ADAMS expressed the following opinions: " Sir, in the authority given to Congress by the constitution of
the United States to declare war, all the powers incidental to war
are, by necessary implication, confened upon the government of tlui
United State~. Now, the powers incidental to war are derived, not
from their internal municipal source, buJ, from the laws and usages of
nations.
"There are, then, l\Ir. Chairman, in the autl.01·ity of Congress and
of the Executive, two classes of powers, altogether different in their
nature, and oflen incompatible witlt each other - the war power and
the peace power. T he peace power is limited by regulations and restricted by provisions prescribed within the Constitution itself. 1'/w
war power is limited only by the laws and usages of nations. This
power is tremendous; it is stricil!J constittdional, but it breaks down
every barrier so anxiously erected for the protection of liberty, ofproperty, and of life. This, sir, is the power which authorizes you to pass
the resolution now before you, and, in my opinion, no other."

After an interruption, Mr. Adams went on to say, " There arc, indeed, powers of peace conferred upon Congress
which al~o come within tbe scope anu jurisdiction of the Jaws of
nations, such as the negotiation of treaties of amity and commerce,
the interchange of public minister$ and consuls, nnd all the personal
and social intercoul's e between the individual inhabitants of the
United States and foreign nations, and the Indian tribes, which require
the interpo.•ition of any law. But tlte powers ofwar are all regulated
by the laws of nation:1, and are su7!iect to no oilier limitation . . .. It
was upon this principle that I voted against the resolution reported by
the slavery committee, 'that Congress possess no constitutional authority to interfere, in any way, with the institution of 1<lavery in any of
the States of this confederacy,' to which resolution most of those with
whom I usually concur, and even my own colleagues in this house,
gave their assent. I do not admit that there is, even among the peace
powers of Congress, no such aut1writy; but in war, tltere are many ways
by tohiclt Congress not only have the authority, but ARE BOUND TO
I NTER~'ERE WITH TllE INSTITUTION OF S L AV};IU- I:X TUE STA.TF.S.

The existing law prohibiting the importation.9f slaves into the United
States from foreign countrie~ is itself an inle1ference wit/1 the inst·i-
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tulion of slavery in the Stales. It wns so considered by the founder,
of the constitution of the United States, in which it was stipulated
that Congress should not interfere, in that way, with the institution,
prior to the year 1808.
"During the late war with Great Britain, the military and naval
commanders of that nation issued proclamations inviting the slaves to
rcpaiJ- to their standard, with p1·omises of freedom and of settlement in
some of the British colonhil establishments. This surely was an interference with the institution of slavery in the States. By the treaty
of peace, Great Britian 8tipulated to evacuate all the forts and places
in the United States, without carrying away any slaves. If the government of the United States had no power to interfere, in any toay,
with the institution of slavery in the States, they would not have had
the authority to require this stipulation. It is well known that this
engagement was not fulfilled by the British naval and military commander8; that, on the contrary, they did carry away all the slaves
whom they bad induced to join them, and that the British government
inflexibly refused to restore any of tllcm to their masters,· tbat a claim
of indemnity wa,; con equently instituted in behalf of the owners of
the slaves, and was successfully maintained. All that series of transactions was an interference by Congress with the institution of slavery
in the States in one way - in the way of protection and support. It
was by I.he institution of slavery alone that the restitution of slaves,
enticed by proclamations into the British service, could be claimed as
property. But for the institution of slavery, the British commanders
c-ould neither have allured them to their standard, nor 1·estored them
otherwise than as liberated prisoners of war. But for the institution
of slavery, there could have been no stipulation lhat they should not
oo carried away as property, nor any claim of indemnity for the violation of that engagement."

Mr. Adams goes on to state how the war power may
be used: " But the war power of Congress over the institution of filavery in
the States is yet far more extensive. Suppose the ease of a servile
war, complicated, as to some extent it is even now, with an Indian
war; suppose Congress were called to raise armies, to supply money
from the whole Union to supp1·ess a senrile insitrrection: would they
have no authority to interfere with the institution of slavery? Tb,.
issue ofa servile war may be dis1'btrous; it may become necessary for the
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master of the slave to recognize his emancipation by a treaty of peace:
can it for an instant be pretended that Congress, in such a contingency,
would haNe no authority to interfere with the institution of slavery, in
any way, in the States? Why, it would be equivalent to ~aying that
Congress have no constitutional authority to make peace. I suppose
a more portentous case, certainly within the bounds of possibility- I
wonld to God I could say, not within the bounds of probability - "
"Do you imagine," he asks, " that your Congress will have no constitutional authority to interfore with the institution of sla,ery, in any
way, in the States of this confederacy? Sir, they must and will interfere with it - perhaps to sustain it by war, perhaps to abolish it by
treaties of peace ; and they will not only possess the constitutional
power so to interfere, but they will be bound in duty to do it, by the
express provisions of the constitution itself. From the instant that
your slaveholding States become the theatre of a war, civil, servile, or
foreign war, from that instant the war powers of Congress extend to interference with the institution of slavery, in every way by which it can
be inte1fered with, from a claim of indemnity for slaves taken or
destroyed, to the cession of States burdened with slavery to a foreign
power."

Extracts from the speech of John Quincy Adams,
delivered in the United States House of Representatives, April 14th and 15th, 1842, on war with Great
Britain and Mexico : "What I say is involuntary, because the subject has been brought
into the house from another quarter, as the gentleman himself admits.
I would leave that institution to the exclusive consideration and management of the States more peculiarly interested in it, just as long as
they can keep within their own bounds. So far, I admit that Congress has no power to meddle with it. As long as they do not step
out of their own bounds, and do not put the question to the people
of the United States, whose peace, welfare, and happiness are all at
stake, so long I will agree to leave them to themselves. But when a
member from a free State brings forward certain resolutions, for which,
instead of reasoning to disprove his positions, you vote a censur e upon
him, and that without hearing, it is quite another affair. .At the time
this was done, I said that, as far as I could understand the resolution ~
proposed by the gentleman from Ohio, (Mr. Gidding:,,) there were
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i;omc of them for which I wa.~ ready to vote, and some which I mn•t
vote against; and I will now tell this house, my constituents, and the
whole of mankind, that the resolution against which I would hiwe
voted was that in which he declares that what are called the sla"e
States have the exclusive right of consultation on the subject or
slavory. F or that resolution I never would vote, because I belicrn
that it is not just, and does not contain constitutional doccrine. I
believe that, so long as the slave States are able to sustain their institutions without going abroad or calling upon other parts of the union to
aid them or act on the subject, so long I will consent never to interfere.
I have said this, and I repeat it; but if they come to the free Stale~
and say to them, You must help us to keep down our slaves, you must
aid u,; in an insurrection and a civil war, then I say that with that call
comes full and plenary power to this house and to the Senate over the
whole subject. I t is a war power. I say it is a war power; and
when your country is actually in war, whether it be a war of invasion
or a war of insurrection, Congress bas power to carry on the war, and
must carry it on, according to the laws of war; and by the laws of
war, an invaded country has all its laws and municipal institutions
swept by the board, and martial law takes the place of them. This
power in Congress bas, perhaps, never been called into exercise under
the present constitution of the United States. But when the laws of
war are in force, what, I ask, is one of those laws? It is this : that
when a country is invaded, and two hostile armies are set in martini
array, the commanders of both armies have power to 1mw.ncipate all tlie
slaves in tlie invaded territory. Nor is this a mere theoretic statement. The history of South Amel'ica shows that the doctrine has
been carried into practical execution within the last thirty years.
Slavery was abolished in Colombia, first, by the Spanish General
Morillo, and, secondly, by the American General Bolivar. I t wa!I
abolished by virtue of a military command give11 at the head of the
army, and its abolition continues to be law to this day. It was abolished
by the laws of wm·, and not by the municipal enactments; the power
was exercised by military commanders, under instructions, of course,
from their respective governments. And here I recur again to the
example of General J ackson. What are you now about in Congrci"i"?
You are about passing a grant to refund to General Jackson the
amount of a certain fine imposed upon him by a judge, under the law;;
of Lhe State of Louisiana. You are going to refu11d him the money,
with interest; and this you are going to do becau~e tlic imposition of
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the fine was m1just. Am! why was it unjust ? BecauRe General
Jackson was acting under t~e laws of war, and because tbe moment.
you place a military commander in a district which is tbe theatre of
wa1·, the laws of war apply to that district.

*

*

*

*

"I might furnish a thousand proofs to show that the pretensions of
g<'ntlemen to tl1e sanctity of their municipal institutions under a state
of actual invasion and of actual war, whether servile, civil, or foreign,
i,, wholly unfounded, and tbat the laws of war do, in all such cases,
take the precedence. I lay this down as the law of nations. I ~ay
that military authority takes, for the time, the place of all municipal
institutions, and slaver,11 among tlie rest,· and that, under that state of
things, so far from its being true that the States where slavery exists
have the exclusive management of the subj ect, not only the President
of the United States, but the commander of the army, bas power to
order the univer;;al emancipation of the slaves. I have given here
more in detail a principle which I have asserted on this floor before
nO\V, and of which I have no more doubt than that you, sir, occupy
that chair. I give it in its development, in order that any gentleman
from any part of the Union may, if he thinks proper, dtmy the truth
of the position, and may maintain his denial; not by indignation, not
by passion and fury, but by sound and sober reasoning from the laws
of nations and the laws of war. .And if my position can be answered
and refuted, I shall receive the refutation with pleas ure; I shall be
glad to listen to reason, aside, as I say, from indignation and passion.
And if, by the force of reasoning, my understanding can be convinced,
I here pledge myself to recant what I have asserted.
" Ltlt my position be answered ; let me be told, let my constituents be
tolJ, let the people of my State be told, - a State whose soil tolerates
not the foot of a slave, - that they are bound by the constitution to a
long and toilsome march, under burning summer suns and a deadly
southem clime, for the suppression of a servile war ; that they are
blmnd to leave their bodies to rot upon the sands of Oarolina, to leave
their wives widows and their children orphans; that those who cannot
march are bound to pour out their treasures while their sons or brothers
are pouring out their blood to suppress a servile, combined with a civil
or a foreign war; and yet that there exists no power beyond the limits
of the slave State where such war is raging to emancipate the slave:;.
] Ray, let this be proved- I am open to conviction; but till that conviction comes, I put it forth, not as a dictate of feeling, but as o, scttl1:d
maxim of the law~ of nations, that, in such a case, the military Ruper-
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sedes t.he civil power; and on this account I sl1oulcl have been obliged
to vote. as T have said, against one of the resolutio11s of my excellent
friend from Ohio, (Mi-. Giddings,) or should at least have required that
it be arnt:oded io conformity with the constitution of tbe U raitc<l States.''
CONCLUSION.

It has thus been proved, that by the law and usage of
rnodern civilized nations, confirmed by the judgment of
eminent statesmen, and by the former practice of this
government, that the President, as commander-in-chief,
lias the authority, as an act of war, to liberate the
slaves of the enemy, that the United States have in
former times sanctioned the liberation of slaves even
of loyal citizens, by military commanders, in time of
war, without compensation therefor; and have deemed
slaves captured in war from belligerent subjects as
entitled to their freedom.*
· • GENERAL WAR PowERS OF THll PnBSIDEXT. It is not intended in this
chapter to explain the general war powers of the President. They arc principally contained in th<? Constitution, Art. II. Sect. 1, Cl. 1 and 7 ; Sect. 2, Cl. 1 ;
Sect. 3, Cl. J.; and in Sect. 1, Cl. 1, and by n ecessary iJnp!ication in Art. I.
Sect. 9, Cl. 2. By Art. II. Sect. 2, the President is made commander-in-chief
of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several
States when called into the service of the United States. This clause gives
ample powers of war to the President, when the army and navy are lawfully in
"actual service." His military authority is supreme, under the constitutiou,
while governing and regulating the land and naval forces, and treating captures
on land and wate1· in accordance with such rules as Congress may have passNl
in pursuance of Art. I. Sect. 8, CJ. 11, 14. Congress may effectually con trol the military power, by refusing to vote supplies, or to raise troops,
and hy impeachment of the President ; but for the military movements, and
measures essential to overcome the enemy, - for the general conduct of the
war, - the President is responsible to and controlled by no other department of
government. Ilis duty is to uphold the constitution and enforce the laws, and
to respect whatever rights loyal citizens arc entitled to enj oy in time of civil
war, to the fullest extent that may be consistent with the performance of the
military duty imposed on him. The effect of a state of war, in changing or modifying civil rights, has been explained in the preceding chapters.
,vhat is the extent of the military power of the President over the p ersons
and property of citizens at a distance from the seat of war- whether he or
the wnr department may lawfully order the arrest of citizens in loyal states on
rcnsonable proof that they are either enemfos or aiding the enellly - or thut
they are 1,pies or emissaries of rebels sent to gain information for their use, or

WAR POWER OF THE PRESIDE.c\'T.

83

to discourage enlistments - whether martial law may be extended over 5 tch
places as the commander deems it necessary to guard, even though distant from
11ny battle field, in order to enable him to prosecute the war effcctunllywhetl1cr the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended as to persons under military arrest, by the President, 01· only by Congress, (on which point judges of
the United States cou1·tsdi.,;agrec); whether, in time of war, all citizens are liable
to military arrest, on rcasouable proof of their aiding or abetting the enemy or whether they arc entitled to practise treason until indicted by some g,·aml jury
-thus, for example, whether Jefferson Davis, or General Lee, if found in Boston, could be arrested by military authority and sent to Fort ,varren ? 'Whether,
in the midst of wide-sp1·ead and terrific war, those persons who violate the laws
of war and the laws of peace, traitors, spies, emissaries, brigands, bush-whackers,
guerrillas, persons in the free States supplying arms nnd ammunition to tbe
enemy, must all be proceeded against by civil tribunals only, under due forms
and precedents of law, by the tardy and ineffectual mar,hinery of arrests by
marshal$, (who can rarely have means of apprehending them,) and of grand
jw-ies, (who meet twice a year, and could seldom if ever seasonably secure the
evidence on which to indict them) ? Whether government is not entitled by
military power to Pl\EVENT the traitors and spies, by anest and imprisonment,
from doing the intended mischief, as well as to punish them after it is done?
Whether war can be carried on successfully, without the power to save the
army and navy from being betrayed and destroyed, by cleprii:ing any citizen
temporarily of tl1e power of acting as an enemy, whenever there is reasonable
cause to suspect him of being one? ·whether these and similar proceedin.gs
are, or :ire not, in violation of any civil rights of citizens under the constitution,
are questions to which the answers depend on the construction given to the war
powers of the Executive. Whatever any commander-in-chief, in accordance
wiili the usual practice of carrying on war among civilized nations, may order
his army and navy to do, is within the power of the President to order and to
execute, because the constitution, in express terms, gives him the supreme
command of both. If he makes war upon a forcig11 nation, he should be governed by the law of nations; if lawfully engaged in civil war, he may treat his
enemies as subjects and as belligerents.
The constitution provides that the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces, and the treatment of captures, sliould be according to law:
but it imposes, in express tE>rms, no other qualification of the war power of the
President. I t does not prescribe any territorial limits, within the United
States, to which his military operations shall be restricted ; nor to which the
picket guard, or military guards (sometimes called p,·ovost marshals) shall be
confined. It does not exempt any person making war upon the country, or
aiding and comforting the enemy, from being captured, or arrested, wherever
he may be found, whether within or out of the lines of any division of the army.
It does not provide iliat public enemies, or their abettors, shall find saie asylum
in any part of the United States where military power can reach them. I t
requires the President, as an executive magistrate, in time of peace to see that
the laws existing in time of peace are faithfully executed- and as commanderin-chief, in ti.me of war, to see that the laws of war arc executed. In doing bnth
duties he is st.i·ictly obeying the constitution.
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CHAPTER IV.
BILLS OF ATTAINDER.

the authority of government shall have been
reestablished over the rebellious districts, measures
may be taken to punish individual criminals.
The popular sense of outraged justice will embody
itself in more or less stringent legislation against
those who have brought civil war upon us. It would
be surprising if extreme severity were not demanded
by the supporters of the Union in all sections of the
country. Nothing short of a general bill of attainder,
it is presumed, will fully satisfy some of the loyal
people of the slave States.
AFTER

BILLS OF .A.T'l'.A.INDER IN ENGLAND,

By these statutes, famous in English political history, tyrannical governments have usually inflicted
their severest revenge upon traitors. The irresistible
power of law has been evoked to annihilate the criminal, as a citizen of that State whose majesty he had
offended, and whose existence he had assailed. His
life was terminated with horrid tortures; his blood was
corrupted, and his estates were forfeited to the king.
While still living, he was deemed, in the language of
the law, as" civiiiter mortuus."
PUNISHUENT BY .A.'l'TAINDER.

The refined cruelty which characterized the punishment of treason, according to the common Jaw of Eng-
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land, would have been discreditable to the barbarism
of North American savages in the time of the Georges,
and has since been equalled only by some specimens of
chivalry in the secei-sion army. The mode of executing
these unfortunate political offenders was this: 1. The culprit w as required to be dragged on the
g round or over the pavement to the gallows; he could
not be allowed, by law, to walk or ride. Blackstone
says, that by comzii-ance, at last ripened into law, he was
allowed to be dragged upon a hurdle, to prevent the
extreme torment of being dragged on the grnund or
pavement.
2. To be hanged by the neck, and then cut down
alive.
3. His entrails to be taken out and burned while he
was yet alive.
4. His head to be cut off.
5. His body to be divided into four parts.
6. His head and quarters to be at the king's disposal.*
Blackstone informs us that these directions were, in
former times, literally and studiously executed. J udge
Story observes, they "indicate at once a savage and
ferocious spirit, and a degrading subserviency to royal
resentments, real or supposed." t
ATTAL'\OEl?S PROllIBITEO AS IXCOXSISTE::'<'l' WITU COXSTITUTIO::'<AL
LIBERTY.

Bills of attainder struck at the root of all civil rights
and political liberty. To declare single individuals, or
• 4 Bia. Com. 92.
Lord Coke undertakes to justify the severity of this punishment by
examples drawn from Scripture.

t
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a large class of persons, criminals, in time of peac0,
merely upon the ground that they entertained certain
opinions upon questions of church or state; to do this
by act of Parliament, without a hearing, or after the
death of the alleged offender; to involve the innocent
with the guilty in indiscriminate punishment, - was an
outrage upon the rights of the people not to be tolerated in our constitution as one of the powers of government.
BILLS OF ATTAINDER ABOLISHED.

'r he constitution provides expressly,* that "no bill
of attainder, or ex post facto law, shall be passed by Congress; and that no State shall pass any bill of attainder,
ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts." -r There is, therefore, no power in this country
to pass any bill of attainder.
WHAT IS A BILL OF ATTAINDER?

Wherein does it differ from other statutes for the
punishment of criminals ?
A "bill of attainder," in the technical language of
the law, is a statute by which the offender becomes
"attainted," and is liable to punishment without having
been convicted of any crime in the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings.
If a person be expressly named in the bill, or comes
within the terms thereof, he is liable to punishment.
The legislature undertakes to pronounce upon the guilt
of the accused party. He is entitled to no hearing,
when living, and may be pronounced guilty when ab• Art. I. Sect. 9.

t

Art. I . Sect. I 0.
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:;;ent from the country; or even long after his death.
Lord Coke sayli that the reigning monarch of England,
who was slain at Bosworth, is said to have been attainted by act of Parliament a few months after his
death, notwithstanding the absurdity of deeming him
at once in possession of a throne and a traitor.,:,
A question has been raised, whether any statute ca11
be deemed a bill of attainder if it inflicts a degree of
punishment less than that of death ?
In technical law, statutes were called bills of attainder
only when they inflicted the penalty of death or outlawry; while st.a,tutes which inflicted only forfeiture:;;,
fines, imprisonments, and similar punishments, were
calle<l bills of "pains and penalties." This distinction
was practically observed in the legislation of England.
1o bill of attainder can probably be found which did
not contain the marked feature of the death penalty,
or the penalty of outlawry, which was considered as
equivalent to a judgment of death. Judgment of outlawry on a capital crime, pronounced for absconding or
1Jeeing from justice, was founded on that which was in
law deemed a tacit confession of guilt. t
IllLLS OF PAINS AND PENAL'rms.

It has been said that within t he sense of the constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains and
penalties ; and t his view seemed to derive support from
a remark of a judge of the Supreme Court. "A bill of
attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may
confiscn.te his property, or both." l
• Sec Story on the Constitution, B. III. Sect. 678.
182.
t /l'letcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, ll.

t Standf. Pl. Co. 41, 122,
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It is true that a bill of attainder may affect the life
of an individual; but if the individual attainted were
dead before the passage of the act, as was the case with
Richard III., the bill could not affect his life ; or if a
bill of attainder upon outlawry were passed against
persons beyond seas, the life of the party would not be
in fact affected, although the outlawry was equivalent
in the eye of the law to civil death. There is nothing
in this dictum inconsistent with the ancient and acknowledged distinction between bills of attainder and
bills of pains and penalties; nothing which would authorize the enlargement of the technical meaning of
the words; nothing which shows that Judge Marshall
deemed that bills of attainder included bills of pains
and penalties within the sense of the constitution.
This dictum is quoted by Judge Story,* who supposed
its meaning went beyond that which is now attributed
to it. But he does not appear to sanction such a view
of the law. This is the only authority to which he
refers ; and he introduces the proposed constrnction
of this clause by language which is used by lawyers
who have little confidence in the result which the authority indicates, viz., "it seems." No case has been
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States
which shows that" bills of attainder," within the sense
of the constitution, include any other statutes than
those which were technically so considered according
to the law of England.
EX POS'l' FACTO LAWS PROHIBITED. BILLS OF PAtNS AND PENALTIES, AS WELL AS AT'l?AINDERS, UNCONSTl'l'U'l?IONAL.

It does not seem important whether the one or the
other construction be put upon the language of this
• Com. Const. III. Ch. 32, Sect. 3.
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clause, nor whether bills of pains and penalties be or be
not included within the prohibition; for Congress can
pass 110 ex post facto law; and it was one of the invariable characteristics of bills of attainder, and of bills of
pains and penalties, that they were passed for the punishment of supposed crimes which had been committed
before the acts were passed.
The clause prohibiting Congress from pm;sing au.r
ex post facto law would doubtless have prevented their
passing any bill of attainder; but this prohibition was
inserted from greater caution, and to prevent the
exercise of constructive powers against political offenders. No usurpation of authority in the worst
<lays of English tyranny was more detested by the
framers of our constitution than that which attempted
to ride over the rights of Englishmen to gratify royal
revenge against the friends of free government. H e~ce
in that respect they shut down the gate upon this sovereign power of government. They forbade any punishment, under any form, for crime not against some
standing law, which had been enacted before the time
of its commission. They prevented Congress from passing any attainder laws, whereby the accused might be
deprived of his life, or bis estate, or both, without trial
by jury, and by his political enemies; and whereby
also his relatives would suffer equally with himself.
ATTAn"DERS IN TIIE COLONIES A..'iD STATES.

Bills in the nature of bills of attainder were familiar
to our ancestors in most of the colonies and in the
States which subsequently formed the Union. And
several of these acts of attainder have been pronounced
valid by the highest courts in these I tates. By the
12
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act of the State of New York, October 22, 177 D, the
real and personal property of persons adhering to the
enemy was forfeited to the State ; and this act has been
held valid,=~ and proceedings under acts of attainder
wore, ai;: the court held, to be construed according to
the rules in cases of attainder, and not by the ordinary
course of jndicia.1 proceedings; t and these laws ap•
plied to persons who were dead at the time of the proceedings. t
"Bills of attainder," says the learned judge, (in 2
Johuson's Cases,) "have always been construed in
this respect with more latitude than ordinary judicial
proceedings, for the purpose of giving them more certain effect, and that the intent of the legislature mity
prevail." "They are extraordinary acts of sovereignty,
founded on public policy§ and the peace of the community." "The attainted person," says Sir Matthew
H ale, "is guilty of the execrable murder of the king."
The act of New York, October 22, 1779, attainted,
among others, Thomas J ones of the offence of adhering
to the enemies of the State. This was a specific offence,
and was not declared or understood to amount to treason, because many of the persons attainted had never
owed allegiance to the State. II
Bills of attainder were passed not only in New York,
but in several other colonies and States, inflicting the
penalties of attainder for other crimes than treason,
actual or constructive. And the harsh operation of
such laws, their injustice, and their liability to be abused
• Sleiglit v. Kane, 2 Johns. Cas. 236, decided in April, 1801.
Jackson v. Sands, 2 Johns. 267.
Jackson v. Stokes, 3 Johns. 15.
§ Foster, 83, 84.
I Jackson v. Catlin, 2 Johns. R. 260.

t
t
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in times of public excitement, were understood b) th'-se
who laid the foundations of this government too well
to permit them to disregard the dangers which they
sought to avert, by depriving Congress, as well as the
several States, of all power to enact such cruel statutes.
If bills of attainder had been passed only for the
punishment of treason, in the sense of making war
upon the government., or aiding the enemy, they would
have been less odious and less dangerous ; but the regiment of crimes which servile Parliaments had enrolled
under the title of" treason," had become so formidable,
and the brutality of the civil contests in England had
been so shocking, that it was thought unsafe to trust
any government with the arbitrary and irresponsible
power of condemning by statute large classes of their
opponents to death and destruction for that which only
want of success had made a crime.
BILLS OF ATTAINDER, HOW RECOGNIZED.

The cousequences of attainder to the estate of the
party convicted will be more fully stated hereafter;
but it is essential to observe that there are certain characteristics which distinguish bills of attainder from all
other penal statutes.
1. They always inflict the penalty of death upon the
offender, or of outlawry, which is equivalent to death.
2. They are always ex post facto laws, being passed
after the crime was committed which they are to
punish.
3. They never allow the guilt or innocence of the
persons attainted to be ascertained by trial; but the
guilt is attributed to them by act of Parliament.
4. They always inflicted cermin penalties, among
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which were corruption of blood and forfeiture of <:.state.
The essence of attainder was in corruption of blood,
and without the corruption of blood no person was by
the English law attainted.
Unless a law of Congress shall contain these four
characteristics -penalty of death, or outlawry, corruption of blood, and the legislative, not judicial condemnation - embodied in a law passed after the commission of the crime it seeks to punish, it is not a bill of
attainder under the sense of the constitution.
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C HAPTER V.
RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO DECLARE BY STATUTE TIIE PUNISJUffiNT OF TREASON, AND rrs CONSTITUTIONAL LDUTATIOXS.
'l' REASON.

Tfil highest crime known to the law i'.! treason. It is
"the sum of all villanies;" its agents have been branded
with infamy in all countries where fidelity and justice
have respect. The name of one who betrays his friend
becomes a byword and a reproach. How much deeper
are the guilt and infamy of the criminal who betrays
his country ! No convict in our State prisons can have
fallen so low as willingly to associate with a TRAITOR.
There is no abyss of crime so dark, so horrible, as that
to which the traitor has descended. Ile has left forever behind him conscience, honor, and hope.
.A.."'CTENT ENGLlSH DOCTRL."<E OF CONSTRUCTIVB TREASON.

Treason, as defined in the law of England, at the
date of the constitution, embraced many misdemeanors
which are not now held to be crimes. Offences of a political character, not accompanied with any intention to
subvert the government; mere words of disrespect to
the ruling sovereign; assaults upon the king's officers
at certain times and places; striking one of the judges
in court; and many other acts which clid not partake
of the nature of treason, were, in ancient times, declared
treason by Padiament, or so construed by judges, as
to c,,nstitnte that crime. Indeed, thel'e was nothing to
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prevent Parliament from proclaiming any act of a subject to be treason, thereby subjecting him to all its terrible penalties. The doctrine of constructive treasous,
created by servile judges, who held their office during
the pleasure of the king, was used by them in such a
way as to enable the sovereign safely to wreak vengeance upon his victims under the guise of judicial
condemnation. If the king sought to destroy a rival,
the judges woulcl pronounce him guilty of constructive
treason; in other words, they would so construe the
acts of the defendant a::i to make them treason. Thus
the king coulcl selfishly outrage every principle of
law and justice, while avoiding responsibility. No
man's life or property was safe. The wealthier the
citizen, the greater was his apprehension tha.t the king
would seize and confiscate his estates. The danger
lay in the fact that the nature and extent of the legal
crime of treason was indeterminate, or was left to
arbitrary determination. The power to dejiue treason,
to declare from time to time who should be deemed in
law to be traitors, was in its nature an arm~rary power.
No government having that power would fail to become
oppressive in times of excitement, and especially in
civil war. As early as the reign of Edward III., Parliament put an end to these judge-made-treasons by declaring and defining all the different acts which should
be deemed treason; and, although subsequent statutes
have added to or modified the law, yet treason has at
all times since that reign been defined by statute.
POWER OF CONGRESS TO DEI-'lNE A...'\D P UXIS8 TREASOX Llilll'F.D.

It was with full knowledge of the history of judicial
U'3urpation, of the tyranny of exa~peratcd govern-
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ments, and of the tendency of rival factions in iepublics to seek revenge on each other, that the convention
which framed the constitution, having given no power
to the judiciary, like that poss~ssed by English judges,
to make constructive crimes, introduced several provisions limiting the power of Congress to define and
punish the political crime of treason, as well as other
offences.
The various clauses in the constitution relating to
this subject, in order to a clear exposition of their
meaning, should be taken together as parts of our.
system.
ATTA..TNDER AND EX POST FACTO LAWS.

The first and most important limitation of the power
of Congress is found in Art. I. Sect. 9 : "No bill of
attainder, or ex post facto law, shall be passed." By prohibiting bills of attainder, no subject could be made a
criminal, or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, by
mere act of legislat£on, without trial or conviction. The
power to enact ex post facto laws having been withheld, Congress could not pass "a statute which would
render an act punishable in a manner in which it was
not punishable when it was commi'tted." No man's
life could be taken, his liberty abridged, nor his estate,
nor any part of it, seized for an act which had not, previously to the commission thereof, been declared by
some law as a crime, and the manner and extent of
punishment prescribed.* Hence no law of Congress
can make that° deed a crime which was not so before
the deed was done. Every man may know what are the
• See Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 138.
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laws to which he is amenable in time of peace by reading the statutes. There can be uo retrospective crimi•
nal legislation by any State, or by the United States.
1'1H,ASON DE.-XN};D BY S'l'ATUTE.

These points having been secured, the next. ste p was
to define the c RnIE OF TREASON. Countless difficulties aud
dangers were avoided by selecting from the English
statutes one crime onl;J, which should be deemed to constitute that offence.
The constitution provides that, "Treason against the
United St.'1..tes shall consist only in levying war against
them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid
and comfort." ''' Hence many acts are not treasonable
which were so considered according to the law of England, and of the colonies and States of this countt·y.
Each State still retains the power to define and punish
treason against itself in its own way.
Nothing but 01:ert acts are treasonable by the laws of
the United States; and these overt acts must be overt
acts of war.t These acts must be proved either by
confession in open court, or by two witnesses to the
same act. ! Our ancestors took care that no one
should be convicted of this infamous crime, unless his
guilt is made certain. So odious was the offence
that even a senator or representative could be arrested
on suspicion of it. § All civil officers were to be removed
from office on impeachment and conviction thereof II
And a person charged with treason against a State, and
fleeing from that State to another, was to be delivered
• Art. III. Sect. 3.
§ Art. I. Sect. 6.

t

Ibid.

II Art. 11. Sect. 4.

t

Ibid.
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up, on demand, to the State having jurisdiction."' The
crime being defined, and the nature of the testimony
to establish it being prescribed, and conviction being
possible only in " open court," the constitution then
provides, - that" Congress shall have power to declare
the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason
shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except
during the life of the person attainted." t
CONGRESS llAVE UNLUIITED POWER TO DECLARE THE PUN1SHMENT

0~' 'J'REASON.

By this article, the constitution has in express terms
given to Congress the power to declare the punishment
of treason; and the nature and extent of the punishment which they may declare are not limited. Congress
may impose the penalty of fine, or imprisonment, or
outlawry, or banishment, or forfeiture, or death, or of
death and forfeiture of property, personal and real.
Congress might have added to all these punishments
the more terrible penalty which followed, as a consequence of atta£nder of treason, under the law of England,
had the constitution not limited the effect and operation of that species of attainder.
A COMMON ERROR.

Some writers have supposed that this article in the
constitution, which qualifies the effect of an attainder
of treason, was a limiLa:tion of the power of Congress to
declare the punishment of treason. This is an error. A
careful examination of the language used in the m• Constitution, Art. IV. Sect. 6.

13

t

Art. III. Sect. 3.
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strument itself, and of tbe history of the English law
of attainder, will make it evident that the framers of
the constitution, in drafting Sect. 3 of Art. III. did not
design to restrain Congress from decla.riog against the
traitor himself, his person or estate, such penalties
as it might deem sufficient to atone for the highest of
crimes.
Whenever a person had committed high treason in
England, and had been duly indicted, tried, and convicted, and when final judgment of guilty, and sentence
of death or outlawry, had been pronounced upon him,
the immediate and inseparable consequence, by common law, of the sentence of death or outlawry of the
offender for treason, and for certain other felonies, was
attainder. Attainder means, in its original application,
the staining or corruption of the blood of a criminal
who was in the contemplation of law dead. ~e then
became "attinctus - stained, blackened, attainted."
COXSEQUENCES O~' A'rT.USDER.

Certain legal results followed from attainder, among
which are the following: The convict was no longer of
any credit or reputation. He could not be a witness
in any court. Ile was not capable of performing the
legal functions of any other man; his power to sell or
transfer his lands and personal estate ceased. By anticipation of his punishment he was already dead in law/
except when the fiction of the law would prntect him
from some liability to others which he had the power
to discharge. It is true that the attainted felon could
not be murdered with irnpunity,t but the law preserved
• 3 Inst. 21a.

t

Fo&ter, 73.
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his physical existence only to vindicate its own majesty,
and to inflict upon the offender an ignominious death.
CORRUPTION OF BLOOD.

Among the most important consequences of attainder
of felony, were those resulii'ng from " corrup#on of blood,"
which is the essence of attai'nder.* Blackstone says,t " Another immediate consequence of attainder is the cot-ruption of
blood, both upwards and downwards; so that an attainted person can
neither inherit lands or other hercditaments from his ancestors, nor
retain those he is already in possession of, nor transmit them by descent
to any heir; but the same shall escheat to the lord of the fee, subject
to the king's superior right of forfeiture ; and the person attainted
shall also obstruct all descents to his posterity whenever they are
obliged to derive a title through him, to a remote ancestor."

The distinctions between escheat and forfeiture it is
not necessary now to state, t because, whether the forfeiture enured to the benefit of the lord or of the king,
the effect was the same upon the estate of the criminal. §
By this legal fiction of corruptwn of b'lood, the offender
was deprived of all his estate, personal and real; his
children or other heirs could not inherit any thing from
him, nor through him from any of his ancestors. " If
a father be seized in fee, and the son commits treason
and is attainted, and then the father dies, then the
lands shall escheat to the lord." II
SAVAGE CRUELTY 01<' ENGLISH LAW.

By the English system of escheats to the lord and
forfeitures to the king, the innocent relatives of the
offender were punished, upon the theory that it was
• See Co. Litt. 391.

t

4 Com. b. 388.
p. 254

J Co. Litt. p. 391. Bia. Com. Vol. II.

t

See Co. Litt. 13.

ll Co. Litt. p. 13.
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the duty of every family to secure the loyalty of all its
members to the sovereign; and upon failure to do so,
the whole family should be plunged into lasting disgrace and poverty. A punishment which might continue for twenty generations, was indeed inhuman, and
received, as it merited, the condemnation of liberal men
in all countries; ~• but aristocratic influence in Engfand
had for centuries resisted the absolute and final abandonment of these odious penalties. The framers of
the constitution have deprived Congress of the power
of, passing bills of attainder. They might have provided that no person convicted of treason should be
held to be attainted, or be liable to suffer any of the
common law penalties which resulted from attainder,
but only such penalties as Congress should prescribe
by statute. They have, however, not in terms, abolished
attainders, but have modified their effect, by declaring
that attainder shall not work corruption of blood.
FORFEITmrns.

By the law of England, forfeiture of estates was also
one of the necessary legal consequences of attainder of
felony. Real estate was forfeited upon attainder, personal estate upon conviction before attainder. By
these forfeitures all the property, rights, and claims, of
every name and nature, went to the lord or the king.
But forfeiture of lands related back to the time when
the felony was committed, so as to avoid all subsequent
sales and encumbrances, but forfeiture of goods took
effect at the date of conviction, so that sales of personal p1operty, prior to that time, were valid, unless col• See 4 Bla. Com. p. 388.
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lusive.''' The estates thus forfeited were not m.ere
estates for life, but the whole interest of the felon, whatever it might be. Thus forfeiture of property was a
consequence of attainder; attainder was a consequence
of the sentence of death or outlawry; and these penal
consequences o( attainder were over and above, and in
addition to, the penalties expressed in the terms of
tlw judgment and sentence of ihe court.t The punishment,
and in many instauces the only punishment, to which
the sentence of the court condemned the prisoner, was
death or outlawry. The disabilities which resulted fro)ll
that sentence were like the disabilities which in other
cases result from the sentence of a criminal for infamous crimes. Disability to testify in courts, 01 to
hold offices of trust and honor, sometimes follows, uot
as part of the punishment prescribed for the offence,
but as a consequence of the condition to which the
criminal has reduced himself.
There is a clear distinction between the punishment
of treason by specific penalties and those consequential
damages and injuries which follow by common law as
the result or technical effect of a sentence of death or
outlawry for treason, viz., attainder of treason, and corruption of blood and forfeiture of estates.! To set this
subject in a clearer light, the learned reader will recollect that there were different kinds of attainder:
• See Stat. 13 Eliz. ch. 5; 2 B. & A. 258; 2 Hawkins's P . C. 4.54; 3
Ins. 232; 4 Bia. 387; Co. Litt. 391, b.
See 2 Greenlears Cruise on Real Property, p. 145, and note ; 2 Kent,
386; 1 Greenlears Cruise, p. 71, sect. I, and note.
t There is a pro,•ision in the new constitution of :Maryland, (1851,) that
"no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate."
(Deel. of Rights, Art. 24.) The constitution of Ohio (1851) contains the
same "nds in th~ 12th sect. of the Deel. of Rights. The constitutions of

102

CONSTITUl'ION OF THE UNITED STATES.

l. Attainders in a prremunire; in which, "from the conviction, the defendant shall be out of the king's protection,
his lands, tenements, goods, and chattels forfeited to the
king, and his body remain in prison during the king's
pleasure, or during life."* But the offences punishable
under the statutes of prrnmunire ,vere not felonies, for
the latter are punishable only by common law, and
not by statute.t 2. Attainder by bill. 3. Attainders of
FELONY and treason; and the important distinction between attainders in treason and attainders in prrnmunire is this : that in the former the forfeitures are consequences of the judgment, in the latter they are part
of the judgment and penalty. Blackstone! recognizes
folly this distinction. "I here omit the particular forfeitures created by the statutes of prrnmunire and
others, because I look upon them rather as a part of
the judgment anq penalty inflicted by the respective
statutes, than as consequences of such judgment, as in
treason and felony they are." Lord Coke expresses the
Kentucky, Delaware, and Pennsylvania declare that attainder of treason shall
not work forfeiture beyond the lifetime of the offender. In Alabama, Connecticut, Indiana, Illinois, Maine, Missouri, New Jersey, Rhode I sland, and
Tennessee, all forfeitures for crime are abolished, either by statutes or
constitutions.
"In New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Virginia, Georgia, Michigan, Mississippi, and Arkansas, there are statutes providing specifically for the punishment of treason and felonies; but no mention is made of corruption of blood
or forfeiture of estate; and inasmuch as these offences are explicitly legislated
upon, and a particular punishment provided in each case, it may be gravely
doubted whether the additional common law punishment of forfeiture of
estate ought not to be considered as repealed by implication." 1 Greenlears
Cruise Dig. 196, note.
• 1 Inst. 129 ; 3 Bia. p. 118; and for the severity of the penalties, see
Hawk. P. C. 55.
t 4 Bia. 118.
t 4 Com. p. 386.

PUNISIDIBNT OF TREASON.

103

same op1mon.* And statutes of proomunire and attainders of treason are both different in law from bills
of pains and penalties; of which English history affords,
among many other examples, that against the Bishop
of Rochester; t in the latter the pains and penalties
are all expressly declared by statute, and not left as
conseqllences of judgment. '1,hat clause in the constitution which gives power to Congress to make laws
for the punishment of treason, limits and qualifies the
effect of attainder of treason, in case such attainder
should be deemed by the courts as a legal consequence
of such sentence as the statute requires the court to
impose on traitors. This limitation applies, in terms,
only to the effect of attainders of treason.
CRARACTERISTICS OF A'.rTAlNDER OF TREASON.

There is no attainder of treason known to the law
of England, unless, 1. The judgment of death or outlawry has been pronounced against the traitor. t 2.
Where the crime was a jelonll, and punishable according to common law;§ and, 3. Where the attainder was
a consequence of the judgment, and not part of the
judgment and penalty. II Congress may pass a law
condemning every traitor to death, and to the conscquentiaJ punishment of" attainder;" but such attainder
will not of itself operate to corrupt blood or forfeit
estate, except during the life of the offender. But unless
Congress pass a law expressly cdtainti'ng the criminal of
' Co. Litt. 391, b.
t Stat. 9 Geo. I. ch. 17.
l 4 Bia. 387.
§ 4 Bia. 387.
II lb ; Co. Litt. 391, b.; 4 Bia. 386.
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treason, there is not, under the laws of the United
States, any "attainder." The criminal laws of the
United States are all embraced in specific statutes, defining crimes and all their penalties. No consequential
penalties of this character are known to this law. And
if a person is convicted and sentenced to death for
treason, there can be no corruption of blood, nor forfeiture of estate except by express terms of the statute.
The leading principles of the constitution forbid the
making of laws which should leave the penalty of
crime to be determined by ancient or antiquated common law proceedings of English courts. Forfeiture of
estate, by express terms of statute, may be in the nature
of forfeiture by a bill of pains and penalties, or prremunire, but is not forfeiture by attainder; nor is it such
forfeiture as is within the sense of the constitution,
which limits the operation of attainders of treason.
This distinction was well known to the framers of the
constitution. They thought it best to guard against
the clanger of those constructive ancl consequential
punishments, giving full power to Congress, in plain
terms, to prescribe by statute what punishment they
should select; but in case of resort to attainder of
treason, as one of those punishments, that form of puni"lhment should not be so construed as, ex ?)i termini, to
corrupt blood nor forfeit estate except during the life
of the person attainted.
TECIINICAL LANGUAGE 'fO BE CONSTRUED TECII:NICALLY.

The language of the constitution is peculiar; it is
technical; and it shows on the face of it an intention
to limit the technical operation of attainders, not to
limit the scope or extent of legislative penalties. If
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the authors of the constitution meant to say that Congress should pass no law punishing treason by attainder,
or by its consequences, viz., forfeiture of estate, or corruption of blood, they would, in plain terms, have said
so; and there would have been an end to the penalties
of attainder, as there was an end to bills of attainder.
Instead of saying, "Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but shall not impose
the penalties of attainder upon the offender," they
said, " Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason; but no attainder of treason shall work
corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the
life of the person attainted."
This phraseology hns reference only to the technical
effect of attainder. The "working of forfeitures" is a
phrase used by lawyers to show the legal result or effect
which arises from a certain state of facts. If a traitor
is convicted, judgment of death is passed llpon him;
by that judgment he becomes attainted. Attainder
works forfeitures and corruption of blood; forfeitures
and corruption of blood are, in the ordinary course of
common law, followed by certain results to his rights
of property. But the constitution provides, if the
traitor is attainted, that attainder shall not, ex vi termini,
and of its own force, and without statute to that effect,
"work" forfeiture or corruption of blood. The convict may still retain all those civil rights of which he
has not been deprived by the strict terms of the statute
which shall declare the punishment of treason.
The punishment of treason, by the statute of the
United States of April 30, 1790, is death, and nothing
more. Can any case be found, since the statute was
enacted, in which a party convicted and adjudged guilty

14
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of treason and sentenced to death, has been held to be
"attainted" of treason, so that the attainder has worked
forfeiture of any of his estate, real or personal? Would
not any lawyer feel astonishment if a court of the
United States, having sentenced a traitor to death
under the law of 1790, should announce as a further
penalty the forfeiture of the real and personal estate
of the offender, "worked " by the attainder of felony,
notwithstanding no such penalty is mentioned in that
statute?
If Congress should pass an act punishing a traitor by
a fine of five dollars, and imprisonment for five years,
who would not feel amazed to learn that by the English
doctrine of forfeitures worked by attainders, by operation of law, the criminal might be stripped of property
worth thousands of dollars, over and above the penalty
prescribed by statute?
TRUE MEANING 0~' ART. III. SECT. Ill. CL. IT.

The constitution means that if traitors shall be attainted, unlimited forfeitures and corruption of blood
shall not be worked by attainders. It means to leave
untrammelled the power of Congress to cause traitors
to be attainted or otherwise ; but if attainted Congress
must provide by statute for the attainder; and the
constitution settles how far that attainder shall operate
constitutionally; and when the legislature has awarded
one punishment for treason, the law shall not evoke
the doctrine of forfeitures worked by attainder, and
thus, by technical implication, add punishments not specifically set down in the penal statute itself; or if this
implication exist, the results of the technical effect of
attainder shall not be corruption of blood, or forfeiture,

4
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except during the life of the offender. The third article does not limit the power of Congress to punish,
but it limits the technical consequences of a special
kind of punishment, which may or may not be adopted
in the statutes.
From the foregoing remarks it is obvious that no
person is attainted of treason, in the technical sense,
who is convicted under the United States act of 1790.
There can be no attainder of treason, within the meaning
of the constitution, unless there be, first, a judgment of
death, or outlawry; second, a penalty of attainder by
express terms of the statute. A mere eonviction of
treason and sentence of death, or outlawry, and forfeitures of real and personal estate, do not constitute an
attainder in form, in substance, nor in effect, when made
under any of the present statutes of the United States.
IF CONGRESS MAY IMPOSE FINES, WRY NOT FORFEITURES?

No one doubts the power of Congress to make treason punishable with death, or by fines to any amount
whatever. Nor would any reasonable person deem any
fine too large to atone for the crime of involving one's
own country in civil war. If the constitution placed
1:1 Congress the power to take life, and to take property of the offender in one form, why should it deny
the power to take property in any other form? If the
framers of the constitution were willing that a traitor
should forfeit his life, how could they have intended
to shelter his property ? Was property, in their opinion, more sacred than life ? Would all the property
of rebels forfeited to the treasury of the country repair
the injury of civil war?
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FOlWETTURES NOT LIMITED TO LIFE ESTATES.

Could the lawyers who drafted the constitution have
intended to limit the pecuniary punishment of forfeiture to a life interest in personal estate, when every
lawyer in the convention must have known than at
common law there was no such thing as a life estate in
personal pr9perty? Knowing this, did they menn to
protect traitors, under all circumstances, in the enjoyment of personal property? If so, why did they not
say so? If they meant to prevent Congress from passing any law that should deprive traitors of more than
a life estate in real estate, the result would be, that the
criminal would lose only the enjoyment of his lands
for a few days or weeks, from the date of the judgment
to the date of his execution, and then his lands would
go to his heirs. Thus it is evident, that if the constitution cuts off the power of Congress to punish treason,
and limits it to such forfeitures as are the consequence
of attainder, and then cuts off from attainder its penal
consequences of corruption of blood and forfeiture of
estate, except during the life of the offender, then·
the framers of that instrument have effectually protected the personal and real estate of traitors, and have
taken more care to secure them from the consequences
of their crime than any other class of citizens. If so,
they have authorized far more severity against many
other felons than against them. If such were the purpose of the authors of the constitution, they would
have taken direct and plain language to say what they
meant. They would have said," Congress may punish
treason, but shall not deprive traitors of real or personal
property, except for the time which may elapse between sentence of death and execution." Instead
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of such a provision, they gave full power to i-,unish
treason, including fines, absolute forfeitures, death, and
attainder, only limiting the tech_nical, effect of the lastmentioned penalty, if that form of punishment should
be adopted ; and Congress. has the power, under the
constitution, to declare as the penalty for treason the
forfeiture of all the real and personal estate of the
offender, and is not limited, as has been supposed by
some, to a forfeiture of real estate for life only.
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CHAPTER VI.
STATUTES AGAINST TREASON. WHAT THEY ARE, AND HOW
THEY ARE TO BE ADMINISTERED.

THE United States statute of April 30th, 1790,
provides that, " If any person or persons, o\ving allegiance to the United States of
America, shall levy war against them, or shall adhere to their enemies,
giving them aid and comfort, within the United States or elsewhere,
and shall be thereof convicted, on confession in open court, or on the
testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act of the treason whereof be or they shall stand indicted, such person or persons shall be
adjudged guilty of treason against the United States, and sltall suffer
deatlt."

Concealment of knowledge of treason ( misprision of
treason) is, by the same act, punished by fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisonment not
exceeding seven years. By the statute of January
30th, 1799, corresponding with foreign governments,
or with any officer or agent thereof, with intent to influence their controversies with the United States, or to
defeat the measures of this government, is declared to
be a high misdemeanor, though not called treason, and
is punishable by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, and imprisonment during a term not less than six
months, nor exceeding three years. So the law has
stood during this century, until the breaking out of
the present rebellion.
The chief provisions of the law passed at the last
session of Congress, and approved July 17th, 1862, are
the~e : -
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Section 1. Persons committing treason shall suffer
one of two punishments : 1. Either death, and freedom
to his slaves; or, 2. Imprisonment not less than five
years, fine not less than ten thousand dollars, and freedom of slaves; the fine to be collected out of any
personal or real estate except slaves.
Sect. 2. Inciting rebellion, or engaging in it, or aiding those who do so, is punishable by imprisonment not
more than ten years, fine not more than ten thousand
dollars, and liberation of slaves.
Sect. 3 disqualifies convicts, under the preceding sections, from holding office under the United States.
Sect. 4 provides that former laws against treason
shall not be suspended as against any traitor, unless he
shall have been convicted under this act.
Sect. 5 makes it the duty of the President to cause
the seizure ofall the property,real and personal, ofseveral
classes of persons, and to apply the same to the support
of the army, namely : 1. R~bel army and navy officers; 2. Government officers of Confederate States in
their national capacity ; 3. Confederate State officers;
4. United States officers turned traitor officers; 5. Any
one holding any office or agency, national, state, or
municipal, under the rebel government, provz"ded persons enumerated in classes 3, 4, and 5 have accepted
office since secession of the State, or have taken oath
of allegiance to support the Confederate States; 6. Persons who, owning property in loyal States, in the territories, or in the District of Columbia, shall hereafter
assist, aid, or comfort such rebellion. All transfers of
property so owned shall be null, and suits for it by such
persons shall be barred by proving that they are within
the terms of this act.
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Sect. 6. Any persons within the United States, not
ttbove named, who are engaged in armed rebellion, or
aiding and abetting it, who shall not, within sixty days
after proclamation by the President, "cease to aid,
countenance, and abet said rebellion," shall be liable to
have ~l their property, personal and real, seized by the
President, whose duty it shall be to seize and use it, or
the proceeds thereof All transfers of such property,
made more than sixty days after the proclamation, are
declared null.
Sect. 7. To secure the condemnation and sale of
seized property, so as to make it available, proceedings
in rem shall be instituted in the name of the United
States, in any District Court thereof, or in any territorial court, or in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, within which district or territory the property, or any part of it, may he found, or
into which, if movable, it may first be brought. Proceedings are to conform to those in admiralty or revenue cases. Condemnation shall be as of enemy's property, and it shall belong to the United States; the
proceeds thereof to be paid into the treasury.
Sect. 8. Proper powers are given to the courts to
carry the above proceedings into effect, and to establish
legal forms and processes and modes of transferring
condemned property.
Sect. 9. Slaves of rebels, or of those aiding them,
escaping and taking refuge within the lines of our army ;
slaves captured from them; slaves deserted by them,
and coming under the control of the United States government; slaves found in places occupied by rebel forces,
and afterwards occupied by the United States army, shall
be deemed captives of war, and shall be forever free.
Sect. 10. No fugitive slave shall be returned to a
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person claiming him, nor restrained of his liberty, except
for crime, or offence against law, unless the claimant
swears that the person claiming the slave is his lawful
owner, has not joined the rebellion, nor given aid to
it. No officer or soldier of the United States shall surrender fugitive slaYes.
Sect. 11. The President may employ: organize, and
use as many persons of African descent as he pleases
to suppress the rebellion, and use them as he judgf's
for the public welfare.
Sect. 12. The President may make provisions for
colonizing such persons as may choose to emigrate, after
they shall have been freed by this act.
Sect. 13. The President is authorized by proclamation to pardon any persons engaged in the rebellion,
on such terms as he deems expedient.
Sect. 14. Courts of the United States have full powers to institute proceedings, make orders, &c., to carry
the foregoing measures into effect.
A resolution, explanatory of the above act, declares
that the statute punishes no act done prior to its passage; and no judge or member of a State legislature,
who has not taken the oath of allegiance to support
the constitution of the Confederate States; nor shall
any punishment or proceedings be so construed as to
,:work forfeiture of the real estate of the offender beyond his natural life."
The President's proclamation, in accordance with the
above act, was issued July 25th, 1862. Thus all persons engaged in the rebellion, who come within the
provisions of-. the sixth section, will be liable to the
penalties after sixty days from July 25th. This is one
ol' the most important penal acts ever passed by the
Congress of the United State:;.
15
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'l'HE CONl'ISCA'l'ION ACT OF 1862 I S NO'r A BILL OF A'r'l'AINDER. NOR

AN J<:X POST FACTO LAW'.

This act is not a bill of attainder, because it does not
punish the offender in any instance with corruption of
blood, and it does not declare hilll;, by act of legislature,
guilty of treason, inasmuch as the offender's guilt must
be duly proved and established by judicial proceedings
before he can be sentenced. It is not an ex post facto
law, as it declares no act committed prior to the time
when the law goes into operation to be a crime, or to
be punishable as such. It provides for no attainder of
treason, and therefore for none of the penal consequences which might otherwise have followed from
such attainder.
The resolution, which is to be taken as part of the
act, or as explanatory of it, expressly provides that no
punishment or proceedings under said act shall be so
construed as to work a forfeiture of t he real estate of
the offender beyond his natural life. Thus, to prevent
our courts from construing the sentence of death, under
Sect. 1, as involving an attainder of treason, and its
consequences, Congress has, in express terms, provided
that no punishment or proceeding shall be so construed
as to work forfeiture, as above stated. Thus this statute
limits the constructive penalties which result from forfeitures worked by attainders, and perhaps may be so
construed as to confine the punishments to those, and
those only, which are prescribed in the plain terms of
the statute. And this limitation is in accordance
with the constitution, as understood by the President,
although the forfeiture of rebels' real estate might have
been made absolute and unlimited, without exceeding
the constitutional power of Congress to punish treason.
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CHAPTER V II.
'l'HE RIGilT OP CONGRESS TO DECLARE THE PUNISID!E~
OF CRDIES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OTHER THAN
TREASON.
TTIE ~E\V CRllIES 0}' REBELLION Rf:QUIRF. NEW PENAL LAWS.

SEVERAL crimes may be committed not defined as
treason in the constitution, but not less dangerous to
the public welfare. The prevention or punishment of
such offences is essential to the safety of every form
of government; and the power of Congress to impose
penalties in such cases cannot be reasonably questioned.
The rights guaranteed in express terms to private citizens cannot be maintained, nor be made secure, without
such penal legislation; and, accordingly, Congress has,
from time to time, passed laws for this purpose. The
present rebellion has given birth to a host of crimes
which were not previously punishable by any law.
Among these crimes are the following : Accepting or
holding civil offices under the Confederate government ;
viohting the oath of allegiance to the United States;
taking an oath of ~illegiance to the Confederate States;
manufacturing, passing, or circulating a new and illegal
currency; acknowledging and obeying the authority
of a seceded State, or of the Confederate States; neglecting or refusing to return to allegiance and to lay
down arms after due warning ; attempting to negotiate
treaties with foreign powers to intervene in our rdfa.irs ;
grant ing or taking letters of marque; conspiracy
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against the lawful government; holding public nH.etings to incite the people to the commission of treason;
plotting treason; framing and passing ordinances of
secession; organizing and forming new governments
within any of the Sta.tes, with the intent that they
shall become independent of the United States, and
hostile thereto; the making of treaties between the
several States; refusal to take the oath of allegiance
to the United States, when tendered by proper authority; resistance to civil process, or to civil officers of the
United States, when such resistance is not so general
as to constitute war. Each of these and many other
public wrongs may be so committed as to avoid the
penalty of treason, because they may not be overt acts
of levying war, or of aiding and comforting the enemy,
which the offender must have committed before he can
have rendered himself liable to be punished for treason
as defined in the constitution. These and other similar
offences are perpetrated for the purpose of overthrowing government. Civil war must inevitably result from
them. They might be deemed less heinous than open
rebellion, if it were not certain that they are the fountain from which the streams of treason and civil war
must flow, sweeping the innocent and the guilty with
resistless tide onward to inevitable destrnction.
ALL ATTE)lPTS TO OVER'fUR~ GOVERX-YEN'J ' SHOULD BJ:: PITTiISHED.

Of the many atrocious misdeeds which are preliminary to or contemporaneous with treason, each and
all may be and should be punishable by law. It is b_v
no means desirable that the punishment of all of t hem
should be by deatlt, but rather by that penalty, which,
depriving the criminal of the means of doing harm,
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will disgrace him in tbe community he has dishonc,re<l.

Imprisonment, fines, forfeitures, confiscation, are the
proper punishments for such hardened criminals, because imprisonment is a personal punishment, and
fines, forfeitures, &c., merely transfer the property of
the offender to the public, as a partial indemnity for
the wrong he has committed.
When the terrible consequences of the crimes which
foment civil war are considered, no penalty would seem
too severe to expiate them. But it has been erroneously suggested that, as the levying of war - treason
-itself is not punishable by depriving traitors of more
than a life estate in their real estate, even though they
are condemned to death, it could not have been the
intention of the framers of the constitution to punish
any of the crimes which may originate a civil war, by
penalty equally severe with that to which they limited
Congress, in punishing treason itsel£ A lower offence,
it is said, should not be punished with more severity
tban a higher one. This objection would be more
plausible if the power to punish treason were in fact
limited. But, as has been shown in a previous chapter,
such is not the fact.*
ACT OF 1862, SECTION VI., DOES NOT PURPORT '1'0 PUNISH TREASON.

If the penalty of death be not inflicted on the guilty,
and if he be not accused of treason, no question as to
the validity of the statute could arise under this clause
of the constitution limiting the effect of attainders
of treason. No objection could be urged against its
• See Chap. V. page 93.
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validity on the ground of its forfeiting or con:6.scati11g
all the property of the offender, or of its depriving
him of liberty by imprisonment, or of its exiling him
from the country.
Section 6 of the act of 1862 does not impose the
penalty of deaili, but it provides that if rebels in arms
shall not, within sixty days after proclamation by the
P resident, cease to aid and abet the rebellion, and
return to their allegiance, they shall be liable to have
all t heir property seized and used for the benefit of the
country.
Suppose the rebels in arms refuse to obey the proclamation, and neglect or refuse to return to their allegiance;
the mere non-performance of the requisition of this act
is, not levying war, or aiding and comforting the enemy,
technically considered, and so not treason - although,
if they go on to perform overt acts in aid of the rebels,
those acts will be treasonable. Will it be denied that the
rebels in arms ought to be required by law to return
to their allegiance and cease rebellion? If theiirefusal to do so is not technically treason, ought they
not to be liable to punishment for violating the law?
Is any degree of pecuniary loss too severe for those
who will continue at war with their country after warning and proclamation, if their lives are not forfeited ?
LEGAL CONS'rRUCTION OF THE ACT 01<' 1862,

What will be the construction put upon section 6th
of the act of 1862, when taken in connection with the
joint resolution which accompanied it, is not so certain
as it should be. The language of the last clause in
that resolution is, "Nor shall any punishment or proceedings, under said act, be so construed as to work a
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' forfeiture' of the real estnte of the offender beyond
his natural life." There is no forfeiture in express
terms provided for in any part of the act. The punishment of treason, in the first section, is either death
and freedom of slaves, or imprisonment, fine, and freedom of slaves. The judgment of death for treason is
the only one which could, even by the common law,
have been so construed as to "work any forfeiture."
It may have been the intention of Congress to limit
the constructive effect of such a judgment. But the
words of the resolution are peculiar; they declare that
no " proceedings" under said act shall be so construed
as to work a forfeiture, &c. Then the question will arise
whether the "proceedings" ( authorized by section 6, in
which the President has the power and duty to seize
and use all the property of rebels in arms who refuse,
after warning, to return to their allegiance) are such
that a sale of such real estate, under the provisions of
sections 7 and 8, can convey any thing more than an
estate for the life of the offender? But the crime punished by section 6 is not the crime of treason; and
whether there be or be not a limitation to the power
of the legislature to punish that crime, there is no limit
to its power to punish the crime ·described in this
section.
Forfeiture a.nd confiscation of real and personal
estates for crimes, when there was and could have been
no treason, were common and familiar penal statutes in
several States or colonies when the constitution was
framed. Many of the old tories, in the time of the
revolution, were banished, and their real estate confiscated, without having been tried for or accused of
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treason, or having incurred any forfeiture by the laws
against treason. Such was the case in South Cn,rolina
in 1776.* In that State, one set of laws was in force
against treason, the punishment of which was forfeiture
worked by attaz"nder. Another set of htws were confiscation acts against tory refugees ~vho had committed no
treason. These distinctions were familiar to those who
formed the constitution, and they used language relating to these subjects with technical precision.
THE SEVERITY OF DIFFERENT PUNISHMENl'S COMPARED.

Forfeiture and confiscation are, in the eye of the law,
less severe punishments than death: they are in effect
fines, to the extent to which the criminal is capable of
paying them. It would not seem to be too severe a
punishment upon a person who seeks, with arms in his
hands, to destroy yonr life, to steal or carry away your
property, to subvert your government, that he should
be deprived of his property by confiscation or fine to
any amount he could pay. Therefore, as the provisions
of section 6, which would authorize the seizure and
appropriation of rebel real estate to public use, are not
within the prohibitions of Art. III. Sect. 3 of the constitution, it is much to be regretted that the joint resolution of Congress should have been so worded as to
throw a doubt upon the construction of that part of
the statute, if not to paralyze its effect upon the only
class of rebel property which they cannot put out of
the reach of government, viz., their real estate.
• See Willis v. Martin, 2 Bay 20. See also Hinzleman v. Clarke and
Al., Coxe N. J., li95.
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TIU: ::, IX'tll SBC'tlON OF TUE CON ~'lSCA'flON AC'l' OJ.' 1862 I S .NOT
WITllTN THE PROHIBl'tlON OF TlTE CONSTlTU'rTON, ARTICLE nt.
SEC'l'ION III.

Congress cannot, by giving a new name to acts of
treason, transcend the constitutional limits in declaring
its punishment. Nor can legislation change the true
character of crimes. Hence some have supposed that
Congress has no right to punish the most flagrant and
outrageous acts of civil war by penalties more severe
than those prescribed, as they i;ay, for treason. Since a
subject must have performed some overt act, which may
be constrned by courts in to the " levying of war," or" aiding the enemy," before he can be convicted of treason,
it has been supposed that to involve a great nation in
the horrors of civil war can be nothing more, and nothing else, than treason. This is a mistake. The constitution does not define the meaning of the phrase
" levying war." Is it confined to the true, and genuine
signification of the words, namely," that to levy war is
to raise or begin war ; to take arms for attack ; " or must
it be extended to include the carrying on or waging
war, after it has been commenced?* The crime committed by a few individuals by merely levying war, or
beginning without prosecuting or continuing armed
resistance to government, although it is treason, may be
immeasurably less than that of carrying on a colossal
rebellion, involving millions in a fratricidal contest.
Though treason is the highest poliiical crime known to
the codes of law, yet wide-spread and savage rebellion
• To ler:y war is to raise or begin war; to take arms for attack; to
11ttack.- Webster's Quarto Diet.
To levy is, 1. 'l'o i·aise, aR a siege. 2. To raise or collect; t.o gather.
3. To raise, applied to ,car. - Worcester's Quarto Diet.
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is a still higher crime against society; for it embraces
a cluster of atrocious wrongs, of which the attack upon
government-treason-is but one. Although there
can be no treason unless the culprit levies war, or aids
the enemy, yet it by no means follows that all acts of
carrying on a war once levied are onl!J acts of treason.
•rreason is the threshold of war; the traitor passes over
it to new and deeper guilt. He ought to suffer punishment proportioned to his crimes.
It must also be remembered, that the constitution
does not indicate that fines, forfeitures, confiscations,
outlawry, or imprisonment are "severer penalties than
death." The law hns never so treated them. Nor is
there any limit to the power of Congress to punish
traitors, as has been shown in a previous chapter.*
Who will contend that the crime of treason is in morals
more wicked, in its tendencies more dangerous, or in
its results more deadly than the conspiracy by which it
was plotted and originated ? Yet suppose the conspirator is artful enough not to commit any overt act
in presence of two witnesses; he cannot be convicted
of treason, though he may have been far more guilty
than many thoughtless persons who have been put
forward to execute the "overt acts," and have thereby
become punishable as traitors. Suppose a person commit homicide; he may be accused of assault and battery,
or assault with intent to kill, or justifiable homicide,
or manslaughter, or murder in either degree. Suppose
the constitution limited the punishment of wilful murder to the death of the criminal and forfeiture of his real
nnd personal estate fo1· life; would any person contend
that neither of the other above-mentioned cl'imes could
• See Chap. V. p. 93.
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be punished, unless the criminal were convicted of wilful murder? If he had committed murder, he must
have committed all the crimes involved in murder.
He must have made an assault with intent to kill;
and he must have committed unjustifiable homicide, or
manslaughter. If the government should, out of leniency, prosecute and convict him of manslaughter, and
impose upon him a penalty of fine, or confiscation of
his real and personal estate, instead of sentence of
death, "·ould any one say that the penalty impo:-ed was
severer than death? or that murder was legislated into
any other crime? or that any other crime was legislated into murder? Many crimes of different grades
may coexist, and culminate in one offence. It is no
sign of undue severity to prosecute the offender for one
less than the highest. The same course of crime may
violate many of the duties the loyal citizen owes to his
cotmtry. To pass laws declaring the penalty for each
and all of these crimes does not transcend the true
scope of the criminal legislation of Congress, where an
offender has brought upon his country the horrors of
civil war by destroying the lives of those who hnve
given him no cause of offence, by violating the rights
of the living and the dead, by heaping upon his guilty
act the criminality of a thousand assassins and murderers, and by striking at the root of the peace and
happiness of a great nation; it does not seem unduly
severe to take from him his property and his life. The
constitution does not protect him from the penalty of
death; and it cannot be so interpreted as to protect
him against confiscation of hiR real estate.
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1:REASON AND CONFISCATION LAWS IN 1862.
OPERATION.

THEIR PRACrICAL

To understand the practical operation of the statutes
now in force for the punishment of treason and rebellion, and for the seizure and confiscation of rebel property, it is necessary to observe the effect of other
statutes which regulate the modes of procedure in the
United States courts. Section 1 of the act of 1862,
which, as well as the act of 1790, prescribes the punishment of death for treason; section 2, which imposes
fines and penalties; section 3, which adds disqualification for office ; and, in fact, all the penal sections of
this statute, - entitle the accused to a judicial trial.
Before he can be made liable to suffer any penalty, be
must have been "pronounced guilty of the offence
charged;' and he must have suffered "judgment and
sentence on conviction." The accused cannot by law
be subjected to a trial unless he has previously been
indicted by a grand jury. He cannot be adjudged
guilty unless upon a verdict of a petty jury, impanelled
according to law, and by courts having jurisdiction of
the person and of the alleged offence. A brief examination of the statutes regulating such proceedings will
show that treason and confiscation laws will not be
likely to prove effectual, unless they shall be amended,
or unless other statutes shall be so modified as to adapt
them to the present condition of the country.
LEGAL RIGH'rS OF PERSONS ACCUSED OF TREASON.

All judicial convictions must be in accordance with
the laws establishing the judiciary and regulating its
proceedings. Whenever a person accused of crime is
held by the government, not as a belligerent or prisoner
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of war, but merely as a citizen of the United States,
then he is amenable to, and must be tried under and
by virtue o~ standing laws; and all rights guaranteed to
other citizens in his condition must be conceded to him.
WILL SECESSIONISTS INDICT AND CONVICT EACH O'fHER /

No person can lawfully be compelled to appear and
answer to a charge for committing capital or otherwise infamous crimes, except those arising in the army
and navy, when in actual service, in time of war or
public danger, until he has been indicted by a grand
jury.* That grand jury is summoned by the marshal
from persons in the district where the crime was committed.
By the statute of September 24, 1789, section 29,
"in all cases punishable witµ death, the trial shall be
had in the county where the offence was committed;
or where that cannot be done without great inconvenience, twelve petit jurors at least shall be summoned
from thence." It has indeed been decided that the
judges are not obliged to try these cases in the county
where the crime was committed, but they are bound
to try them within the district in which they were
perpetrated. t
HOW THE JURIES ARE SELECTED, AND THEIR POWERS.

The juries are to be designated by lot, or according
to the mode of forming juries practised in 1789_, so far
as practicable : the qualifications of jurors must be the
same as those required by the laws of the State where
Constitutional Amendment V.
United States"· Wilson, Baldw. 117; United States "· Cornell, 2 Mass.
95-98; United States"· The Insiirgents, 3 Dall. 518.

t
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the trial is held, in order to qualify them to serve in
the highest court of that State ; and jurors shall be
returned from such parts of the district, from time to
time, as the court shall direct, so as to be most favorable to an impartial trial. And if so many jurors are
challenged as to prevent the formation of a full jury,
for want of numbers, the panel shall be completed from
the bystanders.
STATE RIGHTS AND SECESSION DOCTRINES IN TBE JUUY

nomr.

The jury are by law judges of the law and the fact,
according to the opinion of many eminent lawyers
and judges. Whether this be so or not, their verdict, being upon the law and the fact, in a criminal
case, they become in effect judges of law and fact.
Suppose that the judge presiding at the trial is honest
and loyal, and that the jury is composed of men who
believe that loyalty to the State is paramount to loyalty to the United States; or that the States had, and
have, a lawful right to secede from the Union. Whatever the opinions of the judge presiding in the United
States court might be on these questions, he ·would have
no power to root out from the jury their honest belief;
that obedience to the laws of their own 8eceding State
is not, and cannot be, treason. The first step towardll
securing a verdict would be to destroy the belief of
the jury in these doctrines of State rights, paramoun t
State sovereignty, and the right of secession. To decide the issue, according to the conscientious judgwent
of the jurymen upon the facts and the law, would re•
quire them to find a verdict against the United States.
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SYMPATHY.

But this is not the only difficulty in the operation
of this statute. The grand jurors and the petit jury
are to be drawn from those who are neighbors, and
possibly friends, of the traitors. The accused has the
further advantage of knowing, before the time of trial,
the names of all the jurors, and of all the witnesses to be
produced against him; he bas tp.e benefit of counsel, and
the process of the United States to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behal£* How improbable is it
that any jury of twelve men will be found to take away
the lives or estates of their associates, when some of the
jurymen themselves, or their friends and relatives or
debtors, are involved in the same offence ! Could any
judge reasonably expect a jury of horse thieves to convict one of their own number, when either of the jurymen might be the next man required to take his turn
in the criminal box? Under the present state of the
law, it is not probable that there will ever be a conviction, even if laws against treason, and those which confiscate property, were not unpopular and odious in a
community against whom they are enacted. When an
association of traitors and conspirators can be found to
convict each other, then these statutes will punish tre~
son, but not sooner.
LA \f"S ARE MOST EFFECl' IVE WHICH REQITTRE NO REBEL '1'0 ADMINI$1'ER THEM.

Those sections of the act of 1862, empowering government to seize rebel property, real, personal, and
mixed, and to apply it to the use of the army, to secure
the condemnation and sale of seized property, so as to
• Statute of April 30, 1790, Sect. 29.

')
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make it available, and to authorize proceeclii1gs t'n rem
conformably to proceedings in admiralty or revenu~
ca.ses, are of a. different and far more effective character. Those clauses in the act which allow of the
employment in the service of the United States of
colored persons, so far as they may be serviceable, and
the freeing of the slaves of rebels, whether captured,
seized, fugitive, abandoned, or found within the lines
of the army, may be of practical efficacy, because these
measures do not require the aid of any sece~sion jury
to carry them into effect.
STATUTES OF LIMITATION WILL PROTECT TRAITORS.

The statutes limiting the time during which rebels
and traitors shall be liable to indictment ought also to be
considered. By the act of 1790, no person can be punished unless indicted for treason within three years after
the treason was committed, if punishable capitally; nor
unless indicted within two years from the time of committing any offence punishable with fine or fo1feiture.
Thus, by the provisions of these laws, if the war should
last two years, or if it should require two or three years
after the war shall have been ended to reestablish regular proceedings in courts, all the criminals in the seceded States will escape by the operation of the statutes of limitations. It is true, that if traitors flee from
justice these limitations will not protect them; but this
exception will apply to few individuals, and those who
flee will not be likely to be caught. Unless these sta.tutes are modified, those who have caused and maintained the rebellion will escape from punishment.
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CHAPTER VIII.
D!TERFERENCE OF GOVERN~iENT WIT'H THE DOMESTIC
AFFAIRS OF THE STATES.
PARTY PLATFOR:\IS CANNOT AL'n:ti 'l'HE CONSTITUTION.

PoLITICAL parties, in times of peace, have often declared that they do not intend to interfere with slavery
in the States. President Buchanan denied that government bad any power to coerce the seceded States into
submission to the laws of the country. When President Lincoln called into service the army and navy,
he announced that it was not his purpose to interfere
with the rights of loyal citizens, nor with their domestic affairs. Those who have involved this country in
bloody war, all sympathizers in their treason, and others
who oppose the present administration, unite in denying the right of the President or of Congress to interfere with slavery, even if such interference is the only
means by which the Union can be saved from destruction. No constitutional power can be obliterated by
any denial or abandonment thereof, by individuals, by
poli i ical parties, or by Congress.
The war power of the President to emancipate enemy's slaves has been the subject of a preceding chapter.
Congress has power to pass laws necessary and proper
to provide for the defence of the country in time of war,
by appropriating private property to public use, with
just compensation therefor, as shown in Chapter I.;
also laws enforcing emancipation, confiscation, and all
other belligerent rights, as shown in Chapter II.; and
it is the sole judge as to what legislation, to effect
these objects, the public welfare and defence require;
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it may enact laws abolishing slavery, whenever slaveiy,
ceasing to be merely a. private and domestic relation,
becomes a matter of national concern, and the public
welfare and defence cannot be provided for and secured
without interfering with slaves. Laws passed for that
purpose, in good faith, against belligerent subjects, not
being within any express prohibition of the constitution, cannot lawfully be declared void by any depart,.
ment of government. Reasons and authority for these
propositions have been stated in previous chapters.
DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS.

Among the errors relating to slavery which have
found their way into the public mind, - errors traceable
directly to a class of politicians who are now in open
rebellion,- t he most important is, that Congress has no
rigid to inte,fere in any way wz'tli slavery. Their assumption is, that the States in which slaves are held are
alone competent to pass any law relating to an institution which belongs exclusively to the domestic affairs
of the States, and in which Congress has no right to
interfere in any way whatever.
From a preceding chapter,( see page 17,) it will be seen,
that ifslaves are property, property can be interfered with
under the constitution; if slavery is a domestic institution,
as Momzonwm or appnmticesldp iR, each of them can lawfully be interfered with and annulled. But slavery has
a double aspect. So long as it remains in truth "domestic," that is to say, according to Webster's Dictionary,
"pertaining to house 01· home," so long government cannot
be affected by it, and have no ground for interfering
with it; when, on the contrary, it no longer pertains
only t.o houRe and home, but enters into vital questions
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of war, aid and comfort to public enemies, or any of
the national interests involved in a gigantic rebellion;
when slavery, rising above its comparative insignificance as a household affair, becomes a vast, an overwhelming power which is used by traitors to overthrow
the government, and may be used by government to
overthrow traitors, it then ceases to be merely domestic;
it becomes a bell£gerent power, acting against the "public
welfare and common defence." No institution continues to be simp1y " domestic" after it has become the
effective means of aiding and supporting a pt;b]ic
enemy.
When an "institution" compels three millions of
subjects to become belligerent traitors, because they
are slaves of disloyal masters, slavery becomes an affair
which is of the utmost public and national concern. B ut
the constitution not onlj; empowers, but, under certain
contingencies, requires slavery in the States to be interfered with. No one who will refer to the sections of
that instrument here cited, will probably venture to
deny the power of Congress, in one mode or another,
to i11.te,fere for or against the institution of slavery.
CONGIU.:SS MAY PASS LAWS IN'l'ERFERING l•'OH 'rflE PRESERV.A'rION
ANO PRO'rECTION OF SLAVE!W IN THE STATES.

Art. I V. Sect. 2, required that fugitive slaves should be
delivered up, and the fugitive slave laws were passed to
carry this clause into effect.
Art. I. Sect. 9, required that the fore ign slave trade
should not be interfered with prior to 1808, but allowed
an importation tax to be levied on each slave, not exreeding ten dollars per head.
Art. V. provided that no amendment of the constitu-
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tion should be made, prior to 1808, affecting the pre,
ceding clause.
Art. I. Sect. 2 provides that three fifths of all slave..
shall be included in representative numbers.
CONGRESS MAY INTERFERE AGAINST SLAVlmY IN THE STATES

Art. I. Sect. 8. Congress has power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes. Under this clause
Congress can in effect prohibit the i"n:ter-state slave trade,
and so pass laws diminishing or destroying the value
of slaves in the border States, and practically abolisl,
slavery in those States.
CONGRESS J\1AY INTERFERE WITH SLAVERY BY CALLING UPON THE
SLAVES, AS SUBJECTS, 'l.'0 ENTER MILITARY SERVICE.

Art. I Sect. 8. Congress has the power to declare
war and make rules for the government of land and
naval forces, and under this power to decide who shall
constitute tlie rnilif:ia of tlie United States, and to enrol and
compel into the service of the United States all the
slaves, as well as their masters, and t.hus to interfere
with slavery in the States.
CONGRESS l\1AY IN'r ERl'ERE WITH SLAVERY IN THE STATES BY C(lT.
TING OFF THE SUPPLY OF SL.AVES TO SUCH STA'rES•

.The law now prohibiting the importation of slaves,
and making slave trading piracy, is an interference with
slavery, by preventing their introduction int~ the
slave States. So also is the treaty with England to
suppress the slave trade, and to keep an armed naval
force on the coast of Africa.
ln case of servile insurrection against the laws and
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authority of the United States, the government are
bound to inte,fere wiili slavery, as much as in an insurrection of their masters, which may also require a similar
interference. The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, has the power to make treaties;
and, under the treaty-making power1 slavery can be
and has been interfered with. In the last war with
Great Britain, a treaty was made to evacuate all the
forts and places in the United States without carrying
away any of the slaves who had gone over to them in
the States. Congress then interfered to sustain the
institution of slavery, for it was only by sustaining
slavery that this governm~nt could claim indemnity for
slaves as proped!J. The trea(IJ•making power may abolish
slavery in the whole country, as, by Art. VI., the constitution, the laws, and all treaties made or which shall
be made under the authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the land. A clause in any
treaty abolishing slavery would, ipso facto, become the
supreme law of the land, and there is no power whatever that could interfere with or prevent its operation.
By the treaty-making power, any part of the country
bmdened with slavery, and wrested from us by conquest, could be ceded to a foreign nation who do not
tolerate slavery, and without claim of indemnity, The
principle is well established that " the release of a
territory from the dominion and sovereignty of the
country, if that cession be the result of coercion or
conquest, does not impose any obligation upon the
government to indemnify those who may suffer loss of
property by the cession."'~
• I Kent Com. 178.
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The State of New York had granted to her own citizens many titles to real estate lying in that part of her
territory now called Vermont. Vermont separated
itself from New York, and declared itself an independent State. It maintained its claims to such an
extent, that New York, by act of July 14, 1789, was
enforced to empower commissioners to assent to its
independence; but refnsed to compensate persons
claiming lands under grant from New York, though
they were deprived of them by Vermont. The ground
taken by the legislature was, that the government was
not required to assume the burden of losses produced by
conquest or by the violent dismemberment of the State.
Supposing England and France should, by armed intervention, compel the dismemberment of the United
States, and the cession of the slave States to them as
conquered territory; and that the laws of the conquerors allowed no slaveholding. Could any of the
citizens of slave States, who might reside in the free
States, having remained loyal, but having lost t heir
slaves, make just legal claim for indemnity upon the
government? Certainly not.
Other instances may be cited in which Congress
has the power and duty of interference in the local
and domestic concerns of States, other than those
relating to slavery.* Chief Justice Taney says, " Moreover, the constitution of the United States, as far as i t ha~
provided for an emergency of this kiud, and authorized the general
government to interfere in the domestic concerns of a State, has
treated the subject as political in its nature, and placed the power
in the bands of that department. Art. IV. Sect. 4 of the constitution
of the United States provides that the United States shall guarantee _to
• IA,ther v. Borden, 1 How. 42,
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rvery State in the Union a repuhlican form ofgovernment,and shall protect each of them against invasion, 11nd, on the application ofthe Iegislnwre, or of the executive when the legislature cannot be con,ened, again~t
domestic violence. Under this article of the constitution it rests with
Congress to decide what government is the establi:;hed one in a State.
For, a.s the United tates guarantees to each Srnte a republican go\'ernment, Congress must necessarily decide what government is estnbli~hed, before it can determine whether it is republican or not. And
when senators and representatives of a State are admitted into the council;. of the Union, the authority of the government under which they are
nppointed, a" l\·ell as its republican character, is recognized by the
proper constitutional authority, and its decision is binding upon every
other department of the government, and could not be questioned in
a judicial tribunal. So, too, as relates to the clause in tbc above-mentioned article of the constitution, providing for cases of domestic
violence. It rested with Cong1·es3, too, to determine the mean;; proper
to be adopted to fulfll this guaranty.''

Suppose, then, thn.t for the purpose of securing "domestic tranquiltuy" and to suppress domestic violence, Congress
should determine that emancipation of the slaves was a
necessary and proper means, it would be the duty of Congress to adopt those means, and thus to interfere with
slavery."' If a civil war should arise in a single State
between the citizens thereof, it is the duty of Congress
to cause £mmediate £nte1ference in the domestic and local
affairs of that State, and to put an end to the war ;
and this interference may be by force of arms and by
force of laws; and the fact that the cause of q uarrcl is
domestic and private, whether it be in relation to a p roposed chn.nge in the form of government, as in Dorr's
rebellion,* or a rebellion growing out of any other
domestic matter, the constitution authorizes and
requires interference by the general government.
Hence it is obvious that if slaves be considered prop• See .Luther v. Borden, 7 How.
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erty, and if the regulation of slavery in the States be
deemed in some aspects one of the domestic affairs of
the Stlftes where it is tolerated, yet these facts constitute no reason why such property may not be interfered with, and slavery dealt with by government
according to the emergencies of the time, whenever
slavery assumes a new aspect, and rises from its private
and domestic character to become a matter of national
concern, and imperils the safety and preservation of
the whole country. We are not to take our opinions
as to the extent or limit of the powers contained in the
constitution from partisans, or political parties, nor even
from the dicta of political judges. We should examine
that instrument in the light of history and of reason;
but when the language is plain and clear, we need no
historical researches to enable us to comprehend its
meaning. When the interpretation depends upon technical law, then the contemporary law writers must be
consulted. The question as to the meaning of the constitution depends upon what the people, the plain
people who adopted it, intended and meant at the
time of its adoption.
A-0'.rHORI'l'ATIVE CONSTRUC'l'TON 01<' THE :\IEANL.""G OF THE CONSTITUTION.

The conclusive authority on its interpretation is the
document itself When questions have arisen under
that instrument, upon which the Supreme Court have
decided, and one which they had a right to decide,
their opinion is, for the time being, the supreme authority, and remains so until their views are changed
and new ones announced; and as often as the Supreme
Court change their judgments, so often the authoritative
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interpretation of the constitution changes. The Supreme Court have the right to alter their opinions e~ery
time the same question is decided by them: and as
new judges must take the place of those whose offices
are vacated by death, resignation, or impeachment, it is
not unlikely that opinions of the majority of the court
may, upon constitutional as well as upon other questions,
be sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other.
Upon political discussions, such as were involved in
the Dred Scott case, the judges are usually at variance
with each other; and the view of the majority will
prevail until the majority is shifted. The judges are
not legally bound to adhere to their own opinions,
although litigants in their courts are. Whenever the
majority of the court has reason to overrule a former
decision, they not only have the right, but it is their
duty, to do so.
The opinions of the framers of the constitution are
not authority, but are resorted to for a more perfect
understanding of the meaning they intended to convey
by the words they used; but after all, the words should
speak for themselves ; for it was the language in which
that instrument was worded that was before the people
for discussion and adoption. We must th~ fore go
back to that original source of our supre~ law, and
regard as of no considerable authority the platforms
of political parties who have attempted to import into
the constitution powers not authorized by fair interpretation of its meaning, or to deny the existence of
those powers which are essential to the perpetuity of
the government.
A political party may well waive a legal constitutional right, as matter of equity, comity, or public pol18
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icy; and this waiver may take the form of a denial
of the existence of the power thus waived. In this
manner• Mr. Douglas not merely waived, but denied,
the power of Congress to interfere with slavery in the
territories; and in the same way members of the Re~
publican party have disclaimed the right, in time of
peace, to interfere with slavery in the States; but such
disclaimers, made for reasons of state policy, are not
to be regarded as enlarging or diminishing the rights
or duties devolved on the departments of government, by a fair and liberal interpretation of all the provisions of the constitution.
Rising above the political platforms, the claims and
disclaimers of Federalists, Democrats, Whigs, Republicans, and all other parties, and looking upon the constitution as designed to give the government made by
the people, for the people, the powers necessary to its
own preservation, and to the enforcement of its laws,
it is not possible justly to deny the right of government to interfere with slavery, Mormonism, or any
other institution, condition, or social status into which
the subjects of the United States can enter, whenever
such interference becomes essential as a means of
'' public welfare or common defence in time of war."*
• In several preceding chapters other branches of this subject have beeu
discussed.

APPE N DIX.
MANY of the leading doctrines contained in the foregoing
work have received, since the publication of the fourth edition,
the sanction of the Supreme Court of the United States, of
wliose anthoritntive and final decision in the prize cases, argued
in the spring of 1863, the following is the substance : -

Ix TIT£ SUPREME COURT OE' THE Ur-ITED STATES. - Claimant of schooner, B1·illiant, Crenshaw, barque llia1oatha and others, appellants, vs.
United States.
'l'hese causes came up by nppeal from decrees in prize, of the Circuit
Courts for the Southern District of Xew York, and the District of :\lassachusetts, affirming respecti\'dy the sentences of condemnation passed upon
the vessels and cargoes by the District Courts for said districts. The following opinion is confined to the gencrnl questions of law which were raised
by all the cases. It does not discuss the special f m;ts and circumstances of
the respecti\'e cases.
March 9th, 1863. Opinion of the Court by GRIER, J.
There are certain propositions of law which must necessarily affect the
ultimate decision of these cases and many others, which it will be proper to
discuss and decide before we notice the special facts peculiar to each. They
are First. Had the President a right to institute a blockade of ports in possession of persons in armed rebellion against the government, on the principles of international law, as known and acknowledged among ci\'ilized
States?
Second. Was the property of persons domiciled or resicling within those
States a proper suhject of capture on the sea as "enemies' rroper(IJ "'J
I. Neutrals hnve a right to challenge the existence o n blockade de
/m;to, and also the authority of the party exercising the right to institute
,t. They have a right to enter the ports of a friendly nation for the purposes of trnde and commerce, but are bound to recognize the rights of a belligerent engaged in actual war, to use this mode of coercion for the purpose
of subduing the enemy.
That a blockade de facto actually existed and was formally declared and
notified by the President on the 27th nnd 30th of April, 1861, is an admitted fact in these cases. That the President, as the executive chief of the
go,·ernment, and commander-in-chief of the army and navy, was the proper
person to make such notification, has not been, anll cannot be, disputed.
The right ofJirize and capture has its origin in the jus bel.li, and is governed and adju ged under the Jaw of nations. To legitimate the capture
of a neutral 1•essel, or property on the high seas, a war must exist de fadn,
and the neutral must ha,·c a knowledge or notice of the intention of one of
the parties belligerent to use this mode of coercion against a port, city, or
territory in possession of the other.
Let us inquire whether, at the time this blockade was instituted, a state
(139)
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of war existed which would justify a resort to these means of subduing the
hostile force.
War has been well defined to be " that state in which a nation prosecuiea
its ,·ight by force." The parties belligerent in a public war are independent
nations. But it is not necessary to constitute war, that both parties shoulc!
be acknowledged as independent nations or sovereign States. A war may
exist where one of the belligerents claims sovereign rights as against thr
other.
Insunection against a government may or may not culminate in an
organized rebellion; but a ci,-il war always begins by insurrection against
the lawful authority of the government. A ci,·il war is never solemnly declared; it becomes such by its accidents - the number, power,
and organization of the persons who originate and carry it on. When the
party in rebellion occupies and holds in a hostile manner a certain portion
of territory, have declared their independence, have cast off their allegiance,
ba,,e organized armies, haYe commenced hostilities agafost their former sovereign, the world acknowledges them as belligerents, and the contest a war.
They claim to be in arms to establish theu· liberty and independence, in
order to become a sovereign State, while the sovere1~n party treats them as
insurgents and rebels who owe allegiance, and who sllould be punished with
death for their treason.
The laws of war, as established among nations, have their foundation in
reason, and all tend to mitigate the cruelties and misery produced by the
scourge of war. Hence the parties to a ciYil war usually concede to each
other belligerent rights. 'l'hey exchange prisoners, and adopt the other
courtesies and rules common to public or national wars.
" A civil war," says Vattel, "breaks the bands of society and government, or, at least, suspends their force and effect; it produces in the nation
two independent parties, who consider each other as enemies, and acknowledge no common judge. Those two parties, therefore, must necessarily be
considered as constituting, at leastfor a time, two separate bodies - two distinct societies. Having no common superior to judge between them, they
stand in precisely the same predicament as two nations who engage in a
contest and have rncourse to arms. This being the case, it is very evident
that the common laws of war, those maxims of humanity, moderation, and
bono1·, ought to be obsPn·ed by both parties in every civil war. Should the
so,-ereign conceive that be bas a right to hang up his prisoners as rebels,
the opposite party will make reprisals, &c., &c. ; the war will be cruel, horrible, and every day more destructive to the nation."
As a ciYil war is ne,·er publicly proclaimed, eo nom·ine, against ii1s1rrgents,
its actual existence is a fact in our domestic history which the Cottl't is
bound to notice and to know.
·
The true test of its existence, as found in the writings of the sages of the
common law, may be thus summarily stated : " When the regular course
of justice is interrupted by revolt, rebellion, or iusu1Tection, so that the
courts of justice cannot be kept open, civil war exists, and hostilities may
be prosecuted on the same footing as if those opposing the government were
foreign enemies invading the land." By the constitution, Cong1:ess alone
has the powei- to declare a national or fo1·eign war. It cannot declare war
against a State, or any m1mber of States, by virtue of any clause in the
constitution. The constitution confers on the President the whole executii-e power. He is bottnd to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
He 1s Commander-in-chief of the ATmy and Navy of the United States,
and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service
of the United States. He has no power to initiate or declare a war, either
against a foreign nation or a domestic State. But by the acts of Congress

APP.EXDLX.

141

of February 28th, 1795, n':1~ 3d of ::llarclr, 1807, he i8 authori~ed to call out
the militia, a~d use the t~ihtary ~nd na,•al forces of th~ Urute~ States_ rn
ca,e of invasion by foreign notions, and to suppress 10surrect1on ag1un~t
the government of n State or of the United States.
If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is uot
only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate
the war, but_is bound t? accept the challenge witho1;1t waiting for any special legislative authority. And whether the hostile party be a foreign
invader, or States organized in rebellion, it is none the less a war, although
the declaration of it be "unilateral." Lord Stowell (l Dodson, 247)
olJserves, "It is not the less n war on that acco11nt, for war may ei.:ist without a dcclaratiou on either side. It is so laid down by the best writers on
the law of nations. A declaration of war by one country only, is not a mere
challenge, to be accepted or refused at pleasure by the other."
This greatest of civil wars was not gradually developed by popular commotion, tumultuous assemblies, or local unorganized insurrections. Howc,er long may have been its previous conceplion, it ne\'Cl'theless sprung
forth suddenly from the parent brain, a ::lliuena in the fuU panoply of war.
'fbe President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without
,l'aiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name given to it
by him or them could ch~~ge the fa~t.
.
. .
.
It is not the less a civil war, with bclhgercnt pnrues 111 hostile array,
because it may be called an "insurrection " by one side, and the insurgents
be considered ns rebels or traitors. It is not necessary that the independence of the revolted province or State be acknowledged, in order to constitute it a party belliaerent in a war, according to the Jaw of nations.
F orei"'n nations ncknow1edge it as wur by II declaration of neutrality. The
condifion of neutrnlity cannot exist unless there be two belligerent parties.
In the case of Sa11tissima Trinidad, 7 Wheaton, 337, this Court says,
., The government of the United States has recognized the existence of a
ciYil war between Spain and her colonies, and has avowed her determination to remain neutral between the parties. Each party is, therefore,
deemed by us a belli~erent nation, having, so far as concerns us, the sovereign rights of war.' See also 3 Binn., 262.
As soon a, the news of the attack on Fort Sumter, and the orianizntion
of a go\'ernment by the seceding States, assuming to act as belligerents,
could become known in Europe, to wit, on the 13th of May, 1861, the
Queen ofEngland issued her proclamation of neutrality," recognizing hostili tts as existing between the government of the United States of Amerir.1 and certain Statu styling tbemseh•es the Conrederate Stutes of America."
'l'bis was immediately followed by similar declarations, or silent acquiescence,
by other nations.
· After such an official recognition by the sovereign, a citizen of a foreign
State is estopped to deny the existence of a war, with all its consequences
a~ regards neutrals. They cannot ask a Court to affect a technical ignorance of the existence of a war which all the world acknowledges to be the
greatest ch·il war known in the history of the human race, and thus cripple
the arm ofthe government and paralyze its powers by subtle definitions and
ingenious sophisms.
·
'fhe law of nations is also cnlled the law of nature ; it is founded on the
common consent as well as the common sense of the world. It contains no
such anomalous doctrine as tb11t which this Court are now, for the first time,
desired to pronounce, to wit: That insurgents who ha,·e risen in rebellion against their sovereign, expelled her Courts, established a re\'olutionary government, organized armies,
and commenced hostilities, are not ,meniie, because they are traitms; and
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a war le,ied on the government by traitors, in order to dismember and
destroy it, is not a war, because it is an ·• insurrection."
Whether the President, in fulfilling bis duties as commnnder-in-cbie( in
suppressing an insurrection, bns met with such armed hostile resista~ce
and a ci\'il war of such alarming proportions, as will compel him to accord
to them the character of belligerents, is a question to he decided by him •
and this Court must be goYerned by the decisions and acts of the politicai
department of the go,-ernment to which this power was intrusted. " He
must determine what degree of force tho crisis demands." The proclamation of blockade i~ itself official and conclusive e\'idence to the Court that
a state of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a
measure, under the circumstances, peculiar to the case. The correspondence of Lord Lrons with the Secretary of State admits the fuct and con.
cludes the question.
If it were necessary to the technical existence of n war that it should
ha,·e a legislati\'e sanction, we find it in almost e,·ery act passed at the
e:i;traordinary session of the Legislature of 1861, which was wholly employed in passing laws to enable the government to prosecute the war with
vigor and efficie11cy. And finally, in 1661, we find Congress, " ex ,najore
cautela," pa.~sing'an act, approving, legaHzing, and making valid all the acts
proclamations, and orders of the President, &c., "As if they had bee~
issued and done ullder the p1·c~ious exprus authority and direction of the
Congress of the United State~."
·w ithout admittini;: that such an act was necessary under the circumstances, it is plain, if the President had in any manner assumed power~
which it was necessary should haYe the authority or sanction of Congress,
that the we!l-kJJown principle of law, " Omnis ratihabitio rttrofrahilur a
man.data equiparatur," this ratification has operated to perfectly cure the
defect.
In the case of Brown vs. United States, 8 Cranch, 131, 132, 133, ~Ir.
Justice Story treats of this subject, and cites numerous authorities, to
which we may refer, to pro,·e this position, and concludes, " I nm perfectly
satisfied that no subject can commence hostilities or capture proper ty of an
enemy, when the sovereign has prohibited it. But suppose he did. I
would ask if the sovereign mny not ratify his proceedings ; and t hen, by a
r etroactive operation, gi,·e validity to them."
Although :\Ir. Justice Story dissented from the majority of the Court on
the whole case, the doctrine stated by him on this point is correct and fully
substantiated by authority.
The objection made to this net of ratification, that it is ex post facto, and
therefore unconstitutional nnd void, might possibly hn,~e some weight on
the trial of an indictment in a criminal Court. But precedents from t hat
source cannot be received as outhoritati\'e in a tribunal administering public and international law.
On this first question, therefore, we are of opinion that the President had
a rightjure belli to institute a blockade of ports in possession of the States
in rebellion, which neutrals are bound to regard.
Il. "'e come now to the consideration of the second question. What is
included in the term " enemies' property "?
Is the property of all persons residing within the territory of the State,
now in rebellion, captured on the high sens, to be treated as " enemies' property," whether the owner be in arms against the go\'ernment or not?
The right of one belligerent not only to coerce the other by direct force,
but also to cripple his resources by the seizure 01· destruction of his property, is a necessary result of a state of war.
) Coney and wealth, the products of agriculture and commerce, are said to
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be the sinews of war, and as necessary in its conduct a~ numbers and physical force. Hence it is, that the laws of war 1·ccognize the 1·igbt of a belligerent to cut these sinews of the power of the enemy, by captm·ing his propert,• on the high seas.
'l'hc appellants contend that the term enemies is properly applicable to
those only who are subjects or citizens of a fo reign ~t.ato at wnr with our
own. They quote from the poges of the Common Lnw, whicl1 say, "thnt
persons who wage wnr against the king may be of two kinds, subjects or
citizens. The former nrc- not proper enemies, but rebels and traitors ; the
lattrr ure tl1ose that come properly under the name of enemies."
They insi~t. moreo\'er, that the President bim~elf, in his proclomation, admit~ tliot arc,1t numbers of the persons residing within the territories in possession ol'the insurgent government, are loyal in their feelings, and forced
by compubion and the violence of the rebellious and revolutionary party,
and its " de farto ~overnment," to submit to their laws and assi$t m their
scheme of re,·oluuon ; that the acts of the usurping go,·ernment cannot
le....ally sever the bond of theiJ· allegiance; they have, therefore, a corrclati~e rlght to claim the protection of the government for thefr person• nm!
property, and to be treated aq loyal citizens, till legally con\'icted of ba,iug
reuounced their allegiance, and made war against the government hr trensonably resisting its laws.
The\' contend also that insurrection is the act of individuals, and not of 11
<>o,·crnment or so\'ereignty; that the individuals engaged a.re subjects of
faw ; that confiscation of their property can be effected only under municipal Jaw ; that, by the law of the land, such confiscation cannot take pince
without the conviction of the owner of some offence; and finally, that the
secession ordinances are nullities, and ineffectual to release any citizen from
bis allegiance to the national government; consequently, the constitution and
Jaws of the United States are still operati,·e over persons in all the States for
punishment as well as protection.
'l'his argument rests on the assumption of two propositions, each of which
is without foundation on the established law of nations.
It ~umes that where a ch·il war exists, the party belligerent claiming to
he so,·ereign cannot, for some unknown reason, exercise the rights of belligerents, ulthough the re,·olutionary party may. Being sovereign, he can exercise only so\'ereign 1·ights over the other party. The i1mll'gent may be killed
the executioner; bis property 011 land may be conon the buttle-field, or
fiscated under the mumcipal law; but the commerce on the ocean, which
supplies the rebels with means to support the wa1·, cannot be made the subject of capture under the laws of war, because it is •· 1m,·u11.'Jlit1.1lio11al "! ! .'
Xow, it is a proposition ne"er doubted, that the belligerent partv who claim~
to be so,·ere1gn, may exercise both belligerent and soYercign rigbts. ( See 4
Cranc\1, 2i2.) Treating the o1hcr party as a belligerent, and using only th~
milder modes of coercion which the law of nations has introduced to mitigate t~e . rigors of war, cannot be a subject of com~laint by the party to
whom 1t 1s accorded as n grace or granted as a necessity.
We ha,·e shown that a civil war, such as that no,1; waged between the
Xorthern and Southern States, is properly conducted, according to the
hum ane regulations of public law, as regards capture on the ocean.
. pnder the very peculiax constitution of' this go\'ernment, although the
c1hzcn_s owe supreme allegiance to the Federal government. they owe also
a qualified allegiance to the State in which they are domiciled ; their persons and property arc subject to its laws.
llence, _in organizing tb1s rebellion, tbey hn,·e fl,c/ed n.~ ."!tntes, claiming to
be so,·ere1in o\'er all persons and property within their Jl'specth·e limits,
and dS<ertrng a right to absoh-e therr citizens from their 1.llegiance to the
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Federal government. Several of t hese States have combined to form a new
confederacy, claiming to be acknowledged by the world as a sovereign
State. Their right to do so is now being decided by wager of battle. The
ports and tenitory of each of these States are held in hostility to the general government. It is no loose, unorganized insw·rection, having no
defined boundary or possession. It has a boundary, marked by lines of
bayonets, and which can be crossed only by force. South of this line is
enemy's territory, because it is claimed and held in possession by an organized, hostile, and bellige1·ent power.
All persons residing within this territory, whose property may be used to
increase the re,·enues of the hostile power, are in this contest liable to be
treated as enemies, though not foreigners. They have cast off their allegiance, and made war on their government, and are none the less enemies
because they are traitors.
But in defining the meanin<> of the term "enemies' property," we will be
led into error if we refer to Fleta and L or d Coke for their detinition of the
word "enemy." It is a technical phrase peculiar to prize courts, and
depends upon principles of public as distinguished from the common law.
Whether property be liable to capture as " enemies' pr operty," does not
in any manner depend on the personal allegiance of the owne1·. " It is the
illegal traffic that stamps it as ' enemfos' property.' It is of no consequence
whether it belongs to an ally or a citizen.'' 8 Cranch, 384. "The owner
pro liac vice is an enemy." 3 Wash. C. C.R. 183.
The produce of the soil of the hostile territory, as well as other property
engaged in the commerce of the hostile power, as the source of its wealth
unu strength, is always l'egarded as legitimate prize, without rega1·d to the
domicile of the owner, and much more so if he reside and trade within ita
territory. (See Upton, chap. 3d, et cas. cit.)
The foregoing opinion of the hi"'hest judicial tribunal of the United
States was deli\'ered by Mr. Justice Grier, and was concurred in by J ustices
, vayne, Swayne, Miller, and Da,·is. An opinion was delfrered by Mr.
Justice Nelson, and concw-red in by Chief J ustice Taney, and Justices Cliffor d and Catron, who differed from the majority of the Court upon the
question, " whether ou1· civil wai· began before Juty 13, 1861 ? " the majo1·ity holding the affirmative, and the minority the neo-ati, e.
·
Both opinions sanction many of the doctrines or' international, constit utional, and belligerent law set forth in the treatise on the " War Powers of
the P.residenl, a11d the Legislative Power of Congress.'' 'fhe folJowing extracts are from the
DISSENTING OPINION.
" The laws of war, whether the war be civil or inter gentes, as we have
seen, convert every citizen of a hostile State into a public enemy, and
treat him accordingly, whatever may have been his previous conduct.
" Congress alone can determine whethe1· war exists, or should be declared,
and until they [Congress] have acted, no citizen of the State can be 1mnished
in his rerson or property, unless he has committed some offence against a
law o Congress passed before the act was committed which made it a
crime, and defined tlie punishment."
After stating the difference between a rebellion and a civil war, as recognized in Monmouth's rehellion in the rnign of J ames the Second, and in the
rebellions of 171ii and li.J:ii, and also in the beginning of the r ebellion of
I i i o, ..rnd t reating all these rebellions as personal wars, or war s against iudi~idual. engaged in resisting the authority of the government, the judge
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then proceeds to say that the war of the Revolution, beginning us a personal
war or rebellion, became a civil war by Act of Parliament, 16 Geo. III.
(1 ii6.) "By that act," says Judge ~elsou, "all trade and commerce with
the thirteen colonies were interdicted, and aU ships and cargo belonging to
the inhabitants subjected to forfeiture as if the same were the ships and
effects of open enemies. From t!tis time the war became a terriltJritrl civil
mir between the contending pa,·ties, with all the rights of ,var lnwu·11 lo the
law rf nations. Down to this period the war 1H.s personal against the
rebels, and encouragement and support constantly extended to loyal subjects who adhered to theil· allegiance; and although the power to make
war existed ex.elusively in the king, and of course this personal war was
carried on under his authority, and a partial exercise of the war power, no
captures of the ships or cargo of the rebels as enemies' property ou the sea,
-,r confiscation in prize courts as rights of war, took place until qfler the passa_qe of the Act of Parliament.. Until the passage of the Act, the Amexican
subjects were not regarded as enemies in the sense of the law of nations.
The distinction between loyal and 1·ebel subjects was constantly observed.
That act pro,·idcd fot the capture and confiscation of their property as if
the same were the property of open enemies. For the first time, the distinction [between loyal and rebel subjects] was obliterated.
" So the war carried on by tbe P1·eside11t against the insurrectionary districts in tbe Southern States, as in the case of the king of Great B1·itain in
the American Re,·olution, was a personal wru· against those in rebellion, and
with encouragement and support of loyal citizens with a ,·iew to their cooperation and aid in suppressing the insurgents, with this diflerence: as the
wm·-making power belonged to the king, he might ha,·e recognized or
declared the war, at the begi11ning, to be a civit war, whiclt would draw after
it all the rigMs of a belligerent; but in the case of the President no such
powe,· existed. The war therefore, from necessity, was a z,ersonal war until
Cungress assembled and acted upon this state of things. Down to this
period the only enemy recognized by the government was the perso11
engaged in the rebellion; all others were peaceful citizens entitled to all
the privileges of citizens under the constitution. Certainly it cannot be said
that the President has the power to conYcrt a !oral citizen into a belligerent
enemy, or confiscate his \lroperty as enemy's property. Congress assembled,
on call for an extm session, the 4th of July, 1861, and among the.first acts
passed was one in which the President was authorized, by proclamation, to
interdict all trnde and intercourse between all the inhabitants of States in
insurrection and the rest of the United States, rnbjecting vessel and cargo
to capture and condemnation as prize, and also to direct the ca1>turc of auy
ship or Yessel belonging i,1' whole or in pnrt to any inho.bitant of a State
whose inhabitants are declared by the proclamation to be in a state of ii1sm·rection, found at sea, or in any pm·t of the rest of the United States. (Act
of Congress 13th July, 1861, § 5, 6.) The fourth section authorized the
President to close any port in a collection district obstructed so that the
rernnue could not he collected, and prol'ided for the capture and condemnation of any vessel attempting to enter.
"1'l,is act of Congress we [that is to say, all the dissenting judges) tltink
i·ecognized a state of civil wai· between the government and the Co11federnte
Stales, and made it territo1·ial.
. "It is only urg~nt necessities of the government, arising from the magmtude of the resistance, that can excuse the conversion of the personal
i_nto a territorial war, and thus confound all di,iiuclion betwec-n guilt am:l
innocence.
" We agree, therefore, tliat the Act of July 13th, 1861, recognized a state
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of civil tear bet,ceen the yuceni111e11t and the people of the Statu described 111

that p1·oclamatio11.
",ve ao-ree, when such a war [cidl war) is recognized, or declared to
exist, by the war-making power. but not otherwise, it is the duly rif Court11
to follo10 the decision of the poldical power of the youmment."
From the foregoing opinion of the judges who cli~sented from the opinion of the majority of the CoU1·t, it will be seen that the Court were tmanimo1111 on several great questions trcnted of in the preceding work.
The
judges all agree in con~idl'ring a cfoil tear (with all the co11seq11e11ccs to the
residents of tl1e seceding States of a public territorial 1car) to have existed
since the act of July 13th, 1861, and still to exist. 'l'he question on which
the judges differed was, whether the rebellion was or was not a civil territorial war prior to tl,i11 .;let of Congress.
Among the points thus authoritatively settled by agreement of all the
j udges, a1·e these : ·
1. Since July 13th, 1861, there bas existed between the United States
and the Confederate States a cicil, tei-rilorial tear.
2. That the united St.ates, bince that time, haYe full belligerent right,
against all pe,·sons residing in tlie rebellious districts.
3. That whether the inhabitants of the rebellious districts arc guil tr or
innorent, loyal or disloyal, such persons are, in the eye of the law, belligerem enemies, and they a11d their propertv a,·e su~iecl to the lml's of 1car.
"The laws of war, whether the war be civil or i11te,· genies. com•crts every
citize11 of the hostile State into a public enemy, and treats him accordingly,
whatever ma) haye been his pre,·1ous conduct."
4. All tlte rigltls qfwar now may be la:u:fully and constitutionally exercised
against all the i11/iabita11ts of the seceded States.
The following extract from the Rame opinion shows what some of these
bellir1ere:nt rigltls are : " The legal consequences resulting from a st-ate of war between t\\ o
countries, at this day, are well understood, and will be found described in
e very appro,·ed work on the subject of international law. Tho people of
the two countries immediately become 1memies of each other; all intercourse, commercial or othertcise, between them 1111lmc.ful ; all contracts
existing at the commencement of the war su.,pended, and all made durillg it.,
existence utterly void. The insurance of enemies' property, the drawiuµ- of
bills of exchange or purchase in the enemy's country, the remission of bills
or money to it, are illegal and Yoid. Exi~ting partnerships between citizens
or subjects of the two countries are dissoh-ed, ~nd in fine, illterdictio11 qf
trade and i11tcrco111·se, direct or indfrect, is absolute and complete by the
mere force and e.:fJect of war itself. All tltc 7,roperty of the people of
t1co cowili'ies, Oil la11d or sea, is subject to capfare a,ul confiscation 5v tl,e
ndrerse party, as enemies' property, with certain qualifications as it re8pectq
property ou land. (8 Crancb, 110, Brnw1i v~. United Stales.) All ti-eatiu1
l,efwce11 the belligei·ent parties are annulled. The ports of the respecti, e
eountaies may be blockaded. and letters of marque and reprisal granted
as rights of war, and the law of prize, as defined by the law of nations,
comes into full and complete operntiou, resulting from mru:itime captures
jm·e belli. Wa1· also eflccts a change in the 11111tual ,·elations of all S tales
or countries, not clirectly, as in case of belligerents, but immediately and
indirectly, though they take no part in the contest, but remain neutral.
·· The great and pen-ading change in the condition of a country, and in
the relations of alt lier citizens all(l subjects, external cmd i11ler11al, from n
state of peace, is the immediate effect and result of a state of war."
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